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ABSTRACT 
This thesis aims to investigate earnings quality, by employing recent methodologies. 
The thesis has three empirical chapters. 
The first empirical chapter is about the profile of chief executive officers (CEO) and 
earnings quality. Based on previous studies, I introduce a measure of CEO profile, 
denoted PSCORE, which aggregates nine personal characteristics of CEOs. Data for 
the construction of the PSCORE are publicly available on the CEOs’ curriculum vitae 
and firms’ financial statements. Following previous studies, I measure earnings quality 
in different ways: abnormal accruals (Jones, 1991; Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney, 
1995; Peasnell, Pope, and Young, 2000b); abnormal cash flows, abnormal production 
costs, and abnormal discretionary expenditures (Roychowdhury, 2006); and deviations 
of the first digits of figures reported in financial statements from what are expected by 
Benford’s Law (Amiram, Bozanic, and Rouen, 2015). Using a sample of UK listed 
companies for 2005-2012, I find positive relationships between the PSCORE and all 
proxies for earnings quality. Also, the evidence shows that the relationships are 
stronger when CEOs’ equity-based compensation incentives are higher. The findings 
suggest that the PSCORE can be useful to signal a red flag of poor earnings quality. 
The study has some implications for practitioners. 
The second empirical chapter examines the role of banking expertise on the board of 
directors on accounting conservatism. Using the working histories in banks of 
individual directors on the board, I measure banking expertise on the board by 
accumulating the numbers of years and the numbers of banks individual directors have 
worked for. Using a sample of UK listed companies for 2005-2012, I show that the 
2 
 
measures of banking expertise on the board are negatively associated with firm-year 
accounting conservatism. Additional analyses indicate that the relationships between 
accounting conservatism and banking expertise on the board are more pronounced for 
firms which face high bankruptcy risk and have high financial leverage. A possible 
explanation is that directors with banking expertise provide the board with information 
about the market-level demand for accounting conservatism and they also bring 
interpersonal networks in the banking industry that can act as a private communication 
channel in debt contracting, leading to a reduction in accounting conservatism which 
is documented in recent studies as costly for borrowing firms. The study makes a 
significant contribution to the existing literature, especially in that it offers an 
innovative way to measure banking expertise on the board and it complements the 
work of Erkens, Subramanyam, and Zhang (2014) and Bonetti, Ipino, and Parbonetti 
(2017) by providing further evidence on the relevance of boards of directors for 
accounting conservatism. 
The last empirical chapter is about applying Benford’s Law to study the earnings 
quality of UK listed companies. I employ Benford’s Law, which is the law of digit 
distributions, to examine the first digits of financial statement items of UK listed 
companies. I find that the first digits of figures reported in financial statements of UK 
companies for 2005-2012 follow Benford’s Law at the firm-specific level and market 
level. Next, the evidence suggests income statements may contain more errors (as 
evidenced by higher deviations of first digits from what are expected by Benford’s 
Law) than those of balance sheets and cash flows statements. Also, I find that earnings 
management and accounting conservatism are two explanations for first-digit 
deviations. While previous studies support the positive relationship between earnings 
3 
 
management and first-digit deviations, the study is the first which provides an 
alternative explanation for first-digit deviations from Benford’s Law. I suggest that a 
plausible explanation is that accounting conservatism introduces biases to financial 
statements, which make accounting figures deviate from the law of digit distributions. 
The results have implications for auditors. 
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1. Chapter 1: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE THESIS 
1.1. Introduction 
The literature on earnings quality has been emerging for several decades. Researchers 
have been interested in responding to the call from the United States (US) Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) and its worries about the phenomenon of “the numbers 
game” (Levitt Jr, 1998) in listed companies in the 1990s. The accounting scandals in the 
2000s and the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) in the US have also reshaped 
the research on earnings quality (DeFond, 2010). The numbers game, which refers to the 
manipulation of earnings reported in financial statements, raises concerns about the 
earnings quality of listed companies. That is because accounting scandals normally begin 
with inflating earnings up to four years prior to the collapse of corporations (e.g., García 
Lara, Garcia Osma, and Neophytou, 2009). Consequently, investors may suffer losses 
before accounting manipulations are detected.  
A feature of research in accounting following the call has been building, validating and 
improving empirical models to estimate the quality of earnings (Dechow, Ge, and 
Schrand, 2010). For example, researchers have built models to estimate earnings 
management, a measure of poor earnings quality, by using accruals under accounting 
standard choices (e.g., Jones, 1991; Dechow et al., 1995; Peasnell et al., 2000b; Dechow 
and Dichev, 2002; Kothari, Leone, and Wasley, 2005) or by using real business 
transactions such as sale discounts, over productions and cutdown discretionary 
expenditure (Roychowdhury, 2006). A common aspect of these empirical models is that 
they rely on firm characteristics. Despite their importance, the models are subject to 
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considerable criticism, e.g. due to model misspecification (Holthausen, Larcker, and 
Sloan, 1995; Fields, Lys, and Vincent, 2001; Dechow et al., 2010; Ball, 2013).  
This thesis contributes to the research strand on earnings quality by employing recent 
methodologies. Relying on previous research (e.g., Wells, 2002; Francis, Huang, 
Rajgopal, and Zang, 2008; Malmendier and Tate, 2009; Jiang, Petroni, and Yanyan 
Wang, 2010; Huang, Rose-Green, and Lee, 2012; Kuang, Qin, and Wielhouwer, 2014; 
Ali and Zhang, 2015), the thesis proposes a new way to study the quality of earnings by 
using certain personal traits of chief executive officers which are more likely to be linked 
to earnings quality. Also, the thesis uses recently developed measures of earnings quality 
based on mathematics i.e., deviations of first digits of figures reported in financial 
statements (Amiram et al., 2015; Nigrini, 2015), rather than using model-based measures, 
so that the findings would contribute to the debate on earnings quality not only in the UK 
but in the world. Next, the thesis proposes a new way to measure banking expertise of 
boards of directors using working history in the banking industry of individual directors 
and study it with accounting conservatism. The proposed measure of banking expertise 
takes into account past and present working experience in banks of all board members, 
which overcomes limitations of recent studies considering only the presence of bankers 
or ex-bankers on boards of directors (Erkens et al., 2014; Bonetti et al., 2017). 
The thesis has three empirical chapters. The first empirical chapter offers an innovative 
way to examine earnings quality using the profile of chief executive officers (CEO). The 
second empirical chapter uses working history in the banking industry of all individual 
directors on the boards of directors to study accounting conservatism. The third empirical 
chapter employs a recent methodology proposed by Amiram et al. (2015) and Nigrini 
(2015), which relies on deviations of first digits of figures reported in financial statements 
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from what are expected by Benford’s Law, to study the quality of earnings of UK listed 
companies. 
The next section explains the features of data used in the thesis, followed by a brief 
introduction to the three empirical chapters. 
1.2. Empirical settings 
The thesis uses a sample of UK listed companies from 2005 to 2012 to examine earnings 
quality. There are several reasons which make this an interesting study. First, the thesis 
contributes to the debate on earnings quality in the UK by employing recent 
methodologies to study earnings quality. There are some institutional differences between 
the UK market and the US market, where most studies on earnings quality come from. 
Pope and Rees (1992) find that financial statements under UK General Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP) and US GAAP both have information on earnings after 
controlling for reconciliation between those GAAPs. Pope and Walker (1999) show that 
UK GAAP have higher levels of discretions regarding accounting treatments for 
extraordinary items, leading to differences in timeliness of earnings between those 
GAAPs. 1 From 2005, UK firms have used the International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) as a result of the IFRS mandatory adoption in Europe, and there is 
mixed evidence on whether earnings quality has been improved following the IFRS 
adoption. Zeghal, Chtourou, and Fourati (2012) report that IFRS adoption results in less 
earnings management and higher accounting conservatism in 15 European countries 
                                                 
1 It is important to note that the studies of Pope and Rees (1992) and Pope and Walker (1999) also 
imply that evidence on earnings quality of studies in the US can apply to research in the UK.  
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(including the UK). In contrast, Ahmed, Neel, and Wang (2013) use a matched sample 
between IFRS-adoption firms and non-adoption firms with similar legal enforcement and 
firm characteristics and find that IFRS-adoption firms exhibit higher income smoothing, 
higher levels of aggressive abnormal accruals, and lower timeliness of earnings. The 
contradictory findings between Zeghal et al. (2012) and Ahmed et al. (2013) might be 
attributable to different model specifications to estimate earnings quality, as explained in 
Section 1.1. This thesis does not attempt to reconcile the mixed findings of previous 
studies. Instead, it employs recent methodologies to provide further evidence on earnings 
quality in the UK.  
Second, the thesis offers an innovative way to study earnings quality which is relevant 
for research not only in the UK but also in the US and worldwide. As classified by 
Dechow et al. (2010), studies on earnings quality in the US may use observable indicators 
of misstated earnings, namely accounting restatements databases by the US Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) and the Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases 
(AAER) by the SEC.2 However, previous studies show that accounting restatements from 
the GAO can be a noisy proxy for accounting fraud because the database includes both 
restatements following SEC allegations and other restatements which result from 
unintentional errors or retrospective adjustments required by accounting standards 
(Hennes, Leone, and Miller, 2008; Dechow et al., 2010; Plumlee and Yohn, 2010). 
Similarly, the AAER sample is biased because it ignores aggressive earnings management 
within the GAAP, includes mostly large firms, as the SEC might be worried about the 
overall consequences of accounting manipulations on the capital market, and does not 
                                                 
2 Section 2.1.2.3.1 and Section 2.1.2.3.2 will discuss in more details these measures of earnings 
quality. 
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differentiate intentional violations of accounting standards from unintentional violations, 
e.g. violations due to differences in interpretation of accounting principles and rules 
(Dechow et al., 2010). Next, there are increasing concerns that model-based measures of 
earnings quality, e.g. abnormal accruals (e.g., Jones, 1991; Dechow et al., 1995; Kothari 
et al., 2005), are biased due to poor model specifications (Fields et al., 2001; Dechow et 
al., 2010; Ball, 2013). Therefore, there is a promising path for future studies. Using recent 
methodologies to study earnings quality becomes even more important in the context of 
the UK where data on observable indicators of misstated firms comparable to US 
accounting restatements and the AAER are limited. In the UK, the Financial Reporting 
Review Panel (FRRP) releases firm-specific announcements for investigation of 
allegations regarding accounting standards, but the sample is very small. For example, 
the FRRP discloses only 70 cases of accounting allegations from January 1995 and 
December 2012 (Nguyen, 2016).  
The thesis uses the sample period from 2005 to 2012 for several reasons. I start with 2005 
because UK listed firms adopted the IFRS beginning in 2005, so the findings are less 
likely affected by consequences of IFRS adoption on earnings quality. Also, in 2012, the 
Financial Reporting Council (FRC) (2012) released the UK Corporate Governance Code 
to replace the old version issued in 1992 by the Cadbury Committee. Thus, the research 
period ends in 2012 to avoid the effects of changes in corporate governance on the quality 
of earnings in general. 
1.3. Three empirical chapters 
The thesis has three independent empirical chapters. This section briefly introduces each 
empirical chapter. 
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1.3.1. Chapter 3: CEO profile and earnings quality 
Motivated by limitations of model-based measures of earnings quality (Holthausen et al., 
1995; Fields et al., 2001; Dechow et al., 2010; Ball, 2013), I offer the PSCORE, which 
aggregates nine personal characteristics of chief executive officers, to study earnings 
quality. The PSCORE is a composite score based on publicly available data on CEOs. 
The PSCORE captures financial expertise (measured by experience as a CEO, previous 
working experience as a chief financial officer, and finance-related qualifications), 
reputation (measured by early years of service in the firm, performance during the last 
three years of tenure, and press coverage), internal power (measured by whether the CEO 
serves as the chairperson and whether the CEO serves as a founder of firms), and age of 
CEOs. The chapter hypothesises that the PSCORE is positively associated with other 
established proxies for earnings quality. 
The chapter employs three types of measures of earnings quality: (i) accrual earnings 
management, measured by abnormal accruals (Jones, 1991; Dechow et al., 1995; Peasnell 
et al., 2000b); (ii) real earnings management, measured by abnormal cash flows, abnormal 
production costs, and abnormal discretionary expenditures (real earnings management) 
(Roychowdhury, 2006); (iii) financial statement errors, measured by deviations of first 
digits of figures reported in financial statements from what are expected by Benford’s 
Law (Amiram et al., 2015; Nigrini, 2015). The analyses, derived from a sample of 3,395 
firm-year observations of listed companies on the London Stock Exchange from 2005 to 
2012, show positive associations between PSCORE and the established proxies for 
earnings quality. Specifically, the evidence indicates that the PSCORE increases 
monotonically with an increase in measures of earnings quality. The associations between 
PSCORE and abnormal accruals, abnormal cash flows, abnormal production costs, 
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abnormal discretionary expenditures, and deviations of first digits from Benford’s Law 
remain significant after controlling for major factors which affect the quality of earnings. 
Additional analyses demonstrate that the relationships between PSCORE and proxies for 
earnings quality are more pronounced when CEOs have higher equity-based 
compensation incentives. The results suggest that the PSCORE could signal the quality 
of earnings reported in financial statements. 
The research contributes to the literature and practice in several ways. First, data used to 
construct the PSCORE are publicly available and mostly collected from the curriculum 
vitae of CEOs; thus, the application of the research is promising. Second, this is the first 
study which aggregates various characteristics of CEOs into a single index to signal the 
quality of earnings. Third, the research is the first of its kind to provide evidence that the 
profile of CEOs can be associated with many measures of earnings quality, e.g. accrual 
earnings management, real earnings management, and financial statement errors 
measured by deviations of first digits from Benford’s Law. Practitioners could value the 
PSCORE because it is highly practical and can signal the misrepresentation of financial 
statements regardless of whether the misstatements result from intentional or 
unintentional acts. The PSCORE could be a useful tool for investment professionals, 
boards of directors, auditors, and regulators to assess the risks of poor earnings quality.   
1.3.2. Chapter 4: Accounting conservativism and banking expertise 
on boards of directors 
Previous studies show that accounting conservatism is helpful for contracting demand 
and for litigation, regulation, and taxation (Watts, 2003a). In debt contracting, accounting 
conservatism provides lending banks with an early indication of creditworthiness of 
borrowing firms so that the banks can take timely actions to protect their interests. Recent 
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studies further argue that the presence of a banker on the board of directors affects demand 
for accounting conservatism because bankers can act as a private information-sharing 
channel between borrowing firms and lending banks (Erkens et al., 2014) as a corporate 
governance mechanism (Bonetti et al., 2017). 
This chapter contributes to this path of research by examining the role of banking 
expertise on the board of directors on accounting conservatism. The chapter provides an 
innovative way to measure banking expertise based on the working history in banks of 
all individual directors on the board. While previous studies consider only the presence 
of bankers or ex-bankers on the boards of directors (Erkens et al., 2014; Bonetti et al., 
2017), the proposed measure of banking expertise in this chapter accumulates past and 
present banking experience of all board members. There are some reasons to hypothesise 
that there is a negative relationship between banking expertise on the board and 
accounting conservatism. First, directors with banking expertise could have an 
information advantage about the market-level demand for accounting conservatism; 
hence, having them on the board can help non-financial firms avoid excessive 
conservatism. Second, directors with banking expertise often possess interpersonal 
networks in the banking industry (e.g., Engelberg, Gao, and Parsons, 2012) that could act 
as a private communication channel in debt contracting, resulting in less demand for 
accounting conservatism at the firm-specific level.  
The chapter tests the hypothesis that the banking expertise of boards of directors is 
negatively related to accounting conservatism, using a sample of companies listed on the 
London Stock Exchange from 2005 to 2012. The findings support the hypothesis that 
banking expertise on the board helps to reduce accounting conservatism. Specifically, the 
chapter finds a statistically significant and negative relationship between firm-year 
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accounting conservatism (Basu, 1997; Khan and Watts, 2009; García Lara, García Osma, 
and Penalva, 2016) and different measures of banking expertise on the board which are 
constructed from working history in the banking industry of individual directors on the 
board of directors. Additional analyses show that the effects of banking expertise on the 
board on accounting conservatism are more pronounced for firms with high financial 
leverage and firms with high bankruptcy risk. 
The chapter makes significant contributions to the existing literature. First, it shows that 
not only the presence of a banker or ex-banker on the board of directors (Erkens et al., 
2014; Bonetti et al., 2017) but also the working history in the banking industry of board 
members affects the demand for accounting conservatism. Second, the findings may be 
more generalised because there is no restriction in the chapter’s sample construction, and 
they are less likely to be affected by changes in accounting standards in the UK. The 
results have some implications for boards of directors.  
1.3.3. Chapter 5: Benford’s Law, earnings management, and 
accounting conservatism: the UK evidence 
Chapter 5 uses Benford’s Law to study the earnings quality of UK listed companies. 
Benford’s Law refers to the distributional probability of the digits of numbers in a data 
set. The law indicates that every digit will appear with a certain frequency in the data set, 
and deviations from the expected frequencies are signals of the existence of errors or 
biases (Nigrini, 1996; Amiram et al., 2015; Nigrini, 2015). 
There are emerging accounting studies which use Benford’s Law to study errors or biases 
in financial statements, e.g. earnings management and fraud (Carslaw, 1988; Thomas, 
1989; Nigrini, 1996; Caneghem, 2002, 2004; Lin, Wu, Fang, and Wun, 2014; Amiram et 
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al., 2015; Nigrini, 2015). The reason for the prominent application of Benford’s Law is 
that it helps to overcome the limitations of model-based measures of earnings quality 
(e.g., Fields et al., 2001; Dechow et al., 2010; Ball, 2013) or sample selection biases in 
accounting restatements by the GAO or AAER by the SEC (e.g., Dechow et al., 2010). 
The chapter hypothesises and finds that the first digits of figures reported in financial 
statements of UK listed companies from 2005 to 2012 follow Benford’s Law at the firm-
specific level and at the market level. Also, the results indicate that, compared with those 
in balance sheets and cash flow statements, items in income statements have larger 
deviations of first digits from what are expected by Benford’s Law, suggesting that 
income statements may contain more errors or biases. Next, the chapter finds a positive 
association between deviations from Benford’s Law and accrual earnings management 
(Jones, 1991; Dechow et al., 1995; Peasnell et al., 2000b) and accounting conservatism 
(Basu, 1997; Khan and Watts, 2009; García Lara et al., 2016). Further analysis shows that 
the relationship between deviations from Benford’s Law and accounting conservatism 
exists only when there is an absence of a Big-Four auditor, implying that conservatism-
related purposeful intervention by management causes biases in financial statements, 
leading to higher deviations of first digits from what are expected by Benford’s Law. 
This chapter makes at least three significant contributions to the existing literature. First, 
the chapter is the first paper showing that the first digits of all figures reported in financial 
statements follow first-digit distributions expected by Benford’s Law. The approach 
applying Benford’s Law on all items in financial statements (Amiram et al., 2015) 
overcomes the limitations of previous studies (Caneghem, 2002, 2004) which focus on 
only an individual item in financial statements such as earnings before tax. The approach 
has at least three major advantages because (i) it gives a chance to detect errors or fraud 
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in assets, liabilities, incomes, expenses and cash flows, (ii) it makes errors or fraud in 
financial statements are more likely to be detected due to the double-entry accounting 
system, and (iii) it can flag up errors or fraud in accounts which do not directly affect net 
income because it takes into account deviations of first digits of all items reported 
financial statements. Second, the study provides further evidence for the notion that 
earnings management causes deviations of the first digits of financial statements of UK 
companies (Caneghem, 2002, 2004). However, while Caneghem (2002) and rely on one 
item in financial statements (pre-tax income), the chapter uses a recent methodology 
(Amiram et al., 2015; Nigrini, 2015) which relies on first digits of all items reported in 
financial statements. Third, the chapter is the first of its kind to provide an alternative 
explanation for deviations of first digits from Benford’s Law. While earnings 
management has been widely documented as a source of deviations (Carslaw, 1988; 
Caneghem, 2002, 2004; Amiram et al., 2015), the chapter shows that accounting 
conservatism also leads to deviations of first digits. This evidence is in line with 
increasing concerns that managers could manipulate conservatism-related accounting 
choices for different purposes (LaFond and Watts, 2008; Zhang, 2008). The results of the 
chapter have some implications for auditors.  
The thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 overviews the concept of earnings quality, 
which is the foundation for three empirical chapters. Chapter 3 is the first empirical study 
“CEO profile and earnings quality”. Chapter 4 is the second empirical study “Accounting 
conservatism and banking expertise on boards of directors”. Chapter 5 is the third 
empirical study “Benford’s Law, earnings management, and accounting conservatism: 
the UK evidence”. Chapter 6 summarises the main findings of the thesis, limitations, and 
suggestions for future studies.  
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2. Chapter 2: AN OVERVIEW OF EARNINGS QUALITY 
This chapter provides an overview of the concept of Earnings Quality, which is the 
foundation for the three empirical chapters. The chapter begins with an introduction to 
Earnings Quality in Section 2.1, including definitions of Earnings Quality, empirical 
proxies for Earnings Quality, and recent methodological advancements in estimating 
Earnings Quality. Then more detail is provided about Earnings Management (Section 2.2) 
and Accounting Conservatism (Section 2.3), which are the main focuses of three 
empirical chapters. Section 2.4 provides concluding remarks. 
2.1. Introduction 
There has been a growing body of research focusing on determinants, consequences, and 
empirical models to estimate earnings quality (e.g., Healy and Wahlen, 1999; Dechow 
and Skinner, 2000; McNichols, 2000; Fields et al., 2001; Schipper and Vincent, 2003; 
Lo, 2008; Holthausen, 2009; Dechow et al., 2010; DeFond, 2010). A fundamental aspect 
of empirical models to estimate earnings quality is that they rely on the definition of 
earnings quality. The following sections discuss definitions of earnings quality and 
empirical proxies for earnings quality. 
2.1.1. Definitions of earnings quality 
For several decades, the meaning of earnings quality has firstly referred to the usefulness 
of earnings reported in financial statements for stock valuation (Dechow et al., 2010). The 
use of the terminology “earnings quality” can be traced to the 1930s when earnings per 
share were used in security valuation (Dechow et al., 2010). Lev (1989) is also of the 
view that earnings are useful if earnings information is used by investors. Dechow and 
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Schrand (2004, p. 5) provide an early comprehensive definition of earnings quality as 
this: “earnings to be of high quality when the earnings number accurately annuitizes the 
intrinsic value of the firm”. This definition relies on the use of earnings information for 
equity valuation, and it highlights the importance of earnings in depicting current 
performance and in predicting the future performance of a company.  
Dechow et al. (2010) take a broad view of earnings quality which is built on the concept 
of earnings in accounting standards. Dechow et al. (2010, p. 344) state that “higher quality 
earnings provide more information about the features of a firm’s financial performance 
that are relevant to a specific decision made by a specific decision-maker”. The authors 
note three important aspects of this definition. First, the quality of earnings depends on 
the usefulness of the earnings information for financial statement users’ specific 
decisions. The definition implies that users of financial statements use earnings 
information not only for equity valuation but also for other purposes such as tax purposes 
or purchases. Therefore, it is likely that earnings quality may vary for different users, 
given their needs. Second, earnings quality is conditional on whether reported earnings 
can describe the unobservable financial performance of the reporting entities. Because a 
“true” picture of performance (or fundamental performance) cannot be observed, users 
rely on financial statements in general, and reported earnings in particular, to have an idea 
about fundamental performance. Earnings are of high quality if it better reflects firms’ 
fundamental performance. Third, earnings quality is affected by both the relevance of 
earnings information on firms’ the financial performance for the decision-making process 
and the quality of the accounting system to record performance. In general, the broad 
definition of Dechow et al. (2010) embraces the usefulness of earnings for security 
valuation (e.g., Lev, 1989; Dechow and Schrand, 2004) and for any other decisions which 
rely on earnings information.  
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To provide a better understanding, Dechow et al. (2010) also reshape the ideas about how 
much earnings should be presented in financial statements. They define reported earnings 
as a function of unobservable “X”, where X are factors determining the financial 
performance of companies. In their definition, the accounting system plays a major role 
in reporting unobservable financial performance factors in the form of observable 
earnings. In other words, the accounting system helps to convert the unobservable X to 
earnings reported in financial statements. The first importance of the definition of 
earnings is that the X factors are not related to a specific stakeholder. The definition can 
be applied for short-term or long-term debtholders, shareholders, and other stakeholders. 
This inference about users of earnings information is consistent with the general purpose 
of financial statements under accounting standards (e.g., Financial Accounting Standards 
Board (FASB), 2010; International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), 2010, 2018), 
which is to provide financial information for various users. The second importance is that 
earnings is a function of unobservable factors determining financial performance, not a 
“perfect” or “true” measure of financial performance. Dechow et al. (2010) provide three 
explanations for “imperfect” earnings: (i) it is unlikely that a financial statement can 
provide information that fits all decisions of all users, who range from finance providers 
(e.g., debtholders and shareholders) to other users (e.g., suppliers and other stakeholders); 
(ii) pre-determined accounting choices to measure X factors are limited, and thus it also 
is unlikely that a principle or a rule can fit all companies in all situations; and (iii) 
accounting standards allow the use of accounting estimates and judgments to measure 
unobservable X factors, a process which may introduce errors or bias (e.g., earnings 
management). This also has an implication for research on the use of accrual models to 
estimate abnormal accruals, with the notion that abnormal accruals erode earnings quality 
regardless of whether they result from bias or errors (Dechow et al., 2010). Taking a broad 
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perspective, this thesis applies the definition of Dechow et al. (2010) to study the earnings 
quality of UK listed companies.     
2.1.2. Empirical proxies for earnings quality 
Most empirical models to estimate earnings quality rely on the fundamental 
characteristics of earnings quality. Dechow et al. (2010) classify proxies for earnings 
quality into three types: (i) earnings properties (e.g., earnings persistence, abnormal 
accruals, earnings smoothness, asymmetric timeliness and timely loss recognition, and 
target beating) (ii) responsiveness of investors to earnings (e.g., earnings response 
coefficient), and (iii) observed indicators of misstated earnings (e.g., AAER, accounting 
restatements, and internal control weakness reports). The next sections briefly introduce 
influential studies in each type of proxy for earnings quality as well as its determinants 
and consequences before focusing on the main proxies of interest, i.e., earnings 
management and accounting conservatism. 
2.1.2.1. Earnings properties 
2.1.2.1.1. Earnings persistence 
Research on earnings persistence relies on the assumption that equity valuation models 
with the input of more persistent earnings result in better valuation outcomes (Dechow et 
al., 2010). More persistent earnings are an indication of a higher quality of earnings. The 
logic underlying the construction of empirical models to estimate earnings persistence is 
that current earnings provide good information for the estimation of future earnings when 
earnings are persistent, and more persistent earnings result in smaller errors in valuation. 
In some models, current earnings have two components: cash and accruals (e.g., Sloan, 
1996). 
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A majority of research in this area examines determinants of the persistence of earnings 
(Dechow et al., 2010). Sloan (1996) finds that the cash component of earnings is more 
persistent than the accrual component of earnings. The author explains that the 
measurement of fundamental performance using accruals may induce errors or bias, 
which makes the accrual component of earnings less persistent. The relatively lower 
persistence of the accrual component may be affected by an increase in firms’ 
fundamental performance (Fairfield, Whisenant, and Yohn, 2003), changes in operating 
and financial leverages (Nissim and Penman, 2001), or extreme accruals which are caused 
by accounting distortions (Richardson, Sloan, Soliman, and Tuna, 2006).  
The empirical research further examines the effect of specific components of accruals on 
earnings persistence. For example, Richardson, Sloan, Soliman, and Tuna (2005) find 
that, compared with short-term accruals, long-term accruals result in more persistent 
earnings. They also find that accruals from financial assets and liabilities are more 
persistent than accruals from operating assets and liabilities. There is evidence that the 
factors that drive the low persistence of the accrual component are inventory accruals 
(Lev and Thiagarajan, 1993; Abarbanell and Bushee, 1997), accrual adjustments for 
special items (Fairfield, Sweeney, and Yohn, 1996; Dechow and Ge, 2006), and large 
positive book-tax differences which result from inflating reported earnings (Blaylock, 
Shevlin, and Wilson, 2012). Prior studies provide mixed evidence about relationships 
between receivable accruals and earnings persistence (e.g., Lev and Thiagarajan, 1993; 
Abarbanell and Bushee, 1997).  
Another research direction examines the consequences of earnings persistence in the 
equity market. Early studies show that more persistence of earnings results in higher 
market reactions (e.g., Kormendi and Lipe, 1987; Collins and Kothari, 1989; Easton and 
20 
 
Zmijewski, 1989). Later research constructs models to predict earnings persistence and 
examines the awareness of investors about the determinants of earnings persistence. For 
example, Sloan (1996) indicates that investors do not fully understand that the accrual 
component of earnings is less persistent than the cash component of earnings. He also 
shows that a trading strategy with abnormal accruals leads to abnormal stock returns. 
Later studies support the findings of Sloan (1996) (e.g., Xie, 2001; Fairfield et al., 2003; 
Desai, Rajgopal, and Venkatachalam, 2004; Richardson et al., 2005; Kraft, Leone, and 
Wasley, 2006; Zhang, 2007; Khan, 2008). The existing literature also documents 
evidence on how investors respond to earnings persistence of specific components of 
accruals, e.g. write-offs accruals (Bartov, Lindahl, and Ricks, 1998; Dechow and Ge, 
2006), loan loss (Beaver and Engel, 1996), or a cut in research and development expenses 
(Penman and Xiao-Jun, 2002). Last but not least, researchers provide evidence that the 
information environment and the ability to process the information of investors affect 
their responses to the earnings persistence of an accrual component (Collins, Gong, and 
Hribar, 2003; Louis and Robinson, 2005; Levi, 2007). 
2.1.2.1.2. Abnormal accruals 
The second proxy for earnings quality is abnormal accruals. A large and growing body of 
literature on earnings quality focuses particularly on developing empirical models to 
differentiate “abnormal accruals” and “normal accruals” (Dechow et al., 2010). Under 
accounting standards, accruals help to report earnings based on the recognition of incomes 
and expenses at the time they occur rather than at the time they are received or paid. 
Normal accruals are accruals needed to reflect firms’ fundamental performance, but they 
are unobservable. Given that accruals help to reflect firms’ fundamental performance, 
they can be estimated from firms’ characteristics such as revenues, fixed assets (Jones, 
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1991; Dechow et al., 1995), returns on assets (Kothari et al., 2005) or cash flows from 
operations (Dechow and Dichev, 2002). Differences between actual accruals and normal 
accruals are abnormal accruals. The underlying reason for the use of abnormal accruals 
as a proxy for earnings quality is that if the models are appropriate in estimating normal 
accruals, abnormal accruals are caused by distortions in financial statements such as 
misapplications of accounting standards or bias such as earnings management (Dechow 
et al., 2010). Higher abnormal accruals indicate lower earnings quality. Because abnormal 
accruals are one of the main interests of this thesis, detail on accrual-based models will 
be provided in Section 2.2. The following paragraph only overviews the relationship 
between abnormal accruals and earnings persistence. 
Several lines of evidence suggest that, compared to normal accruals, abnormal accruals 
have lower earnings persistence (Xie, 2001; Dechow and Dichev, 2002). The reason is 
that abnormal accruals may include extreme accruals which contain measurement errors, 
which in turn reduce the persistence of earnings (Dechow and Dichev, 2002). In addition, 
a study of the relationship between abnormal accruals and investor responses to earnings 
surprise by DeFond and Park (2001) shows that abnormal accruals reduce the market 
responses. The evidence suggests that abnormal accruals are less likely to be used to 
predict firms’ future performance because investors may recognise that abnormal accruals 
are not reliable. A trading strategy with abnormal accruals yields higher abnormal returns 
(Xie, 2001). Last but not least, Bowen, Rajgopal, and Venkatachalam (2008) find that the 
weaknesses of corporate governance affect abnormal accruals and that the effect is useful 
to predict firms’ future performance. 
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2.1.2.1.3. Earnings smoothness 
From the perspective of standard setters, earnings smoothness, which is a result of the 
accrual basis of accounting standards, helps to improve the usefulness of earnings 
information (Dechow et al., 2010). The Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting 
(IASB, 2010, 2018) indicates that accruals help to depict better past and future financial 
performance because the timing of cash flows received or paid may be different from the 
timing of the events which affect the economic resources and obligations of the reporting 
entities. In other words, accrual accounting helps firms to mitigate the effects of the 
differences in the timing of cash flows on financial performance. Accrual accounting 
helps to smooth earnings and therefore, helps to enhance the predictability of earnings 
information. However, Dechow et al. (2010) argue that accrual accounting provides an 
opportunity to smooth earnings as well as to hide true fundamental performance; thus 
earnings smoothness can be of lower earnings quality because it reduces the usefulness 
of earnings information. 
A large body of literature investigates the determinants and consequences of earnings 
smoothness. Early studies focus on examining under which circumstances firms smooth 
earnings, but they are silent on whether earnings smoothness improves the quality of 
earnings (Dechow et al., 2010). The research which focuses on the consequences of 
earnings smoothness yields mixed evidence. In the context of the US, Tucker and Zarowin 
(2006) measure earnings smoothness by using the negative relationship between changes 
in abnormal accruals and changes in unmanaged earnings and find that earnings 
smoothness improves earnings quality. However, many cross-country studies (e.g., Leuz, 
Nanda, and Wysocki, 2003; Lang, Smith Raedy, and Wilson, 2006; Francis and Wang, 
2008) provide evidence suggesting that earnings smoothness is positively correlated with 
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lower earnings quality, which is a phenomenon in countries which have poor quality of 
accounting standards, less enforcement, low shareholder protections (Leuz et al., 2003). 
2.1.2.1.4. Target beating 
Research on target beating can be classified into two categories: small profits or small 
increases in earnings, and meeting or beating earnings forecasts of analysts. 
2.1.2.1.4.1 Small profits or small increases in earnings 
The academic literature on small profits or small increases in earnings has yielded mixed 
evidence on whether they are an indication of low earnings quality. On the one hand, prior 
research claims that small profits or small increases in earnings are evidence that firms 
manipulate earnings reported in financial statements to meet or beat earnings targets (e.g., 
Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Beaver, McNichols, and Nelson, 2003; Phillips, Pincus, 
and Rego, 2003; Altamuro, Beatty, and Weber, 2005; Jacob and Jorgensen, 2007; 
Kerstein and Rai, 2007; Caramanis and Lennox, 2008). For example, Burgstahler and 
Dichev (1997) document that earnings and changes in earnings have unusual distributions 
around the zero benchmark. In particular, there are unusually low frequencies of small 
losses and small decreases in earnings, but unusually high frequencies of small profits 
and small increases in earnings. Their interpretation is that companies which have 
earnings just below zero or below previous period earnings inflate earnings by an amount 
enough to avoid losses or decreases in earnings. Other studies support the view that 
unusually high frequencies of small profits suggest the existence of earnings management 
because small profits are associated with specific items in financial statements such as 
deferred tax expense (Phillips et al., 2003), premature recognition of revenues (Altamuro 
et al., 2005), and abnormal loss reserves (Beaver et al., 2003). Other determinants of small 
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profits are incentives to manage earnings in the fourth fiscal quarter (Jacob and Jorgensen, 
2007; Kerstein and Rai, 2007) or low audit quality (Caramanis and Lennox, 2008).  
On the other hand, prior studies provide alternative explanations for unusual distributions 
of earnings around zero (e.g., Dechow, Richardson, and Tuna, 2003; Durtschi and Easton, 
2005; Beaver, McNichols, and Nelson, 2007; Durtschi and Easton, 2009; Gilliam, Heflin, 
and Paterson, 2015). Using a large sample, Dechow et al. (2003) do not find that abnormal 
accruals, a common measure of earnings management, in firms with small profits are 
different from that in firms with small losses. If firms inflate earnings to meet the earnings 
targets of zero, abnormal accruals should be higher in firms which have small profits than 
in firms which have small losses. Dechow et al. (2003) explain that the scaling effect 
causes the kinked distributions of earnings because investors use different models to price 
loss firms versus profit firms. Income taxes, special items (Beaver et al., 2007), and 
sample selection bias (Durtschi and Easton, 2005, 2009) can also explain the 
discontinuities of earnings. In a recent study, Gilliam et al. (2015) find that the unusual 
distributions of earnings around zero have existed for at least 25 years, but disappeared 
following the passage of SOX in 2002 and have not returned. In general, there are 
alternative explanations for the “kink” in earnings at the zero benchmark; therefore the 
existence of small profits or small increases in earnings does not necessarily indicate 
earnings management (Dechow et al., 2010). 
Consistent with the latter explanation for the kinked distribution of earnings, relatively 
less research provides market consequence evidence that small profits or small increases 
in earnings suggest low earnings quality. Bhattacharya, Daouk, and Welker (2003) are 
among few researchers who find that earnings opacity, e.g. loss avoidance, results in a 
higher cost of equity and low stock trading. 
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2.1.2.1.4.2 Meeting or beating earnings forecasts of analysts 
Previous research provides more persuasive evidence that firms manipulate earnings 
reported in financial statements to meet or beat external earnings targets, e.g. analysts’ 
earnings forecasts (e.g., Beatty, Ke, and Petroni, 2002; Moehrle, 2002; Dhaliwal, 
Gleason, and Mills, 2004; McVay, 2006; Brown and Pinello, 2007; Jiang et al., 2010). 
One trend of research in this area examines the accounting choices used to meet or beat 
expected levels of earnings. Firms may manipulate reported earnings using specific items 
such as tax expense (Dhaliwal et al., 2004), classification shifting (McVay, 2006; Fan, 
Barua, Cready, and Thomas, 2010), or accounting accruals related to restructuring 
charges (Moehrle, 2002). There is a relatively small number of studies that provide 
evidence that firms use actual transactions such as stock repurchases (Bens, Nagar, 
Skinner, and Wong, 2003; Hribar, Jenkins, and Johnson, 2006) or sales of assets 
(Herrmann, Inoue, and Thomas, 2003) to meet or beat expected levels of earnings. The 
second trend of research focuses on the relationship between target beating and equity 
market incentives. Researchers indicate that target beating is affected by ownership 
structure (Beatty et al., 2002; Matsumoto, 2002) and equity-based incentives of managers 
(Cheng and Warfield, 2005; Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006; McVay, 2006; Jiang et al., 
2010). The third trend of research provides evidence on the relationship between 
governance factors and target beating. Firms have a tendency to manipulate reported 
earnings to meet or beat expected levels of earnings when the audit quality is low or when 
financial statements are unaudited (e.g., interim quarters) (Brown and Pinello, 2007). In 
general, the research on meeting or beating analysts’ earnings forecasts yield consistent 
evidence on the determinants of earnings management (Dechow et al., 2010). Dechow et 
al. (2010) interpret this to mean that, compared with small positive profits, meeting or 
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beating analysts’ earnings forecasts is a more reliable measure of earnings management 
or poor earnings quality.  
Regarding previous research on the consequence of target beating, there is general 
evidence which suggests that meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts fairly contains 
information about earnings management, despite some conflicting evidence (Dechow et 
al., 2010). This chapter firstly discusses the contradictory evidence. Bhojraj, Hribar, 
Picconi, and McInnis (2009) find the stock price of firms which manage accruals or cut 
discretionary expenses to beat analysts’ forecasts increases in a short term, but the trend 
reverses within three years. Similarly, Bartov, Givoly, and Hayn (2002) find that a trading 
strategy based on meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts results in higher abnormal 
quarterly returns. The above evidence can be interpreted that investors are not of the view 
that firms engage in earnings management activities to beat analysts’ forecasts (Dechow 
et al., 2010). The existing literature also indicates that analysts do not anticipate that firms 
manipulate reported earnings (Abarbanell and Lehavy, 2003; Burgstahler and Eames, 
2003). Libby, Hunton, Tan, and Seybert (2008) suggest that analysts may ignore earnings 
management practices because they have incentives to maintain a good relationship with 
management. 
In contrast with the view that target beating is not evidence of earnings management, 
Gleason and Mills (2008) find that firms which decrease tax expense to meet or beat 
earnings forecasts of analysts exhibit a decrease in the share price. Dechow et al. (2010) 
explain that the reason for the contradictory results compared with the non-earnings 
management view (Bartov et al., 2002; Abarbanell and Lehavy, 2003; Burgstahler and 
Eames, 2003; Bhojraj et al., 2009) may be that the manipulation of tax expense reduces 
earnings quality while other methods such as managing accruals do not, or that tax 
27 
 
reductions are more obvious and visible to the market. Gleason and Mills (2008) also 
support the view that meeting or beating analyst forecasts suggests the presence of 
earnings management. 
The existing literature also documents compelling evidence on whether the market’s 
anticipation of meeting or beating earnings forecasts of analysts is an indication of 
earnings management (e.g., Barth, Elliott, and Finn, 1999; Kasznik and McNichols, 
2002). Previous studies indicate that only firms which consistently meet or beat earnings 
forecasts of analysts (Kasznik and McNichols, 2002) or which consistently report an 
increase in earnings compared with the same period of the prior year (Barth et al., 1999) 
enjoy a higher market valuation. However, Kasznik and McNichols (2002) find that firms 
that meet or beat analyst forecasts in some years do not enjoy a market premium. This 
evidence suggests that investors consider target beating as an indication of earnings 
management only in some circumstances.  
So far, the chapter has discussed most properties of earnings. Asymmetric timeliness of 
earnings, which is a main focus of the thesis, will be discussed in more detail in Section 
2.3. 
2.1.2.2. Investor responsiveness to earnings 
Studies on investor responsiveness to earnings rely on the theoretical foundation offered 
by Holthausen and Verrecchia (1988). The logic is that investors respond to earnings 
reported in financial statements because it contains information which is relevant for 
valuation. Many of the studies in this area use the earnings response coefficient (ERC) or 
R-squared of regressions between earnings and returns as a measure of investor 
responsiveness (Dechow et al., 2010). In the earnings-return models, earnings with more 
value relevance result in a higher association between earnings and return, and a higher 
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R-squared. A higher association between earnings and return and a higher R-squared 
indicate higher earnings quality. 
Liu and Thomas (2000) derive a model specification to directly test whether ERC can be 
used as a measure of earnings quality. They find that when there are high associations 
between the current period’s abnormal earnings (which are the difference between actual 
earnings and forecasted earnings) and the following period’s revisions in analyst 
forecasts, the ERC and R-squared of the earnings-return regressions are high. The 
interpretation is that analysts view current-period abnormal earnings as value-relevant 
information so that they revise future-period earnings forecasts. This is direct evidence 
for the relationship between ERC and the decision-making usefulness of earnings. 
However, Liu and Thomas (2000) indicate that the relationship between abnormal 
earnings and revisions in analysts’ forecasts are sensitive to heterogeneity in the sample. 
Most studies in this field provide indirect evidence about determinants of investor 
responsiveness to earnings. The first determinant is accounting choices. An accounting 
choice is viewed as informative to investors if it is positively correlated with ERC. 
Altamuro et al. (2005) studied the effect of the SEC’s Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 101, 
which prohibits the premature recognition of revenues, on the informativeness of earnings 
and find that the earnings informativeness of affected firms in the period after the 
adoption is lower than in the period before the adoption. Prior studies also find that there 
is a decrease in earnings informativeness after the application of new financial reporting 
standards related to research and development expenses (Loudder and Behn, 1995) and 
the translation of foreign currency (Collins and Salatka, 1993). Investor response to 
earnings also decreases as a consequence of conservative accounting policies related to 
intangible assets (Lev and Zarowin, 1999) or recognition of losses under fair value 
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accounting (Givoly and Hayn, 2000). Although the above studies contribute much to 
accounting research, Dechow et al. (2010) argue that they have some limitations such as 
endogeneity and omitted variables.  
The second factor influencing earnings informativeness is auditor quality. The research 
in this area assumes that better auditor quality enhances the credibility of financial 
statements; thus it can enhance earnings informativeness. Prior studies find that ERC is 
positively related to a Big-Eight auditor, which is a proxy for high audit quality (Teoh 
and Wong, 1993), or negatively associated with a non-audit fee, which is a proxy for low 
independence and thus low audit quality (Francis and Ke, 2006). Switching auditor for 
reasons related to disagreements or audit fees is found to be negatively associated with 
the informativeness of earnings because it is an indication of lower earnings quality 
(Hackenbrack and Hogan, 2002). Timely review of quarterly financial reports by auditors 
leads to a rise in the association between unexpected earnings and quarterly stock returns 
(Manry, Tiras, and Wheatley, 2003).  
The third factor is corporate governance. In general, prior studies hypothesise that strong 
corporate governance enhances the quality of financial statements; thus it is positively 
associated with the informativeness of earnings (Dechow et al., 2010). The evidence is 
mixed. Firms with a dual-class share structure have low informative earnings (Francis, 
Schipper, and Vincent, 2005). However, ERC is found to be positively related to the 
ownership of a founding family (Wang, 2006) and managerial ownership (Warfield, 
Wild, and Wild, 1995). 
The next factor is firm fundamentals. There are relatively few studies that examine the 
effect of firm fundamentals on investor response to earnings (Dechow et al., 2010). Early 
research shows a positive relationship between ERC and earnings persistence (Kormendi 
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and Lipe, 1987; Collins and Kothari, 1989) and a negative association between ERC and 
loss (Hayn, 1995). However, these studies provide only indirect evidence for the use of 
ERC as a measure of the quality of earnings because earnings persistence may be 
managed or possible loss projects may be abandoned (Dechow et al., 2010). More direct 
evidence on the relationship between the quality of earnings and firm fundamentals is 
provided by Biddle and Seow (1991), who indicate that cross-industry characteristics, e.g. 
barriers to entry, type of products, and operating and financial leverage affect earnings 
informativeness. Other research also indicates that earnings informativeness is affected 
by firms’ cost structure and growth opportunities (Ahmed, 1994) or by dispersion in 
analysts’ forecasts which is widely used as a measure of the uncertainty of firms’ cash 
flows (Imhoff and Lobo, 1992).   
There is also mixed evidence on the relationship between ERC and firms’ information 
environment (Dechow et al., 2010). For example, firms which have low earnings 
informativeness enjoy an increase in the usefulness of earnings if they voluntarily disclose 
“pro forma” earnings information (Lougee and Marquardt, 2004). Also, Baber, Chen, and 
Kang (2006) find that investors use voluntarily disclosed information of supplementary 
items in the balance sheets and cash flows and that they discount share prices when the 
voluntary disclosure suggests that earnings management exists. Francis, Schipper, and 
Vincent (2002b) find that concurrent disclosure of detailed income statements increases 
the usefulness of earnings. Similarly, Michelle Hanlon, Laplante, and Terry Shevlin 
(2005) find that estimated taxable income can explain stock returns. Also, investor 
response to earnings may be affected by the reconciliations between US GAAP earnings 
and non-US GAAP earnings (Amir, Harris, and Venuti, 1993) or by analyst reports which 
are competing with earnings announcements (Francis, Schipper, and Vincent, 2002a). 
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2.1.2.3. Observable indicators of misstated earnings 
2.1.2.3.1. Accounting and auditing enforcement releases  
Accounting and auditing enforcement releases (AAER) issued by the SEC are an external 
indicator of earnings quality. Dechow, Ge, Larson, and Sloan (2011) indicate that senior 
managers of AAER firms could be alleged by the SEC to show negligence in the financial 
reporting process, or could be accused by the SEC of the intentional manipulation of 
financial statements, an action that satisfies the definition of fraud under auditing 
standards. Dechow et al. (2010) argue that although an AAER sample is more likely to 
provide a good indicator of earnings quality than model-based proxies such as abnormal 
accruals, it is subject to major limitations. Firstly, given that the SEC has limited 
resources, the AAER sample often includes detected and less ambiguous allegations of 
accounting standards, which is associated with a lower rate of Type I error in classifying 
misstated firms, and does not include “within the GAAP” aggressive earnings 
management, which is associated with a high rate of Type II error. Secondly, AAER firms 
are often large firms because the SEC pays more attention to the overall impact of 
fraudulent activities on the capital market or are firms which raise equities or debts for 
the first time. Thirdly, in some cases, the violation of accounting standards is not 
intentional because of a different interpretation of accounting rules. 
Although not all AAER firms intentionally manipulate accounting numbers (Dechow et 
al., 2010), numerous studies which attempt to examine determinants of AAER rely on the 
assumption that AAER indicates the presence of earnings management, one reason for 
poor earnings quality. Studies on determinants of AAER focus on managerial 
compensation, debt covenants, capital market incentives, and corporate governance. 
Regarding managerial compensation, although previous research hypothesises that senior 
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managers have incentives to manipulate accounting numbers to extract higher 
compensation such as bonuses or to inflate share prices which in turn affect their wealth, 
the evidence does not show that accounting fraud is affected by managers’ bonus plan 
(Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney, 1996; Beneish, 1999) or equity-based incentives 
(Erickson, Hanlon, and Maydew, 2006; Armstrong, Jagolinzer, and Larcker, 2010). In 
contrast, Johnson, Ryan, and Tian (2009) find that unrestricted stocks provide a 
significant source of incentive for managers to manipulate earnings because managers 
anticipate that a faithful presentation of financial statements would significantly reduce 
stock price which in turn decreases the value of stocks held by managers. Dechow et al. 
(2010) explain that different measurement approaches or control samples cause the above 
inconsistent findings.  
Research on debt covenants and AAER also yield mixed results. While Dechow et al. 
(1996) show that firms which have high leverage manipulate earnings to avoid violating 
debt covenants, Beneish (1999) indicate that there is no difference in debt ratios or default 
risk between misstated firms and control firms.  
Another factor is capital market incentives. The findings of Dechow et al. (2010), Dechow 
et al. (1996), and Dechow et al. (2011) support the hypothesis that firms which need 
external capital have tendencies to manipulate accounting numbers to decrease the cost 
of capital, while Beneish (1999) show conflicting results. The mixed evidence may be 
caused by differences in constructing control samples or measuring key variables 
(Dechow et al., 2010).  
Regarding corporate governance, the existing literature mainly hypothesises that strong 
corporate governance results in good management monitoring, and therefore, managers 
have less opportunity to manipulate financial statements. However, the evidence is mixed. 
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On the one hand, there is evidence that the likelihood of accounting fraud is negatively 
affected by the independence of the board of directors, the separation of the board 
chairman or company founder from the CEO position (Beasley, 1996; Dechow et al., 
1996; Farber, 2005); the existence of an audit committee (Dechow et al., 1996) or number 
of meetings and financial expertise of an audit committee (Farber, 2005); Big-Four 
auditor status (Farber, 2005); and the independence of the auditor (Joe and Vandervelde, 
2007). Feng, Ge, Luo, and Shevlin (2011) indicate that powerful CEOs of AAER firms 
are more likely to dominate other directors, including chief financial officers, in the 
preparation of the financial statement. On the other hand, Farber (2005) does not find that 
the independence of an audit committee helps to reduce accounting manipulation. The 
competing evidence suggests that only an active audit committee could deter accounting 
fraud (Dechow et al., 2010). Also, prior research shows that there is no difference in big 
auditor status between AAER firms and control firms (Dechow et al., 1996; Beneish, 
1999), and that accounting fraud is not affected by a non-audit fee, which is a proxy for 
low independence of the auditor (Joe and Vandervelde, 2007). Again, the mixed evidence 
may be caused by differences in constructing control samples (Dechow et al., 2010). 
Turning now to consequences of AAER, a considerable amount of the literature published 
in this area hypothesises that AAER is evidence of “obvious” earnings management 
(Dechow et al., 2010), and thus AAER announcements lead to higher managerial 
turnover, a decrease in firm value, and higher litigation suffered by AAER firms’ auditors. 
Management turnover rates of AAER firms are 72.4% in the year of the AAER 
announcement (Feroz, Park, and Pastena, 1991) and 35.9% within five years following 
the release of AAER (Beneish, 1999). The likelihood that individuals alleged to have 
involved in fraudulent activities by the SEC to leave the AAER firms is 93% in the 
announcement year (Karpoff, Scott Lee, and Martin, 2008). Regarding firm value, prior 
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studies indicate that an AAER announcement is related to significant negative stock 
returns (Feroz et al., 1991; Dechow et al., 1996), higher bid-ask spreads, and fewer analyst 
followings (Dechow et al., 1996). AAER firms which enhance corporate governance 
within three years following an allegation of accounting fraud exhibit an improvement in 
stock performance (Farber, 2005). Another consequence of AAER is litigation suffered 
by auditors of AAER firms. Big audit companies suffer lower legal costs (Feroz et al., 
1991) because big auditors are less likely to be linked to extreme cases which may impose 
high penalties, or they could negotiate to reduce penalties. The evidence shows that 38% 
of the AAER firms’ auditors face litigation, and the litigation risk is higher for common 
frauds or fictitious transactions (Bonner, Palmrose, and Young, 1998). Although there is 
consistent evidence on the consequences of AAER, Dechow et al. (2010) indicate that the 
use of AAER is a proxy for earnings quality suffers from some limitations. The 
interpretation of negative reactions from the market relies on the assumption that AAER 
is an indicator of earnings management. Negative reactions may be caused by the earnings 
adjustments included in the AAER releases, reassessment of future firm growth, changes 
in the discount rate associated with the uncertainty of cash flows, or changes in analysts’ 
forecasts to include possible losses related to litigation or reputation losses. 
2.1.2.3.2. Accounting restatements 
Early research (e.g., Palmrose, Richardson, and Scholz, 2004) on accounting restatements 
use the Lexis-Nexis news database, but later studies (e.g., Desai, Hogan, and Wilkins, 
2006) use the GAO’s restatement database. Dechow et al. (2010) indicate some 
advantages and disadvantages of using restatements as a measure of earnings quality. 
Regarding advantages, similar to the AAER sample, a restatement sample provides a 
good indicator of earnings quality so that it has a low rate of Type I error in classifying 
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misstated firms. Another significant aspect of restatements is that the sample size is large 
because the construction of the data set is based on restatement announcements regardless 
of firm size. In respect to disadvantages, restatements can be a noisy proxy for accounting 
fraud because they include not only restatements following SEC allegations but 
restatements which result from unintentional errors or retrospective adjustments required 
by accounting standards (Hennes et al., 2008; Plumlee and Yohn, 2010).  
There is a large volume of published studies examining the determinants of restatements 
(Dechow et al., 2010). Similar to studies on the AAER sample, the research in this area 
relies on the assumption that accounting restatements provide an indicator of earnings 
management (Dechow et al., 2010). The existing literature provides mixed evidence on 
the relationship between restatements and managerial compensation and corporate 
governance. Regarding compensation of managers, Burns and Kedia (2006) show that 
restatements are positively affected by the sensitivity of CEOs’ option holding to changes 
in share prices. However, they do not find a link between restatements and incentives 
from other components of compensation such as equity, restricted shares, salary, and 
bonuses. Efendi, Srivastava, and Swanson (2007) provide similar evidence that 
accounting statements are positively influenced by CEOs’ holding of options, which are 
in-the-money exercisable. In contrast to the above evidence, using the propensity score 
matching method, Armstrong et al. (2010) do not find that accounting restatements are 
affected by equity-based incentives of CEOs. Turning to the research on corporate 
governance, accounting restatements are associated with the presence of CEOs who also 
serve as the chairman of the board of directors, company founders, or audit committee’s 
financial expertise (Agrawal and Chadha, 2005; Efendi et al., 2007). Accounting 
restatements are also influenced by the percentage of outside members on the board of 
directors and gearing ratio (Larcker, Richardson, and Tuna, 2007). However, there is 
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evidence that the likelihood of restatements is not affected by a committee’s 
independence and a non-audit fee, which is used as a proxy for weak corporate 
governance (Agrawal and Chadha, 2005). An explanation for the mixed evidence is that 
accounting restatements are not a good proxy for low earnings quality, e.g. earnings 
management, because the restatement database includes both intentional and 
unintentional restatements (Dechow et al., 2010). 
The literature on restatements highlights several consequences of restatement 
announcements. First, similar to AAER firms, restatement firms have high turnover rates 
in management (Srinivasan, 2005; Desai et al., 2006; Hennes et al., 2008) and among 
audit committee members (Srinivasan, 2005). Desai et al. (2006) find that the job market 
is less likely to open for the ex-managers of restatement firms who were replaced after 
restatements. Second, prior studies on the effects of accounting restatements on capital 
markets show that investors discount share prices of restatement firms if restatements are 
caused by frauds (Palmrose et al., 2004) or if restatements need retrospective adjustments 
in earnings (Lev, Ryan, and Wu, 2008). Accounting restatements also have a contagion 
effect on other companies in the same industry in terms of negative market reaction 
(Gleason, Jenkins, and Johnson, 2008). The evidence also indicates that accounting 
restatements result in an increase in information risk (Kravet and Shevlin, 2010) and the 
cost of capital (Hribar and Jenkins, 2004). Third, there are relatively few studies providing 
evidence that accounting restatements are associated with higher litigation costs for 
involved parties. Palmrose et al. (2004) indicate that litigation risk is related to earnings 
or fraud-related restatements. The evidence shows that litigation costs are higher for 
restatements which affect core earnings or affect various accounts in financial statements 
(Palmrose et al., 2004) or need retrospective adjustments in earnings (Lev et al., 2008). 
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2.1.2.3.3. Internal control weaknesses 
Studies on internal control weaknesses are emerging after the passage of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 in the US (Dechow et al., 2010). Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 
Section 302 (effective on 29th August 2002), managers must provide a certification on the 
effectiveness of internal control systems of their firms. Section 404 (effective on 15th 
November 2004) requires that firms’ annual reports must include an assessment of 
internal control effectiveness, and independent audit reports must include an opinion on 
the management’s assessment.  
Previous studies indicate that internal control weaknesses are positively related to 
measures of poor earnings quality, e.g. abnormal accruals (Doyle, Ge, and McVay, 
2007b; Ashbaugh‐Skaife, Collins, Jr., and LaFond, 2008). Also, researchers provide 
consistent evidence that high internal control risks are more likely to exist in firms with 
complexity or changes in organisational structures or those that lack resources to invest 
in internal control systems (Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and Kinney, 2007; Doyle, Ge, and 
McVay, 2007a). Prior research on the consequences of internal control weakness provide 
mixed evidence. Internal control weaknesses which are reported under Section 302 are 
related to negative stock returns (Hammersley, Myers, and Shakespeare, 2007), higher 
cost of capital, and lower revisions of analysts’ forecasts (Beneish, Billings, and Hodder, 
2008). However, Beneish et al. (2008) and Ogneva, Subramanyam, and Raghunandan 
(2007) do not find associations of negative stock returns, lower revisions of analysts’ 
forecasts, and higher cost of capital with internal control weaknesses reported under 
Section 404. Dechow et al. (2010) explain that mixed evidence on the consequences of 
internal control weaknesses is due to differences in the threshold for disclosure under 
Section 302 and Section 404 or different information environments between Section 302 
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and Section 404 samples; differences in event window (disclosures under Section 404 
must be included in annual reports, while disclosures under Section 302 can be made on 
any date); or omissions of disclosures of less severe deficiencies under Section 302.  
2.1.3. Recent methodological advances in estimating earnings 
quality 
In recent years, there have been methodological advances in measuring earnings quality. 
A promising trend of research relies on properties of numbers to provide an indication of 
the quality of earnings. Amiram et al. (2015) apply Benford’s Law, which is a “law” of 
distributions of digits of numbers, to study earnings quality of distributed financial 
statements. They provide evidence that deviations of first digits of financial statement 
items from what are expected by Benford’s Law are related to measures of the quality of 
earnings, e.g. abnormal accruals, meeting or beating zero earnings and earnings 
persistence. They also find that deviations of first digits are useful to predict accounting 
restatements. The importance is that their approach does not require large data for cross-
sectional or time-series regressions because it only relies on distributional properties of 
accounting numbers. The methodology of Amiram et al. (2015) is promising, especially 
for studies on capital markets where there is a lack of data on earnings quality similar to 
the accounting restatements and AAER in the United States. 
Another methodological advance in studying earnings quality relies on linguistic or 
textual analysis. Hobson, Mayew, and Venkatachalam (2012) use software to capture 
vocal emotion of CEOs from the CEOs’ speeches at conferences for earnings 
announcements. The authors find that the markers of vocal dissonance are positively 
related to accounting restatements. Their approach’s accuracy is similar to models which 
solely rely on financial data and is 11% higher than chance. Kim, Kim, and Zhou (2017) 
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study relationships between languages’ grammatical structures and earnings 
management. They hypothesise and find that firms in weak future-time reference (FTR)3 
countries are less likely to manage earnings using accruals or real business transactions 
than firms in strong FTR countries. They argue that speakers in weak FTR countries are 
more likely to anticipate future consequences of earnings management as there is no clear 
mean to distinguish between present and future in their languages so that they do not want 
to face future legal troubles associated with earnings management. On the same theme, 
applying textual analysis, Lo, Ramos, and Rogo (2017) find that firms whose annual 
reports are less readable, i.e., there are more complex words or long sentences in the 
management discussion and analysis section, have a lower quality of earnings. They 
explain that liars, i.e., managers who manipulate their firms’ earnings, have tendencies to 
use complex linguistic structures in their discussions.  
Recently, Liang, Marinovic, and Varas (2018) offered a theory on the impact of the 
credibility of managers on the credibility of financial reporting, for which earnings quality 
is a proxy. The authors theorised that, because of limited tenure or the horizon problem 
(Dechow and Sloan, 1991), managers have an incentive to maximise stock prices at the 
time of retirement. For dishonest managers, they could choose to manage earnings and 
cash in their credibility in the early stage. The model of Liang et al. (2018) indicates that 
abnormal accruals are higher and more volatile in firms with less credible CEOs than in 
firms with more credible CEOs. There are also several lines of evidence showing that 
                                                 
3 An example of future-time references in languages is the use of “will” or “be going to”. There 
are at least 28 grammatical structures related to future-time references (Kim et al., 2017). 
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personal traits of executives such as CEO play a major role in explaining the quality of 
earnings (e.g., Feng et al., 2011; Huang et al., 2012; Yim, 2013; Serfling, 2014). 
2.2. Earnings management 
2.2.1. Definitions 
Early research defines earnings management as managerial discretion by using 
predetermined accounting choices under accounting standards to affect earnings reported 
in financial statements. Schipper (1989, p. 92) defines earnings management as 
“purposeful intervention in the external financial reporting process, with the intent of 
obtaining some private gain”. An important feature of this definition is that it assumes 
managerial involvement as a determinant of earnings numbers. Managers may exercise 
professional judgements and use different accounting policies allowed by accounting 
standards to recognize a particular business transaction so that they can impact reported 
earnings. For example, managers may apply judgments in estimating the useful life of 
fixed assets, provisions for bad debts, or provisions for obsolete inventory. Managers may 
also choose predetermined accounting choices, e.g. policies regarding depreciation 
methods or inventory valuations, to affect reported earnings. 
Extending the work of Schipper (1989), Healy and Wahlen (1999) define earnings 
management as follows 
 “earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in financial 
reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either 
mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the 
company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported 
accounting numbers.” 
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This definition also views earnings management as misleading shareholders and other 
stakeholders about “true earnings” of reporting firms. Like the definition of Schipper 
(1989), this definition admits that there are several ways to manipulate earnings numbers. 
Under this definition, managers can intentionally choose permitted accounting choices to 
exercise judgment in estimating accounting numbers to affect the bottom line of financial 
statements. This definition also views managers can manipulate earnings by using real 
business operations. For example, managers may delay research and development (R&D) 
or maintenance activities to avoid the recognition of significant amounts of expenses, thus 
to increase the annual profit.  
Consistent with Healy and Wahlen (1999)’s definition in terms of the manipulation of 
real business operations, Roychowdhury (2006, p. 337) defines real earnings management 
as “departures from normal operational practices, motivated by managers’ desire to 
mislead at least some stakeholders into believing certain financial reporting goals have 
been met in the normal course of operations.” Roychowdhury (2006) provides some 
examples of how restructuring real business transactions may affect reported earnings. 
For example, managers may temporarily increase sales by providing their customers with 
increased price discounts or more lenient credit terms, leading to abnormally low cash 
inflows because of a low margin for additional sales. The lower margin leads to 
abnormally high production costs relative to sales. Similarly, managers may also want to 
inflate earnings by overproduction. By producing more goods than a market’s demand, 
overhead costs will spread over more finished goods, resulting in lower costs per unit 
(assuming that increases in marginal costs per unit do not offset reductions in fixed costs 
per unit), which in turn leads to lower cost of goods sold reported in income statements. 
Additionally, holding production costs in inventories in balance sheets causes abnormally 
low cash flows from operations relative to sales. Furthermore, managers can cut down or 
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delay discretionary expenditures, e.g. selling and administrative expenses or R&D 
expenses, to inflate earnings. In such situations, financial statements exhibit abnormally 
low discretionary expenditures relative to sales. 
For the purpose of this thesis, I adopt the definitions of earnings management following 
Healy and Wahlen (1999) and Roychowdhury (2006). 
2.2.2. Motivations 
Existing literature documents many reasons why managers are involved in earnings 
management practice. While Section 2.1.2 explains various factors affecting earnings 
quality in general, this section briefly discusses some influential studies on motivations 
for earnings management. 
An important reason for earnings management is to impact capital markets. Managers are 
involved in earnings management because they want to impact their firms’ share values, 
which are priced based on earnings. For example, earnings are managed before initial 
public offerings (Teoh, Welch, and Wong, 1998a; DuCharme, Malatesta, and Sefcik, 
2001), seasoned equity offerings (Teoh, Welch, and Wong, 1998b; Kim and Park, 2005), 
and stock-based mergers and acquisitions (Agrawal, Jaffe, and Mandelker, 1992; 
Erickson and Wang, 1999; Botsari and Meeks, 2008). Also, managers are more likely to 
engage in earnings management to meet target levels, e.g. the zero benchmark, or 
previous period earnings, to avoid negative reactions from capital markets (Burgstahler 
and Dichev, 1997; Burgstahler and Eames, 2006). 
The next reason is for debt contracting. Because debt contracts often include financial 
covenants which are based on financial statements, managers are more likely to engage 
in accounting manipulation to inflate earnings to help their firms avoid the violation of 
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debt covenants (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Sweeney, 1994). There is also evidence 
that financially distressed firms manage earnings upward to avoid debt covenant violation 
when lenders do not forgive the violation and conceal earnings for future use if lenders 
forgive the violation (Jaggi and Lee, 2002). 
Next, complying with regulations is another motivation for earnings management. For 
example, managers manipulate earnings to take advantages of regulatory requirements, 
e.g. to get or increase relief grant value, during import relief investigations (Jones, 1991), 
avoid political costs in the oil industry during the 1990 Persian Gulf crisis (Han and 
Wang, 1998), get approval for seasoned equity offerings (Chen and Yuan, 2004), and for 
tax purpose (Guenther, 1994; Bingxuan Lin, Rui Lu, and Zhang, 2012). Similarly, banks 
have incentives to comply with regulations on capital adequacy ratios, which are based 
on financial statements, by avoiding reporting expenses and losses related to debts and 
loans, and by inflating investment profits (Moyer, 1990; Scholes, Wilson, and Wolfson, 
1990; Beatty, Chamberlain, and Magliolo, 1995). Also, earnings may also be manipulated 
to avoid violating regulations in the insurance industry (Petroni, 1992; Gaver and 
Paterson, 2001). 
Finally, managers have incentives to manage earnings to impact their compensation, 
which is normally calculated based on accounting numbers. For example, Healy (1985) 
and Holthausen et al. (1995) find that maximising salary and bonuses is an important 
motivation for managers to involve in earnings management practices. In the same way, 
when managerial compensation is highly tied to firms’ share prices, managers use 
earnings management to impact share prices, which in turn affect their compensation 
(Guidry, Leone, and Rock, 1999; Richardson and Waegelein, 2002; Cheng and Warfield, 
2005; Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006). In addition, managers use earnings management 
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to affect the bottom line of financial statements to avoid being fired as a consequence of 
firms’ poor financial performance (Hazarika, Karpoff, and Nahata, 2012) or to get higher 
benefits in the future (Dechow and Sloan, 1991). 
2.2.3. Deterrence mechanisms 
Existing literature also documents important key gatekeepers who help firms to deter 
earnings management. Key gatekeepers are boards of directors, audit committee, and 
independent auditors.  
The board of directors act as a monitoring mechanism in firms so that they can mitigate 
managers’ incentives to manipulate earnings. One of the main responsibilities of the 
board of directors is to authorise financial statements for issue (Financial Reporting 
Council (FRC), 2012, 2016b). The board also makes decisions on the appointment or 
removal of CEOs and on CEOs’ compensations. Previous studies show that there are 
negative relationships between earnings management and the number of directors on the 
board (Chtourou, Bedard, and Courteau, 2001), percentage of independent directors on 
the board (Klein, 2002a; Davidson, Goodwin‐Stewart, and Kent, 2005), and the board’s 
meetings (Xie, Davidson, and DaDalt, 2003). There is also evidence that the CEO duality, 
e.g. when a CEO also serves as the chairperson of the board of directors, affects earnings 
quality because CEO could dominate the board in those circumstances (Dechow et al., 
1996). Recent research shows that earnings management is spread among firms via 
professional or social networks of directors, CEOs and CFOs (chief financial officers) 
(Krishnan, Raman, Yang, and Yu, 2011; Chiu, Teoh, and Tian, 2013; Nguyen, Iqbal, and 
Shiwakoti, 2015a). 
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Next, audit committee helps to mitigate earnings management because it oversees the 
effectiveness of internal controls, the integrity of financial statements, and the work 
performed by external auditors (Financial Reporting Council (FRC), 2012, 2016b). There 
is evidence that earnings management is negatively affected by the independence, 
financial expertise, and meetings of the audit committees (Klein, 2002b; Xie et al., 2003; 
Bédard, Chtourou, and Courteau, 2004; Badolato, Donelson, and Ege, 2014). 
Last, independent auditors also help to reduce earnings management. They provide an 
assurance that financial statements are free from material misstatements so that they help 
to reduce earnings management either by mitigating managers’ incentives to manage 
earnings or by detecting and correcting misstatements before the financial statements are 
published. Previous research shows earnings management is negatively affected by audit 
effort (Caramanis and Lennox, 2008) and audit quality (Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo, and 
Subramanyam, 1998a; Krishnan, 2003).  
2.2.4. Empirical models 
This section provides an overview of models to estimate accrual earnings management 
and real earnings management.  
2.2.4.1. Modelling accrual earnings management 
Accounting studies on earnings management are mainly built on the definition of earnings 
management. As described above, accrual earnings management is the exercise of 
judgment in choosing permitted accounting choices or in estimating accounting numbers 
to affect reported earnings (Schipper, 1989; Healy and Wahlen, 1999). An accepted 
methodology to detect earnings management is to estimate “abnormal accruals” (Dechow 
et al., 2010). A general feature of earnings management models is to estimate “normal 
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accruals”, which are needed accruals which help to reflect firms’ fundamental 
performance. If a model properly estimates normal accrual, abnormal accrual is an 
indication of earnings management.   
2.2.4.1.1. Early models 
Early models started with working capital accruals. Healy (1985) uses levels of total 
working capital accruals (divided by opening assets) as abnormal accruals. The estimation 
of abnormal accruals is as follows: 
Equation 2-1: Healy (1985) model 
𝑁𝐷𝐴𝑖,𝜏 =
∑ 𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑇
 
Where 𝑁𝐷𝐴𝜏 is abnormal accruals of firm i in the event period 𝜏; 𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 is total accruals 
of firm i; t is total number of years in the period of estimation (t= 1,2…T). 
DeAngelo (1986) proposes another model which also treats working capital accruals as 
abnormal accruals. The approach of DeAngelo (1986) is similar to that of Healy (1985), 
but it uses accruals in year 𝜏-1 as abnormal accruals. The model is as follows: 
Equation 2-2: DeAngelo (1986) model 
𝑁𝐷𝐴𝑖,𝜏 = 𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝜏−1 
Both models of Healy (1985) and DeAngelo (1986) are criticized because they implicitly 
assume that abnormal accruals are constant, which may not be true as Kaplan (1985) and 
McNichols (2002) suggest that abnormal accruals change when economic situations 
change. 
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2.2.4.1.2. Jones and modified-Jones models 
Later research developed more complicated models which isolate abnormal accruals from 
normal accruals, among which the most influential models are Jones-type models (Jones, 
1991; Dechow et al., 1995; Kothari et al., 2005) and the Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
model.   
Jones (1991) introduces a model, which uses firm characteristics to reflect changes in 
economic circumstances, to estimate accruals. In this model, normal accruals are 
regressed on sale changes and property, plant and equipment (PPE) divided by opening 
assets. The model is as follows: 
Equation 2-3: Jones (1991) model 
𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 (
1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽2 (
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽3 (
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Where: ACi,t is total accruals of firm i at the end of year t; ΔREVi,t is sale change of firm 
i from year t-1 to year t; PPEi,t is gross PPE of firm i at the end of year t; Ai,t−1 is total 
assets of firm i at the end of year t-1.  
Under this model, residuals of Equation 2-3, or differences between actual accruals and 
normal accruals, are abnormal accruals. A distinctive feature of the Jones (1991) model 
is that it differentiates abnormal accruals from normal accruals, and thus it overcomes 
limitations of models of Healy (1985) and DeAngelo (1986). However, as noted by Jones 
(1991), this model is biased when revenues are managed.  
After that, in an attempt to modify the Jones (1991) model, Dechow et al. (1995) subtract 
changes in receivables (∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡) from changes in sales to deal with situations when sales 
are manipulated. This model is widely referred to the modified-Jones model. Using 
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coefficients ?̂?, ?̂?1, β̂2, and β̂3 estimated by Equation 2-3, the abnormal accruals following 
the modified-Jones model are calculated as differences between total accruals and 
predicted values (normal accruals): 
Equation 2-4: Modified-Jones model 
𝐷𝐶𝐴𝑖,𝑡 =
𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
− [?̂? + ?̂?1 (
1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + ?̂?2 (
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 − ∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + ?̂?3  (
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
)] 
Another application of the modified-Jones model is to estimate Equation 2-4 using sale 
changes deducted by receivable changes (Kothari et al., 2005). This is because, in the 
research settings where there is no “event period” and “pre-event period”, researchers can 
assume that earnings management causes all changes in account receivables. Therefore, 
instead of obtained coefficients from the Jones model to calculate abnormal accruals, 
researchers may estimate the modified-Jones equation directly.  
Kothari et al. (2005) further improve the Jones and modified-Jones models by including 
returns on assets (ROA) to the equation to control for firm performance. The model is as 
follows: 
Equation 2-5: Kothari et al. (2005)’s model 
𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 (
1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽2 (
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽3 (
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽4𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡(𝑜𝑟 𝑡−1) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
In addition to the model which adds a measure of performance above, Kothari et al. (2005) 
also offer another approach for performance matching. Their approach is to match one 
firm with another in the same industry and in a year based on the nearest ROA. However, 
the performance-matched model may reduce test power because it requires matched 
observations (Dechow et al., 2010). 
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2.2.4.1.3. Cash flow approach to estimate abnormal accruals 
In addition to Jones-type models, Dechow and Dichev (2002) propose an alternative way 
to estimate normal working capital accruals. In this model, working capital accruals are 
regressed on past, present and future cash flows because working capital accruals related 
to cash payments or collections will reverse when cash is paid or received. The model is 
as follows: 
Equation 2-6: Dechow and Dichev (2002) model 
𝑊𝐶𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡+1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
Where: 𝑊𝐶𝑖,𝑡 is working capital of firm i in year t; 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1 is operating cash flow of 
firm i in year t-1; 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 is operating cash flows of firm i in year t; 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡+1 is operating 
cash flows of firm i in year t+1; 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is residuals. All variables are scaled by opening assets. 
Standard deviations of regression residuals are used as a proxy of earnings management.  
Although Dechow and Dichev (2002) provide a significant technical improvement in 
estimating abnormal accruals, their model has a major limitation when ignoring long term 
accruals, such as depreciation accruals. Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and Schipper (2005) 
extend the model of Dechow and Dichev (2002) by adding sales growth to control firm 
performance and adding PPE to include depreciation accruals (which are a type of long-
term accrual). The model is as follows: 
Equation 2-7: Francis et al. (2005) model 
𝑇𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡+1 + ∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
Where 𝑇𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑡 is total current accruals. Standard deviations of residuals [𝜎(𝜀𝑖,𝑡)] from year 
t-4 to year t is used as a proxy of earnings management. Francis, LaFond, et al. (2005) 
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also attempt to differentiate discretion estimation errors from the innate estimation errors 
as follows: 
Equation 2-8: Francis et al. (2005) model to estimate innate estimation errors 
𝜎(𝜀𝑖,𝑡) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝜎(𝐶𝐹𝑂)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝜎(𝑅𝐸𝑉)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4 log(𝐶𝑌𝐶𝐿𝐸)𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝑁𝐸𝐺𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖,𝑡 
Where: 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is log of total assets of firm i in year t; 𝜎(𝐶𝐹𝑂)𝑖,𝑡 is the standard deviation 
of cash flows over a period of 10 years; 𝜎(𝑅𝐸𝑉)𝑖,𝑡 is the standard deviation of revenues 
over a period of 10 years; 𝐶𝑌𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is operating cycle of firm i in year t; 𝑁𝐸𝐺𝑖,𝑡 is numbers 
of times a firm has negative earnings over a period of 10 years. In this model, 𝑣𝑖,𝑡 is 
affected by managerial discretion; therefore it can be used as a proxy for earnings 
management. However, the process to differentiate discretion estimation errors from the 
innate estimation errors may introduce bias because estimation errors may also result 
from innate characteristics (Dechow et al., 2010).  
2.2.4.1.4. Recent improvements in accrual-based models 
Although earnings management models have been widely applied, a major concern is that 
the detecting power of earnings management models is low in general (Dechow, Hutton, 
Kim, and Sloan, 2012; Frankel and Sun, 2018). Recent research studies are focusing on 
improving the test power of models to detect earnings management.  
Dechow et al. (2012) introduce an approach to estimate abnormal accruals by 
incorporating reversals of accruals in the following periods. 
Equation 2-9: Dechow et al. (2012) model 
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝐴𝑅𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝐴𝑅𝑇𝑃1𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑃𝐴𝑅𝑇𝑃2𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝑓𝑘
𝑘
X𝑘,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
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Where: 𝑊𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑡 is working capital of firm i in year t; 𝑃𝐴𝑅𝑇𝑖,𝑡 is equal 1 in years when 
earnings management is hypothesised to be existed, and 0 otherwise; 𝑃𝐴𝑅𝑇𝑃1𝑖,𝑡 is equal 
1 in the following year, 0 otherwise; 𝑃𝐴𝑅𝑇𝑃2𝑖,𝑡 is equal 1 in the second following year, 
0 otherwise; ∑ 𝑓𝑘𝑘 X𝑘,𝑖,𝑡 represents determinants of normal accruals. In their tests, 
Dechow et al. (2012) use an AAER sample as the presence of exposed earnings 
management. They also employ different models to estimate normal accruals, including 
Jones (1991), Dechow et al. (1995), Dechow and Dichev (2002) and Francis, LaFond, et 
al. (2005).4 This model helps to improve the test power by 40%. 
Recently, Frankel and Sun (2018) also attempt to increase the detecting power of earnings 
management models by considering the probabilities of cash flows. This research is built 
on the theoretical framework on the earnings-accruals-cash flows relationship (Dechow, 
Kothari, and L. Watts, 1998), and the relationship between accruals and past, current, and 
future cash flows (Dechow and Dichev, 2002). They provide evidence supporting the 
hypothesis that changes in cash flows, serial correlations in changes in cash flows and 
length of the operating cycle help to increase the test power to 36.5%. The model is as 
follows: 
Equation 2-10: Frankel and Sun (2018) model 
𝑊𝐶𝐴𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛼 + 𝛽1∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑟𝐶𝑌𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑟𝐶𝑌𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4∆𝑂𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝑂𝐶𝐹𝑆𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6∆𝑂𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑂𝐶𝐹𝑆𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
                                                 
4 For example, the full model based on Jones (1991) becomes: WACi,t  = α + β1PARTi,t +
β2PARTP1i,t + β3PARTP2i,t + β4∆REVi,t + β5PPEi,t + εi,t 
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Where: 𝑊𝐶𝐴𝑖,𝑡 is working capital accruals of firm i in year t; ∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 is change in 
revenues of firm i from year t-1 to year t; 𝑟𝐶𝑌𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is percentile rank of average of 
operating cash cycle in the three previous periods; ∆𝑂𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 is changes in operating cash 
flows of firm i from year t-1 to year t; 𝑂𝐶𝐹𝑆𝐶𝑖,𝑡 is firm-specific serial correlation in 
changes in cash flows for firm i based on historical data. 
In summary, although there are various models to detect earnings management, a general 
characteristic of these models is to distinguish abnormal accruals from normal accruals. 
Among earnings management models, Jones-type models (Jones, 1991; Dechow et al., 
1995; Kothari et al., 2005) are the most common models used in accounting research.  
2.2.4.2. Modelling real earnings management 
As explained in Section 2.2.1, Roychowdhury (2006) argues that manipulation of 
earnings through real business transactions (e.g., increased price discounts or more lenient 
credit terms, overproduction, and cutdown or delay in discretionary expenditures), leads 
to abnormally low cash flows from operations, abnormally high production costs, and 
abnormally low discretionary expenses. He develops models to estimate abnormal cash 
flows, abnormal production costs, abnormal discretionary expenditures which are used as 
proxies for real earnings management. Similar to models to estimate accrual earnings 
management, Roychowdhury (2006) run regressions between cash flows, production 
costs, and discretionary expenses with firm characteristics. Residuals from those 
regressions are used as proxies for real earnings management. The models are as follows: 
Equation 2-11: Roychowdhury (2006) model to estimate abnormal cash flows 
CFOi,t
Ai,t−1
= α
1
Ai,t−1
+ β1
REVi,t
Ai,t−1
+ β2
∆REVi,t
Ai,t−1
+ εi,t  
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Equation 2-12: Roychowdhury (2006) model to estimate abnormal production costs 
PRODit
Ai,t−1
= α
1
Ai,t−1
+ β1
REVi,t
Ai,t−1
+ β2
∆REVi,t
Ai,t−1
+ β3
∆REVi,t−1
Ai,t−1
+ εi,t 
Equation 2-13: Roychowdhury (2006) model to estimate abnormal discretionary 
expenditures 
DISEXPi,t
Ai,t−1
= α
1
Ai,t−1
+ β1
REVi,t−1
Ai,t−1
+ εi,t 
Where: 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 is cash flows from operations of firm i in year t, 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑖,𝑡 is production 
costs of firm i in year t [equals to the sum of cost of goods sold (𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆𝑖,𝑡) and change in 
inventories from year t-1 to year t (∆𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑡)]; 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖,𝑡 is discretionary expenditures of 
firm i in year t; 𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 is sales of firm i in year t; ∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 is change in sales of firm i from 
year t-1 to year t; ∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡−1 is change in sales of firm i from year t-2 to year t-1; 𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 is 
total assets of firm i at the end of year t-1. 
Under these models, abnormal cash flows, abnormal productions costs and abnormal 
discretionary expenditures are residuals of Equation 2-11, Equation 2-12, and Equation 
2-13, respectively.  
Later research shows that these models are able to detect real earnings management both 
in the US and the UK (Cohen, Dey, and Lys, 2008; Athanasakou, Strong, and Walker, 
2009; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Gunny, 2010; Athanasakou, Strong, and Walker, 2011; 
Zang, 2012). 
2.3. Accounting conservatism 
As mentioned above, asymmetric timeliness of bad news over good news is an indication 
of earnings quality. It is also a type of accounting conservatism. There has been emerging 
literature focusing on accounting conservatism in general and asymmetric timeliness of 
bad news over good news in particular (Basu, 1997; Watts, 2003a; Mora and Walker, 
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2015; Ruch and Taylor, 2015). This section provides a brief explanation including the 
definition, motivations, and models to estimate accounting conservatism. 
2.3.1. Definition of accounting conservatism 
Accounting conservatism refers to accounting policies which reduce firms’ book values 
of net assets compared to their “true economic values”. From the standard setters’ view, 
the Financial Accounting Standard Board (US) states that 
“Conservatism is a prudent reaction to uncertainty to try to ensure that uncertainties 
and risks inherent in business situations are adequately considered. Thus, if two 
estimates of amounts to be received or paid in the future are about equally likely, 
conservatism dictates using the less optimistic estimate.” (Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (FASB), 1980) 
The standard setters’ view is that accounting conservatism is essential to deal with 
uncertainty in future earnings. The role of accounting conservatism is not to overstate 
earnings and asset values. The international accounting standards also share a similar 
view on accounting conservatism (e.g., International Accounting Standards Committee 
(IASC), 1989). In accounting research, Watts and Zimmerman (1986) define accounting 
conservatism as predetermined accounting policy choices, which lead to the lowest 
(highest) values of assets (liabilities).  
There are two types of accounting conservatism based on these definitions: unconditional 
and conditional (Ball and Shivakumar, 2005; Beaver and Ryan, 2005). Unconditional 
conservatism refers to accounting treatments that result in lower book values relative to 
neutral (economic) values of net assets, and this conservatism is called “balance sheet 
conservatism” or news-independent conservatism because it does not depend on the news. 
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Mora and Walker (2015) identify two sources of unconditional conservatism. First, 
unconditional conservatism results from conservative recognition of items in statements 
of financial positions (balance sheets) that do not meet the definitions or recognition 
criteria in accounting standards. For example, R&D costs are not allowed to be capitalised 
on balance sheets because future benefits are not “probable”. Second, unconditional 
conservatism can also result from the conservative measurement of items on statements 
of financial positions. For example, assets are depreciated at a rate greater than the 
“economic rate of depreciation”, which is the depreciation rate that matches book values 
of fixed assets with their economic values.  
Conditional conservatism refers to the understatement of values of assets in financial 
statements which recognise losses in unfavourable conditions, but not gains in favourable 
conditions (Basu, 1997; Watts, 2003a; Ball and Shivakumar, 2005; Beaver and Ryan, 
2005). Conditional conservatism is related to how fast bad news and good news are 
recorded in financial statements. It is also called news-dependent conservatism. In a 
seminal work, Basu (1997) defines accounting conservatism as “the accountant’s 
tendency to require a higher degree of verification to recognise good news as gains than 
to recognise bad news as losses”. The recognition of good news relative to bad news 
requires a higher level of verification. This is the asymmetric recognition of bad news 
over good news, which leads to conservatism. An example of conditional conservatism 
is the requirement that inventory must be measured at the lower value between historical 
cost and net realisable value, and such a requirement results in recognition of loss when 
there is bad news related to inventory but not a recognition of gain when there is good 
news. 
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Although they are different in definitions, both unconditional and conditional 
conservatism lead to an understatement of book values of assets (Watts, 2003a; Beaver 
and Ryan, 2005; Mora and Walker, 2015; Ruch and Taylor, 2015). The common purposes 
of both types of conservatism are to increase the efficiency of debt contracts and 
managerial contracts or reduce the costs related to litigation, tax, and regulation (Watts, 
2003a; Beaver and Ryan, 2005). 
2.3.2. Demand for accounting conservatism 
Watts (2003a) provides a comprehensive explanation for the demand for accounting 
conservatism. In general, accounting conservatism arises from demand for contracting, 
litigation, taxation, and regulation. Among four categories, contracting demand is the 
early and main source of demand for accounting conservatism (Watts, 2003a); thus this 
section mostly focuses on the contracting demand, followed by a brief discussion on 
demand for litigation, taxation, and regulation. 
2.3.2.1. Contracting demand 
Under the contracting demand perspective, accounting conservatism is used to increase 
the efficiency of agency contracts between firms and other parties, e.g. debtholders and 
managers (Watts, 2003a). Watts and Zimmerman (1986) point out that accounting 
numbers can be used to reduce agency costs, which occur because contracting parties may 
want to take opportunistic behaviours to maximise their wealth at the expense of 
shareholders.    
2.3.2.1.1. Debt monitoring 
Prior studies show that the agency problems of debts arise because information 
asymmetry exists (Black and Cox, 1976; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Managers and 
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shareholders with superior information may take actions that negatively affect the wealth 
of debtholders, or they may fail to provide relevant information about the 
creditworthiness of the borrowing firms to debtholders.  
A common mechanism to mitigate the agency problems of debts is the use of debt 
contracts with restrictive covenants (see, e.g., Watts, 2003a; Nikolaev, 2010; Erkens et 
al., 2014). For example, debt contracts may require borrowing firms to maintain net assets 
at a minimum level or restrict dividend payments to guarantee that the borrowing firms 
have sufficient resources to repay debts. Smith and Warner (1979) provide evidence that 
debtholders include restrictions on dividends and financing policies in debt contracts to 
minimise the likelihood that managers and shareholders take opportunistic actions to 
maximise shareholders’ wealth at an expense suffered by debtholders. The intensity of 
financial covenants in debt contracts becomes even higher under uncertainty when the 
borrowing firms’ creditworthiness is not revealed at the date of loan initiation (Demerjian, 
2017). Debt covenants help to transfer control rights from shareholders to debtholders in 
certain situations, such as when borrowing firms face financial distress, so that 
debtholders may take appropriate actions to protect themselves in a timely manner (Watts, 
2003a).  
In addition to debt covenants, accounting conservatism can be used as another mechanism 
to mitigate the conflicts of interests between debtholders and managers and shareholders 
(Ahmed, Billings, Morton, and Stanford-Harris, 2002; Watts, 2003a; Nikolaev, 2010). As 
noted by Ball and Shivakumar (2005), two roles of accounting conservatism are to offset 
a potential increase in net assets and financial performance resulting from managers’ 
opportunistic behaviours and to require managers to recognise bad news timely. More 
accounting conservatism would lead to faster violation of accounting-based covenants. In 
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other words, accounting conservatism facilitates the violation of debt covenants, so that 
debtholders may take proactive actions, such as debt renegotiation or restructuring, to 
protect themselves (Watts, 2003a).  
The empirical evidence supports the view that accounting conservatism can benefit 
debtholders because it helps to increase the efficiency of debt contracts (Ahmed et al., 
2002; Beatty, Weber, and Yu, 2008; Zhang, 2008; Nikolaev, 2010). Tan (2013) indicates 
that borrowing firms adopt conservative accounting immediately after the violation of 
debt covenants, suggesting that accounting conservatism is used for debt contracting. 
Ahmed et al. (2002) indicate that accounting conservatism helps to mitigate the conflicts 
of interests between shareholders and debtholders over dividend policies. Instead of 
including restrictions on dividend payments in debt contracts, borrowing firms may 
choose to report more conservative earnings and assets, which provide lower boundaries 
to guarantee loan payments. Nikolaev (2010) argues that, in public debt contracts, 
restrictive covenants are effective only if borrowing firms report conservative earnings 
that include timely loss recognition. He finds that dependence on restrictive covenants is 
positively correlated with accounting conservatism. Zhang (2008) supports the view that 
accounting conservatism is beneficial because it provides lenders with an early indication 
of default risks of borrowing firms. Additionally, Li (2013) provides a theoretical model 
to examine the impact of accounting conservatism on the efficiency of debt contracting 
via the renegotiation of debt covenants. The author shows that accounting conservatism 
may increase the welfare of firms in certain conditions when the renegotiation cost is not 
high. 
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2.3.2.1.2. Managerial control 
Next, accounting conservatism can be used as a management control tool (Watts, 2003a). 
In compensation contracts, financial performance provides a good reflection on 
management performance during management tenure so that compensation is measured 
correctly. In this case, managers with superior information may take opportunistic actions 
at the cost of shareholders, e.g. they may overestimate future cash flows and earnings so 
that they can extract higher compensation. The role of accounting conservatism is that it 
provides shareholders with timely information so that they may correctly evaluate 
managers’ performance and defer compensation bonuses under uncertain circumstances.  
There is evidence to support the view that accounting conservatism is useful for 
shareholders. For example, in a principal-agent (or shareholder-manager) setting, Kwon, 
Niwman, and Suh (2001) and Kwon (2005) provide theoretical models showing that 
accounting conservatism is useful to reduce agency costs when penalties imposed by 
principals for wrongful actions of agents are limited and helpful to mitigate agency costs 
related to suboptimal decisions made by agents. Lafond and Roychowdhury (2008) find 
that accounting conservatism is negatively affected by the ownerships of managers. The 
authors explain that, when managerial ownership decreases, there are higher agency 
problems, which lead to higher demand for accounting conservatism as a managerial 
control. LaFond and Watts (2008) indicate that accounting conservatism decreases 
information asymmetry between insiders and investors who are uninformed and to reduce 
related costs. The findings of LaFond and Watts (2008) suggest that conservative earnings 
benefit shareholders because it can act as a managerial control to reduce information risk. 
Francis, Hasan, and Wu (2013) show further evidence that accounting conservatism leads 
to higher firm stock performance during a financial crisis. In line with LaFond and Watts 
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(2008), Francis et al. (2013) also find that the relationship is stronger for firms which 
have weak corporate governance and for firms which have higher information risk. 
Furthermore, using UK compensation data, O'Connell (2006) shows that the cash 
component of CEO compensation is more sensitive to accounting conservatism in good 
news periods than in bad news periods. The findings lend support to the position that 
firms defer compensation awards during good news periods due to uncertainty concerns. 
Recent studies also support the notion that accounting conservatism can act as a 
managerial control, e.g. it helps to mitigate the costs of CEO overconfidence (Hsu, 
Novoselov, and Wang, 2017). 
2.3.2.1.3. Corporate governance 
Accounting conservatism can serve as a corporate governance mechanism (Watts, 
2003a). Managers have motivations to conceal poor financial performance so that they 
can extend their tenure in companies. Managers may also be involved in activities which 
have negative effects on shareholders’ wealth, e.g. they build their empire by investing in 
many projects even with negative present values. Accounting conservatism results in 
reduced book values which provide boards of directors and shareholders with early 
signals about the managers’ performance for further investigation. For example, 
managers can be forced to abandon projects with negative present values.  
There is evidence on the relationships among corporate governance, accounting 
conservatism, and shareholders’ wealth (e.g., Ahmed and Duellman, 2007; García Lara, 
García Osma, and Penalva, 2009a, 2011; Louis, Sun, and Urcan, 2012; García Lara, 
García Osma, and Penalva, 2014; Lee, Li, and Sami, 2015; García Lara et al., 2016; Kim 
and Zhang, 2016; Goh, Lim, Lobo, and Tong, 2017). For example, previous research 
shows that strong corporate governance leads to more accounting conservatism (Ahmed 
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and Duellman, 2007; García Lara, García Osma, et al., 2009a), which in turn helps firms 
gain access to the debt market and increase their investment efficiency, e.g. reduce 
underinvestment and overinvestment (García Lara et al., 2016). Accounting conservatism 
also helps to increase the values of cash holdings (Louis et al., 2012), reduce the costs of 
capital (García Lara et al., 2011; Li, 2015; Goh et al., 2017), mitigate information 
asymmetry by improving the information environment (García Lara et al., 2014), prevent 
negative market reactions following seasoned equity offerings (Goh et al., 2017), reduce 
audit fees (Lee et al., 2015), and lower the risk of a stock price crash (Kim and Zhang, 
2016). 
2.3.2.2. Litigation, regulation, and taxation 
Empirical studies provide evidence that accounting practices are determined by litigation, 
regulation, and taxation. For example, Ettredge, Huang, and Zhang (2016) studied public 
companies which are facing lawsuits for the violation of US GAAP. The authors show 
that accounting conservatism helps firms mitigate litigation risk from the initiation of 
lawsuits against them to lawsuit resolutions. Specifically, they find that accounting 
conservatism helps to reduce subsequent lawsuits against them as well as negative market 
reactions following lawsuits, lawsuit lengths, lawsuit discharges, and penalties. Using a 
sample of firms investigated by the SEC for accounting fraud, Alam and Petruska (2012) 
examine whether changes in litigation risk affect accounting conservatism. They argue 
that the SEC’s investigation and public discovery of accounting fraud leads to higher 
litigation risk for firms. They find that accounting conservatism in fraud firms is lower 
than in non-fraud firms in the pre-investigation period and that accounting conservatism 
in fraud firms increases in the post-investigation period. The findings suggest that 
litigation risk is an important determinant of accounting conservatism. Focusing on 
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managerial liability coverage, Chung and Wynn (2008) find a negative relationship 
between the coverage of managerial liability and accounting conservatism that the 
relationship is more pronounced when the litigation risk is high. The findings are 
consistent with the notion that litigation risk has an impact on accounting conservatism.  
Regarding regulations, Carel and Martien (2005) examine accounting conservatism of 
UK firms without cross-listing and UK firms with cross-listing in the US markets. The 
authors argue that cross-listing imposes more regulations and enforcements so that firms 
adopt more conservative earnings. The findings show that, compared to firms without 
cross-listing in the US, firms with cross-listing have more accounting conservatism and 
that accounting conservatism in cross-listing firms is higher in the early years of their 
cross-listing. 
Further evidence on the determinants of accounting conservatism can be found in the 
work of Qiang (2007), García Lara, García Osma, and Penalva (2009b) and Bushman and 
Piotroski (2006). Qiang (2007) studied the determinants of conditional and unconditional 
conservatism. The author finds that conditional conservatism is determined by 
contracting demand and litigation while unconditional conservatism is affected by 
litigation, regulation, and taxation. García Lara, García Osma, et al. (2009b) further 
extend the finding of Qiang (2007) by providing evidence that conditional conservatism 
is affected by regulations and taxation in certain circumstances, e.g. when firms are able 
to transfer income from unfavourable periods, e.g. periods with high pressure of taxation 
and public scrutiny, to favourable periods, e.g. periods with low pressure of taxation and 
public scrutiny. Using international data, Bushman and Piotroski (2006) also provide 
evidence that firms’ accounting conservatism is affected by national-level institutional 
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characteristics, namely the legal system, security legislation, the political economy, and 
the tax regime.  
2.3.3. Costly consequences of accounting conservatism 
As discussed above, accounting conservatism is used for contracting demand and for 
litigation, regulation, and taxation. The literature also documents significant and growing 
evidence that accounting conservatism is associated with costs for firms. 
Caskey and Laux (2017) propose a theoretical model of the relationships among corporate 
governance, accounting conservatism, and manipulation. The authors find that firms may 
prefer accounting conservatism as it plays a better overseeing role for investments. 
Unfortunately, they find that accounting conservatism provides managers with 
opportunities to manipulate financial statements to mislead boards of directors and affect 
the boards’ decisions. In such situations, firms can only increase the benefits of 
accounting conservatism and reduce managers’ ability to manage earnings when they 
effectively oversee the reporting process.  
Similar to Caskey and Laux (2017), Gigler, Kanodia, Sapra, and Venugopalan (2009) and 
Li (2013) provide a theoretical framework indicating that accounting conservatism may 
be costly in some circumstances. Gigler et al. (2009) develop the statistical and 
informational characteristics of conservatism, which show that accounting conservatism 
would reduce debt contracting efficiency. Similarly, the theoretical model of Li (2013) 
indicates that, when the renegotiation of covenants is not viable or is induced by very 
high costs, accounting conservatism reduces the efficiency of debt contracts.  
Direct empirical evidence on the unexpected consequences of accounting conservatism 
can be found in the work of Heflin, Hsu, and Jin (2014) and Kravet (2014). Heflin et al. 
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(2014) find that conditional conservatism reduces reported earnings’ usefulness for share 
valuation purposes. The evidence indicates that conditional conservatism negatively 
affects the persistence and informativeness of earnings, which are important for earnings 
forecasting. The findings also suggest that analysts’ exclusions of GAAP earnings make 
earnings forecasts more useful for investors. Kravet (2014) finds that accounting 
conservatism prevents managers from taking risky investments, which potentially yield 
high returns for shareholders. The author also finds that the negative relationship between 
borrowing firms’ accounting conservatism and merger and acquisition activities is driven 
by accounting-based covenants in debt contracts.  
In addition to Heflin et al. (2014) and Kravet (2014), there is a significant and growing 
body of research which shares the view that accounting conservatism is costly because it 
accelerates the violation of debt covenants, which, in turn, causes related costs to 
borrowers. Beneish and Press (1993) find that borrowing firms suffer significant costs for 
refinancing, restructuring debts or changing operations when they fall into technical 
default. The authors also reveal that borrowing firms even suffer more restrictions on 
operating and financing activities if debt contracts are renegotiated following a technical 
default. Debtholders with significant control rights over borrowing firms may facilitate 
the renegotiation of covenants even when technical default is not close, or there is no 
violation of covenants (Denis and Wang, 2014). The violation of debt covenants 
potentially affects shareholders’ wealth, as evidenced by reductions in capital investments 
(Chava and Roberts, 2008; Nini, Smith, and Sufi, 2012), investments in profitable 
projects (Nash, Netter, and Poulsen, 2003), and mergers and acquisitions (Nini et al., 
2012). Debt covenant violation may also cause higher bid–ask spreads and higher 
volatility of stock returns (Gao, Khan, and Tan, 2017), negative reactions from auditors 
such as an increase in audit fees, going-concern audit opinion, or even the resignation of 
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auditors (Bhaskar, Krishnan, and Yu, 2017; Gao et al., 2017). Bhaskar et al. (2017) 
indicate that the negative reactions from auditors are stronger for firms that do not face 
financial distresses because the violation of debt covenants is an indicator that audit risks 
in non-distressed firms may not be assessed correctly so that accessed risks need to be 
adjusted, leading to higher risks and costs for auditors. 
2.3.4. Modelling accounting conservatism 
As discussed in Section 2.3.1, unconditional and conditional are two types of accounting 
conservatism (Ball and Shivakumar, 2005; Beaver and Ryan, 2005). This section 
introduces major empirical models to estimate accounting conservatism. 
2.3.4.1. Conditional conservatism models 
2.3.4.1.1. Basu (1997) model 
The most influential model to estimate conditional conservatism was introduced by Basu 
(1997). In a seminal work, Basu (1997) offered a model to measure the asymmetric 
timeliness of bad news over good news. In this model, he uses stock returns as a measure 
of news. Basu (1997) finds that the higher degree of verification requirements underlying 
the concept of accounting conservatism results in asymmetric recognition of bad news 
over goods news. Under conservative accounting, bad news is recorded more quickly than 
good news, leading to lower book earnings in bad news periods relative to good news 
periods. In Basu (1997), the asymmetric timeliness of bad news over good news is 
estimated as follows: 
Equation 2-14: Basu (1997) model 
𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
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Where: 𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡 is earnings per share of firm i in year t; 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡 is stock returns for the 
period from the beginning to the end of fiscal year t; and  𝐷𝑖,𝑡 is a dummy variable that 
equals one if 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡 < 0, and zero otherwise. The coefficient 𝛽3 is the measure of good 
news timeliness. The coefficient 𝛽4 is a measure of accounting conservatism, which is the 
incremental timeliness for bad news over good news. 𝛽3 + 𝛽4 is the total timeliness of 
bad news. In the model, 𝛽3 and 𝛽4 are expected to be positive. Equation 2-14 is run for 
each year in the sample. 
Although this model is one of the most cited models on accounting conservatism research, 
the validity of the conservatism coefficient is controversial. For example, Dietrich, 
Muller, and Riedl (2007) claim that Basu’s model is biased because it is based on some 
very unrealistic conditions. Pae, Thornton, and Welker (2005) and Roychowdhury and 
Watts (2007) suggest that there is a relationship between Basu’s conservatism coefficient 
and price-to-book ratio. Givoly, Hayn, and Natarajan (2007) show that Basu’s coefficient 
is sensitive to firm characteristics, which are not related to conservatism, e.g. the 
information environment which affects the reflections of news on returns. However, Ball, 
Kothari, and Nikolaev (2013b) explain that a limitation of the work of Basu (1997) is that 
the author does not provide formal econometric and comprehensive analyses to support 
the model, which could potentially invite questions from researchers about the validity of 
the model. Ball et al. (2013b) provide formal tests in different settings and conclude that 
Basu’s coefficient is valid. Ball, Kothari, and Nikolaev (2013a) provide further evidence 
to support the validity of Basu’s model. In general, regardless of some claims of bias, 
there is emerging and robust evidence that Basu’s coefficient is a valid measure for 
accounting conservatism. 
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2.3.4.1.2. Khan and Watts (2009)’s model 
So far, the chapter discusses Basu’s model to estimate conservatism conditional on news 
and evidence to support the validity of this model. A significant disadvantage of this 
model is that it is less efficient to test hypotheses at the firm or industry levels because it 
can only estimate the measure of accounting conservatism at the market level in each year 
(Ryan, 2006; Khan and Watts, 2009). 
Based on the work of Basu (1997), Khan and Watts (2009) developed a model to estimate 
firm-year conservatism. They developed empirical measures of the timeliness of good 
news (𝐺𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸) and the incremental timeliness of bad news over good news (𝐶𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸) 
based on determinants of accounting conservatism, which are mostly depicted in major firm 
characteristics, namely financial leverage, firm size, and market-to-book ratio. The Khan and 
Watts (2009) model is as follows:  
 Equation 2-15: Khan and Watts (2009) estimations of GSCORE and CSCORE  
𝐺𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽3 = 𝜇1 + 𝜇2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜇3𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜇4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡      
𝐶𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽4 = 𝛾1 + 𝛾2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾3𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡       
Where: 𝜇𝑗 and 𝛾𝑗 (j = 1-4) are obtained from the following annual cross-sectional 
regressions: 
Equation 2-16: The Khan and Watts (2009) full model to estimate firm-year accounting 
conservatism 
𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + (𝜇1 + 𝜇2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜇3𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜇4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡)𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 
(𝛾1 + 𝛾2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾3𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡)𝐷𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 
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(𝛿1𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿2𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿3𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿4𝐷𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿5𝐷𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿6𝐷𝑖,𝑡
∗ 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
Where: 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑖 is the natural log of the market value of equity at the end of year t; 𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡 
is the market-to-book ratio at the end of year t; and 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 is the sum of long-term and 
short-term debts at the end of year t, scaled by the market value of equity at the end of 
year t. The coefficients estimated from Equation 2-16 are used in Equation 2-15 to 
calculate 𝐺𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸 and 𝐶𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸. 
The model of Khan and Watts (2009) enables studies which require firm-year 
conservatism and has been widely applied. Later, García Lara et al. (2016) further 
modified the measure of conditional conservatism based on the work of Basu (1997) and 
Khan and Watts (2009). García Lara et al. (2016) incorporated the measure of the 
asymmetric timeliness of bad news over good news (CSCORE) and the measure of the 
timeliness of good news (GSCORE) together, and they refer to the new measure as total 
conservatism (CONS). 
Equation 2-17: García Lara et al. (2016) total conservatism estimation 
𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐺𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐶𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡 
The measure of total accounting conservatism of García Lara et al. (2016) is based on the 
idea of Basu (1997). As stated in Equation 2-14, in the Basu model, the coefficient 𝛽3 is 
the measure of good news timeliness, while the coefficient 𝛽4 is a measure of the 
incremental timeliness for bad news over good news. 𝛽3 + 𝛽4 is the total timeliness of 
bad news.  CONS following García Lara et al. (2016) is the measure of total timeliness of 
bad news for each firm in each year (firm-year measure), while 𝛽3 + 𝛽4 in the Basu model 
is market measure in each year. 
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2.3.4.1.3. Ball and Shivakumar (2005) model 
Although earnings-return models to estimate accounting conservatism have been widely 
applied, a major limitation is that these models cannot be used for private firms as there 
is no share price and returns for those firms (Ball and Shivakumar, 2005, 2008). Ball and 
Shivakumar (2005) introduced a model to estimate accounting conservatism, which only 
employs accounting numbers. They developed this model to estimate the asymmetric 
timeliness of loss recognition. They argue that good news and bad news affect the 
revisions of both current cash flows and expected future cash flows because cash flows 
generated from an asset are more likely to be correlated. Current-period accruals include 
the timely recognition of good news (gains) and bad news (losses), which reflect changes 
in expected future cash flows. Therefore, the timely asymmetric recognition of economic 
gains (good news) and losses (bad news) causes a positive relationship between current-
period accruals and current-period cash flows. The model is as follows: 
Equation 2-18: Ball and Shivakumar (2005) model 
𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼1 + 𝛽1𝐷𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡   
Where: 𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖,𝑡 is accruals that are calculated as follows: 𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = ∆𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑡 +  ∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡 +
∆𝑂𝐶𝐴𝑖,𝑡 − ∆𝑃𝐴𝑌𝑖,𝑡 − ∆𝑂𝐶𝐿𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑖,𝑡, where ∆𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑡 is change in inventories from the 
end of year t-1 to the end of year t, ∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡 is change in receivables from the end of year 
t-1 to the end of year t, ∆𝑂𝐶𝐴𝑖,𝑡 is change in other current assets from the end of year t-1 
to the end of year t, ∆𝑃𝐴𝑌𝑖,𝑡 is change in payables from the end of year t-1 to the end of 
year t, ∆𝑂𝐶𝐿𝑖,𝑡 is change in other current liabilities from the end of year t-1 to the end of 
year t, and 𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑖,𝑡 is depreciation and amortisation in year t; 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 is cash flow from 
operations, which equals net income before extraordinary items (𝐼𝐵𝑖,𝑡) minus accruals 
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(𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖,𝑡); 𝐷𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 is a dummy variable that equals one if 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 < 0, and zero otherwise; 
All variables are scaled by total assets at the end of year t-1.  
In this model, 𝛽2 is expected to be negative following Dechow et al. (1998), who show 
that accruals have a contemporaneous negative relationship with operating cash flows. 
Ball and Shivakumar (2005) find that 𝛽3 is positive, because accruals are more likely to 
reflect losses in periods with negative cash flows.  
Later, Ball and Shivakumar (2008) further improved the model of Ball and Shivakumar 
(2005) by adding changes in sales and PPE to control for firm characteristics which may 
affect accruals. 
Equation 2-19: Ball and Shivakumar (2008) model 
𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼1 + 𝛽1𝐷𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡     
Where: ∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is change in sales from year t-1 to year t; and 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is gross PPE at the 
end of year t; all scaled by total assets at the end of year t-1. 
2.3.4.2. Unconditional conservatism models 
So far, the chapter has discussed popular models to estimate conditional conservatism, 
which is dependent on the news (bad news versus good news). Compared with conditional 
conservatism models, there are relatively fewer attempts to develop a model to capture 
unconditional conservatism.  
Givoly and Hayn (2000) proposed a measure of unconditional conservatism. Under 
conservative accounting practices, earnings tend to have negative skewness because of 
the downward book values of assets. Givoly and Hayn (2000) used the difference between 
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the skewness of cash flows and skewness of earnings (SKEWNESS) as a measure of 
unconditional conservatism. The variable SKEWNESS is calculated as follows: 
Equation 2-20: Givoly and Hayn (2000) calculation of the difference between cash flows 
skewness and earnings skewness 
𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊𝑁𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 =
(𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 − 𝜇𝐶𝐹𝑂,𝑖,𝑡)
3
(𝛿𝐶𝐹𝑂,𝑖,𝑡)
3 −
(𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡 − 𝜇𝑁𝐼,𝑖,𝑡)
3
(𝛿𝑁𝐼,𝑖,𝑡)
3  
Where: 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 is cash flows from operations of firm i in year t and 𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡 is net income of 
firms i in year t, all scaled by total assets in year t-1. 𝜇𝐶𝐹𝑂,𝑖,𝑡 and 𝜇𝑁𝐼,𝑖,𝑡 are the mean of 
cash flows from operations and net incomes, respectively, of firm i over a five-year period 
from year t-4 to year t. 𝛿𝐶𝐹𝑂,𝑖,𝑡 and 𝛿𝑁𝐼,𝑖,𝑡 are the standard deviations of cash flows from 
operations and net incomes, respectively, of firm i over a five-year period from year t-4 
to year t.  
Next, Givoly and Hayn (2000) also used the accumulation of non-operating accruals as a 
proxy of unconditional conservatism. Non-operating accruals do not include accruals 
from depreciation, amortisation, and operating accruals. Instead, non-operating accruals 
mostly include accruals from items whose timing and recognised amount are affected by 
the discretion of managers, such as bad debt provisions, restructuring charges, changes in 
accounting estimates, disposals of assets, write-downs of assets, or revenue deferrals. 
Givoly and Hayn (2000) argue that the negative accumulation of non-operating accruals 
is an indicator of accounting conservatism. Calculation of negative non-operating 
accruals (NOACC) is as follows: 
Equation 2-21: Givoly and Hayn (2000) calculation of negative non-operating accruals 
𝑁𝑂𝐴𝐶𝐶 𝑡 = −1 ∗ {𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠 𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡  −  𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑡} 
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                  =  −1
∗ {[(𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡  +  𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡)
−  𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡]
− [∆𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑡  +  𝛥 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑡  
+ 𝛥 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑡 −  𝛥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑡
−  𝛥 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑡]}  
The measures of unconditional conservatism i.e., the difference in cash flow skewness 
and earnings skewness and accumulation of negative non-operating accruals, proposed 
by Givoly and Hayn (2000), have been widely applied in accounting studies (e.g., Qiang, 
2007; García Lara, García Osma, et al., 2009a; Ahmed and Duellman, 2013). 
2.4. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I overview the concept of earnings quality, which is the foundation for 
three empirical chapters. I firstly explain what earnings quality is. In short, Dechow et al. 
(2010) broadly define earning quality based on the concept of earnings in accounting 
standards. Their view is that higher earnings quality provides more information about 
firms’ financial performance for a wide range of decision makers. This thesis takes this 
broad perspective to study the earnings quality of UK listed companies.  
Next, I discuss proxies for earnings quality and recent methodological advancements in 
estimating earnings quality. Based on Dechow et al. (2010)’s classification of earnings 
quality, I explain the properties of earnings, the responsiveness of investors to earnings, 
and observed indicators of misstated earnings. I also introduce a recent trend in empirical 
research which employs distributions of digits of numbers (e.g., Benford’s Law), 
linguistic and textual analysis as proxies for earnings quality. 
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After that, I discuss in more details about earnings management and accounting 
conservatism, which are the main focuses of this thesis. I firstly provide definitions of 
earnings management and accounting conservatism. I also explain why managers are 
involved in the use of earnings management and accounting conservatism. Finally, I 
quickly introduce empirical models to estimate earnings management and accounting 
conservatism. 
The content of this introduction chapter is applied to the three empirical chapters: Chapter 
3 “CEO profile and earnings quality”, Chapter 4 “Accounting conservatism and banking 
expertise on boards of directors”, and Chapter 5 “Benford’s Law, earnings management, 
and accounting conservatism: the UK evidence”. 
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3. Chapter 3: CEO PROFILE AND EARNINGS QUALITY 
Abstract 
This chapter presents the first empirical study that comprises this thesis. In this study, the 
relationship between CEO personal characteristics and earnings management is 
presented. CEO characteristics are aggregated into a PSCORE, which is a composite 
score based on publicly available data. The chapter reports strong positive relationships 
between the PSCORE and three types of proxies for earnings quality: (i) accrual earnings 
management, e.g. abnormal accruals (ii) real earnings management, e.g. abnormal cash 
flows, abnormal production costs, and abnormal discretionary expenditures (iii) financial 
statement errors, measured by deviations of first digits of figures reported in financial 
statements from what are expected by Benford’s Law. Further analyses indicate that the 
relationships between PSCORE and proxies for earnings quality become more 
pronounced when CEOs have high equity-based compensation incentives. The findings 
have some implications for practitioners.5 
Keywords: Earnings Quality; Benford’s Law; Chief Executive Officers  
                                                 
5 I gratefully acknowledge comments received from Balasingham Balachandran, Mark 
Clatworthy, Halit Gonenc, Young Sang Kim, Jia Liu, Jurica Susnjara, and participants at British 
Accounting and Finance Association’s Doctoral Masterclasses 2017, European Accounting 
Association’s Annual Congress 2017, and European Financial Management Association’s Annual 
Meeting 2017. The study built from this chapter was featured on the Columbia Law School’s Blu 
Sky Blog (http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2017/02/24/using-the-profile-of-ceos-to-detect-
earnings-management/). 
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3.1. Introduction 
A substantial body of research is committed to developing, validating, and improving 
empirical models to estimate earnings quality (Dechow et al., 2010). This chapter 
contributes to the stream of literature by introducing a novel approach which captures 
publicly available information on the personal profile of CEOs to signal red flags of poor 
earnings quality in individual firms. 
An accepted methodology to capture earnings quality is to estimate abnormal accruals 
(Dechow et al., 2010). Abnormal accruals are the residuals (or error terms) in the 
regressions between accruals and firms’ characteristics (e.g., Jones, 1991; Dechow et al., 
1995; Peasnell et al., 2000b; Dechow and Dichev, 2002; Kothari et al., 2005). Despite 
their importance, earnings quality models are subject to considerable criticisms. A major 
limitation of accrual-based models is the absence of an adequate understanding of the 
properties of accruals and a theory of the accrual-generating process; therefore the large 
magnitude of regression residuals may be inferred as showing poor quality of earnings 
(Fields et al., 2001; Dechow et al., 2010; Gerakos, 2012; Ball, 2013). There is also 
increasing concern that accrual-based models are poorly specified (Holthausen et al., 
1995; Fields et al., 2001; Dechow et al., 2010; Ball, 2013), or there may be measurement 
errors in estimating accruals (Hribar and Collins, 2002). Also, most models require large 
data sets to run time-series or cross-sectional regressions, and consequently their 
applications are limited because of data constraints (Dechow et al., 1995; Dechow et al., 
2011; Amiram et al., 2015; Nguyen, Iqbal, and Shiwakoti, 2015b). Nguyen (2016) also 
points out similar concerns over using the models to estimate real earnings management 
activities. 
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In this chapter, I offer a single measure which captures various CEO characteristics to 
signal earnings quality. The chapter constructs PSCORE based on nine CEO 
characteristics which have been documented in the literature as important determinants 
of earnings quality. These characteristics are (i) role experience as a CEO, (ii) previous 
working experience as a chief financial officer, (iii) finance-related qualifications, (iv) 
early years of service in the firm, (v) performance during the last three years of tenure, 
(vi) press coverage, (vii) serving as the chairperson, (viii) serving as a founder of firms, 
and (ix) age. The chapter hypothesises that the PSCORE is positively associated with 
other established proxies for earnings quality.  
The chapter employs established proxies for earnings quality, acknowledging recent 
developments in the field. I use three types of measures of earnings quality: (i) accrual 
earnings management, measured by abnormal accruals (Jones, 1991; Dechow et al., 1995; 
Peasnell et al., 2000b); (ii) real earnings management, measured by abnormal cash flows, 
abnormal production costs, abnormal discretionary expenditures (real earnings 
management) (Roychowdhury, 2006); (iii) financial statement errors, measured by 
deviations of first digits of figures reported in financial statements from what are expected 
by Benford’s Law (Amiram et al., 2015; Nigrini, 2015). 
The chapter uses a sample of 3,395 firm-year observations (615 unique firms) of listed 
companies on the London Stock Exchange from 2005 to 2012. Consistent with 
predictions, the results demonstrate strong positive relationships between PSCORE and 
the established proxies for earnings quality. Specifically, the univariate evidence shows 
that the levels of all proxies for earnings quality increase monotonically as PSCORE 
increases. Multivariate regression findings show that PSCORE is positively and 
significantly related to the magnitudes of abnormal accruals, abnormal cash flows, 
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abnormal production costs, abnormal discretionary expenditures, and deviations of first 
digits from Benford’s Law, after controlling for important determinants of earnings 
quality. Also, further analyses indicate that the relationships between PSCORE and the 
established proxies for earnings quality are stronger for firms which have CEOs with a 
higher equity-based incentive. The evidence provides collaborating evidence for the idea 
that the profile of CEOs matters for examining earnings quality. The results are robust for 
several robustness tests. In general, the findings suggest that a high PSCORE could 
indicate poor earnings quality. 
The research contributes to the literature in several ways. Firstly, a major advantage of 
the PSCORE is that data used to construct the PSCORE are mostly collected from 
publicly available curriculum vitae of CEOs. Because the PSCORE neither needs time-
series data nor requires cross-sectional data to estimate, it can be widely applied, 
especially in some capital markets where data are not publicly available or are costly to 
collect. Secondly, this is the first study which aggregates various characteristics of CEOs 
into a single index to signal the quality of earnings. Previously published studies are 
limited to the effects of a few individual CEO characteristics on earnings quality (e.g., 
Wells, 2002; Francis et al., 2008; Malmendier and Tate, 2009; Jiang et al., 2010; Huang 
et al., 2012; Kuang et al., 2014; Ali and Zhang, 2015). The findings are also consistent 
with the recent work of Liang et al. (2018), which offers a theoretical framework 
indicating that abnormal accruals are higher and more volatile in firms with less credible 
CEOs than in firms with more credible CEOs. Thirdly, the chapter is the first research 
which uses CEO characteristics to study three different aspects of earnings quality: 
accrual earnings management, real earnings management, and financial statement errors. 
Practitioners could value the PSCORE because it can signal the misrepresentation of 
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financial statements regardless of whether the misstatements result from intentional or 
unintentional acts.  
The study, therefore, has some important implications for practitioners. The PSCORE 
could be a useful tool for investment professionals, boards of directors, auditors, and 
regulators to assess the risks of poor earnings quality. It also has potential as an even more 
nuanced and sophisticated tool that can identify and regulate risks related to financial 
reporting quality. For example, in the context of auditing, external auditors could use the 
PSCORE to assess the risks of material misstatements. Auditing standards (e.g., 
International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB), 2009; Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board, 2010) require the risk assessment procedures of auditors to 
include an understanding of the entity and its environment, including the management’s 
philosophy and operating style. A high level of abnormal accruals, abnormal real business 
activities, and deviations of first digits from Benford’s Law, which are associated with a 
high PSCORE, might result from the inappropriate applications of accounting standards 
so that they could be red flags of material accounting misstatements. The evidence implies 
that auditors should be cautious when clients have CEOs have high PSCOREs.   
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 explains the theoretical background for the 
relevance of the CEO profile. Section 3.3 explains the construction of the PSCORE. 
Section 3.4 describes the validity tests of the PSCORE, focusing on sample selection, 
calculation of empirical proxies for earnings quality, control variables, and multivariate 
regression models. Section 3.5 presents findings and Section 3.6 provides concluding 
remarks. 
79 
 
3.2. Theoretical background for the relevance of the CEO profile 
This section briefly discusses the theoretical background for the relevance of the CEO 
profile in explaining earnings quality. 
The upper echelons theory proposes that executive managers’ characteristics, e.g. 
experience and personality, affect their interpretation of strategic situations, which in turn 
affects their decision making (Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Hambrick, 2007). Under this 
theory, it is predicted that organisational outcomes are directly determined by the 
discretion of top executive managers (Hambrick, Finkelstein, and Mooney, 2005). Given 
that CEOs have overall responsibilities for firm performances, it is reasonable to assume 
that they can indeed influence the financial statements which present the financial 
performance, financial position, and cash flows of their companies. Because accounting 
standards allow the use of professional judgments in choosing appropriate accounting 
policies or in estimating accounting numbers, when uncertainties exist, it makes 
characteristics of CEOs relevant to the financial decision-making process and therefore 
worthy of closer inspection.  
With a particular focus on reputation, an aspect of executives’ profile, there is also a good 
theoretical foundation to expect that the reputation of CEOs matters in the context of 
corporate practices. According to rent extraction theory (Hirshleifer and Thakor, 1992; 
Hirshleifer, 1993; Malmendier and Tate, 2009), managers opportunistically make 
business decisions to enhance their reputation rather than to maximise shareholders’ 
value. Efficient contracting theory (Fama, 1980) and matching theory (Francis et al., 
2008) note that highly reputable senior managers can positively affect organisational 
outcomes. Specifically, according to efficient contracting theory, top executives with high 
credibility (such as reputation) lead to high-quality organisational outcomes because they 
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have more to lose (compensation, future career, etc.) if they are involved in unethical 
activities (see, e.g., Francis et al., 2008; Jian and Lee, 2011).  
Recently, Liang et al. (2018) offered a theory on the relationship between the credibility 
of financial reporting, for which earnings quality is a proxy, and the credibility of 
managers. The authors theorise that, because of limited tenure or the horizon problem 
(Dechow and Sloan, 1991), managers have an incentive to maximise stock prices at the 
time of retirement. Under this theory, following the releases of periodic financial 
statements, risk-neutral investors reassess the credibility of financial statements 
previously reported by managers. Managers are dealing with a dynamic reporting 
problem. If they manage earnings aggressively at the beginning, e.g. release a series of 
very opportunistic financial statements, their credibility could be damaged so that there 
could be no more room to manage earnings to boost share price at the time of their 
retirement. If they report conservative earnings at the beginning, the book values are too 
low so that managers could face difficulties in boosting share price at retirement time 
even when managers have high credibility. For dishonest managers, they could choose to 
manage earnings and cash in their credibility in the early stage. The model of Liang et al. 
(2018) indicates that abnormal accruals are higher and more volatile in firms with less 
credible CEOs than in firms with more credible CEOs. What the model of Liang et al. 
(2018) tells us is that the profile of managers, such as CEOs, can be used to study the 
credibility of financial statements. 
To summarise, there are theories that support the view that there are relationships between 
earnings quality and the profile of CEOs. Empirical studies have also documented 
evidence for the link between CEO characteristics and earnings quality (e.g., Wells, 2002; 
Francis et al., 2008; Malmendier and Tate, 2009; Jiang et al., 2010; Huang et al., 2012; 
81 
 
Kuang et al., 2014; Ali and Zhang, 2015). However, previously published studies are 
limited to only a few characteristics. The following section discusses the construction of 
an innovative measure which I call the PSCORE, a profile indicator of CEOs, which has 
been documented in previous empirical studies to be linked to earnings quality. 
3.3. Construction of the PSCORE 
3.3.1. Financial expertise 
Financial expertise is a determinant of earnings quality. Using finance-related working 
experience and qualifications as proxies for financial expertise, Aier, Comprix, Gunlock, 
and Lee (2005) demonstrate that chief financial officers’ financial expertise reduces 
earnings restatement, which is a measure of earnings quality. Aier et al. (2005) argue that 
chief financial officers having high financial expertise are less likely to be involved in 
earnings restatement because they would play a better role in designing and implementing 
the internal control and financial reporting process, resulting in higher earnings quality. 
Similarly, previous studies indicate that audit committees’ financial expertise helps to 
increase earnings quality (Xie et al., 2003; Badolato et al., 2014). Financial expertise is 
important to the role of CEOs because CEOs have a legal duty to prepare true and fair 
financial statements of their companies. While Custódio and Metzger (2014) find that the 
financial expertise of CEOs is relevant for financial policies, there is currently a gap in 
the literature on the relationship between the financial expertise of CEOs and earnings 
quality.  
Following previous studies, I expect that the expertise of CEOs is associated with high 
earnings quality. The first three individual factors of PSCORE are as follows (e.g., Aier 
et al., 2005): (i) role experience of CEOs (pROLE), where pROLE equals one if the 
number of years a CEO works as a CEO is fewer than the corresponding industry-year 
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mean (identified by Datastream level-six), and zero otherwise; (ii) working experience of 
CEOs as a chief financial officer (pCFO), where pCFO equals one if a CEO does not have 
working experience as a chief financial officer, and zero otherwise; and (iii) advanced 
finance-related certification: a master of business administration (MBA) or a chartered 
professional accountancy qualification (CPA) (pCERT), where pCERT equals one if a 
CEO does not have an MBA or a CPA equivalent, and zero otherwise.6 The rationale to 
use these three proxies is that CEOs may have different ways of gaining financial 
expertise. Experience in the role of CEO helps CEOs accumulate financial expertise. 
CEOs may also gain financial expertise if they have working experience as a chief 
financial officer because that position is directly responsible for financial statements. And 
CEOs may study for advanced finance-related certification. 
Although some papers (Klein, 2002a; Bédard et al., 2004; Baxter and Cotter, 2009; 
Badolato et al., 2014; Cohen, Hoitash, Krishnamoorthy, and Wright, 2014) make 
reference to the membership of audit committees as an indicator of financial expertise, I 
do not use this indicator as a proxy. A member of an audit committee is most likely to 
have a finance-related certification or finance-related work experience as required by 
most corporate governance codes (FRC, 2003; FRC, 2012) and hence it has been captured 
by the other variables measuring financial expertise. 
3.3.2. Reputation 
                                                 
6 CPA equivalent refers to professional qualifications provided by accounting bodies accredited 
by Financial Reporting Council (FRC, 2016a). 
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The next individual factors of PSCORE are related to the reputation of CEOs. Currently, 
there is competing evidence on the relationship between reputation and earnings quality. 
Malmendier and Tate (2009) find that “superstar” CEOs inflate reported earnings and 
extract higher compensation after award winning. Similarly, Wade, Porac, Pollock, and 
Graffin (2006) find that the reputation of CEOs has a negative impact on organisational 
outcomes in the long term. In contrast, Francis et al. (2008) firms which have low earnings 
quality are more likely to hire reputable CEOs and that these firms do not manipulate 
earnings in the long term following the appointment of these reputable CEOs. This 
evidence suggests that reputable CEOs help to improve earnings quality because earnings 
management practice in the hiring firms disappears. Regardless of mixed evidence, I 
hypothesise that reputable CEOs are more likely to be associated with high earnings 
quality for several reasons. Firstly, the samples used in the papers of Malmendier and 
Tate (2009) and Wade et al. (2006) are unique (the samples are award-winning CEOs and 
CEOs selected as CEOs of the year, respectively); therefore the findings should not be 
generalised for all listed companies. Secondly, the results of Francis et al. (2008) are 
consistent with previous studies on the reputation of CEOs (e.g., Jian and Lee, 2011) in 
the position that, in the long term, reputable CEOs would lead to high-quality 
organisational outcomes because they have more to lose (compensation, future career, 
etc.) if they are involved with activities which are harmful to organisations they work for. 
Based on prior research (Milbourn, 2003; Francis et al., 2008; Jian and Lee, 2011), the 
next three individual factors of PSCORE are performance during the last three years of 
CEO tenure (pROA), early years of service of CEOs in a firm (pEARLY), and press 
coverage (pPRESS).  
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Here I define pROA as equal to one if the average of industry-adjusted returns on assets 
(aveROA) during the last three years of a CEO’s tenure is negative, and zero otherwise; 
where aveROA is (i) the sum of industry-adjusted returns on assets7 in year t, t-1, and t-
2 if a CEO is in the third year of tenure, or (ii) the sum of industry-adjusted returns on 
assets in year t and t-1 if a CEO is in the second year of tenure, or (iii) the industry-
adjusted return on assets in year t if a CEO is in the first year of tenure.8 The rationale is 
that reputable CEOs should have generated high firm performance (Milbourn, 2003). 
Next, I define pEARLY as equal to one if a CEO is within the first three years of service 
in the firm, and zero otherwise. The reason is that reputable CEOs should have longer 
tenure, given that the board of directors acknowledges their performance (Milbourn, 
2003). Empirical evidence also shows that earnings quality is low in the first three years 
of service of CEOs because CEOs have incentives to manipulate earnings to demonstrate 
their ability when the perception of the market about CEOs is uncertain in the early years 
(Kuang et al., 2014; Ali and Zhang, 2015). 
                                                 
7 The industry-adjusted return on assets is the difference between a firm’s returns on assets and 
the corresponding industry’s mean (identified by Datastream level-six), where returns on assets 
are equal to net income before extraordinary items divided by total assets. 
8 As robustness tests, this study uses different possible definitions for some factors such as pROA 
and pAGE. I transform pROA into pROA1, pROA2, and pROA3, in which returns on assets are 
calculated differently. For pROA1, returns on assets are equal to net income before extraordinary 
items divided by the market values of equity. For pROA2, returns on assets are equal to after-tax 
net income divided by total assets. For pROA3, returns on assets are equal to after-tax net income 
divided by the market values of equity. The results (not tabulated) do not qualitatively change. 
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Also, I define pPRESS as equal to one if the number of newspapers which simultaneously 
cite the name of a CEO and the company the CEO is working for in a year is less than the 
corresponding industry mean (identified by Datastream level-six), and zero otherwise. 
The rationale is that reputable CEOs should have been highly cited by the press 
(Milbourn, 2003). To measure press coverage, I search the LexisNexis using the CEO’s 
full name and company name as the keywords. If there is no result, I search for the first 
name and last name (omitting the middle name). In the LexisNexis database, I tick the 
options to eliminate duplicates, exclude non-business news, and restrict research results 
to UK national newspapers.9 I count the number of all newspapers found in the search 
result. Although the above procedure in measuring press coverage may be controversial, 
I believe that the measure reasonably captures the reputation of CEOs. Firstly, although 
Lafond (2008) doubts that not all news is good news for the reputation of CEOs, Milbourn 
(2003), Francis et al. (2008), and Jian and Lee (2011) show that overall the total number 
of newspapers fairly presents the reputation of CEOs. Secondly, while prior studies open 
search results to worldwide newspapers (for example, Francis et al., 2008), here I argue 
that if a global newspaper has headlines about CEOs of UK listed companies, the news is 
                                                 
9 UK National newspapers which were included in research results in the LexisNexis database are 
the Daily Star, Daily Star Sunday, Express Online, Independent Print Ltd, MailOnline, Morning 
Star, The Business, The Daily Mail and Mail on Sunday (London), The Daily Telegraph 
(London), Telegraph (London), telegraph.co.uk, The Express, The Guardian, The Independent 
(United Kingdom), The Mirror (The Daily Mirror and The Sunday Mirror), mirror.co.uk., The 
Observer, The People, The Sunday, The Sunday Times (London), and The Times (London). 
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also likely to be published in UK national newspapers; therefore expanding research 
results to the global realm may include duplicates. 
3.3.3. Internal power 
The next two individual factors of PSCORE are related to the internal power of CEOs in 
firms. In most companies, CEOs are powerful if they serve as the chairperson of the board 
of directors or are the founder of the firm. Most corporate governance codes place strong 
accountabilities on the position of the chairperson so that individual would play a very 
important role in overseeing activities such as monitoring the integrity of the financial 
reporting process (e.g., FRC, 2003, 2012). Also, the founders of businesses would be 
expected to participate in all the important business and financial policies of the company.  
There are some studies presenting evidence that powerful CEOs are more likely to result 
in low earnings quality. Dechow et al. (1996) show that the boards of directors of fraud 
firms are more likely to be dominated by powerful management. They also find that firms 
are more likely to manipulate earnings when CEOs serve as the chairperson of the board 
or founder. Consistent with Dechow et al. (1996), Farber (2005) also finds that the duality 
role of CEO and chairperson increases the likelihood of accounting frauds. Similarly, 
Feng et al. (2011) provide empirical evidence which suggests that powerful CEOs are 
more likely to dominate firms’ boards and chief financial officers so that CEOs may 
override internal control systems. In such situations, the chief financial officers could 
suffer pressure from CEOs and collude with CEOs to manipulate earnings. Later research 
on earnings quality uses dummy variables to control for CEOs who serve as the board 
chairperson or founder (e.g., Peasnell, Pope, and Young, 2005; Cohen et al., 2014; Petrou 
and Procopiou, 2016).  
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I also expect that powerful CEOs are more likely to be associated with low earnings 
quality. Based on the above-mentioned research, the next two individual factors are that: 
(i) CEOs serve as the chairperson of the board of directors (pCHAIRMAN), where 
pCHAIRMAN equals one if a CEO serves as the chairperson, and zero otherwise; and 
that (ii) CEOs serve as the founder or co-founder of the firms (pFOUNDER), where 
pFOUNDER equals one if a CEO serves as the founder or co-founder, and zero otherwise.  
3.3.4. Age 
The next individual factor of PSCORE is the age of CEOs. There are indications in the 
literature on the effect of age of CEOs on earnings quality. Huang et al. (2012), Serfling 
(2014), and Yim (2013) find that, compared to young CEOs, old CEOs are less likely to 
manage earnings. Because prior research does not provide a clear benchmark of how old 
is young, this study follows the literature to rank the age of CEOs in each industry-year 
to define young CEOs in relative terms. The research also considers the horizontal 
problem of CEOs’ tenure (e.g., Dechow and Sloan, 1991; Kalyta, 2009; Ali and Zhang, 
2015), which suggests that CEOs are more likely to manipulate earnings when they are 
young, or their age is close to retirement age. Taken together, the next factor of PSCORE 
is the age of CEOs (pAGE), where pAGE equals one if either (i) the age of a CEO is equal 
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to or less than the 25th percentile of industry-year (identified by Datastream level-six) or 
(ii) the age of a CEO is close to retirement age by one year or less, 10 and zero otherwise.11 
3.3.5. Other potential factors 
In addition to these CEO characteristics, there might be some other potential candidates 
for the construction of the PSCORE. For example, gender could be a potential factor 
because female directors are found to be more conservative, and therefore less likely to 
manipulate earnings (Barua, Davidson, Rama, and Thiruvadi, 2010). The marital status 
could also be relevant, as Hilary, Huang, and Xu (2016) provide evidence that firms 
having married CEOs exhibit higher earnings quality compared with firms having single 
CEOs because married CEOs are more risk averse and less likely to engage in earnings 
management. Jia, Lent, and Zeng (2014) find that facial masculinity is positively 
correlated with various measures of earnings quality. They argue that the hormone 
testosterone, which determines face shape, is also related to risk-taking behaviour such 
as involvement in financial misreporting activities. Narcissistic CEOs are more likely to 
                                                 
10 The retirement ages of men and women in the UK are 65 and 60, respectively, for the period 
from 1948 to 2010; and from April 2010 to March 2020 the retirement age of women increases 
one month every month until it reaches 65 (Bozio, Crawford, and Tetlow, 2010). 
11 As robustness tests, the chapter changes the definition of pAGE. Instead of considering one 
year prior to retirement age in the calculation of pAGE, I define pAGE1 equal to one if either (i) 
the age of a CEO is equal to or less than the 25th percentile of industry-year (identified by 
Datastream level-six) or (ii) the age of a CEO is close to retirement age by two years or less, and 
zero otherwise. The results (not tabulated) do not qualitatively change. 
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manipulate earnings, a behaviour consistent with their tendency of self-overidentification 
(Capalbo, Frino, Lim, Mollica, and Palumbo, 2018). There are other CEO characteristics 
which may also be linked with earnings quality, e.g. overconfidence (Ahmed and 
Duellman, 2013), managing style (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003), managerial ability 
(Demerjian, Lev, Lewis, and McVay, 2013), vocal tone optimism (Davis, Ge, 
Matsumoto, and Zhang, 2015), origin (Kuang et al., 2014), and personal life behaviours 
such as having a legal record or using luxury goods (Davidson, Dey, and Smith, 2015). 
Regardless of this evidence, the PSCORE does not include the above potential candidates 
for several reasons. First, the PSCORE already has a variable for age, which is an 
observable summary statistic which can be used to characterise different personality traits 
of CEOs such as effort, risk aversion, expected tenure, and human capital (Joos, Leone, 
and Zimmerman, 2003). Second, the sample shows that only 81 out of 3,395 firm-year 
observations (2.39 percent) have female CEOs.12 Given that there is less gender diversity 
among CEOs, including the gender in PSCORE may introduce bias. Third, I do not have 
sufficient data on marital status, masculinity, narcissism, and the other possible factors 
for all CEOs in the sample; therefore including those factors in the PSCORE would 
substantially reduce the sample.  
3.3.6. The PSCORE 
The construction of a single measure for CEO characteristics is important because this 
methodology helps to mitigate concerns about potential multicollinearity when individual 
                                                 
12 This low ratio of female CEOs is similar to previous studies on boards of directors in the UK 
(e.g., Nguyen et al., 2015b). 
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factors are included in the models (see, e.g., Larcker et al., 2007; Dey, 2008; Ellul and 
Yerramilli, 2013; Custódio and Metzger, 2014). As explained earlier, PSCORE is a 
composite score which aggregates nine aspects of the characteristics of CEOs. The 
PSCORE of a CEO who works for firm i in year t is calculated as follows: 
Equation 3-1: Calculation of PSCORE 
𝑃𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑝𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑝𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑝𝑅𝑂𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑝𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑝𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑝𝐸𝐴𝑅𝐿𝑌𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝑝𝐹𝑂𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑝𝐶𝐻𝐴𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑁𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑝𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡 
Under this construction, the PSCORE value theoretically ranges from zero to nine. A 
higher PSCORE suggests lower earnings quality. I also perform principal component 
analysis to see whether the construction of the PSCORE based on nine equally weighted 
factors is defensible. 
However, as discussed above, the PSCORE is not an exhaustive list of characteristics of 
CEOs, which could be correlated with earnings quality. Empirical evidence suggests that 
other potential candidates could be included in the PSCORE such as marital status, 
gender, masculinity, narcissism, and working experience as a member of an audit 
committee. Those variables are excluded because of data constraints, the introduction of 
bias due to less diversity if included, or internal correlation with other variables. Also, 
because the main purpose of the chapter is to introduce a tool which can be easily applied 
by average practitioners to assess risks of low earnings quality in individual firms quickly, 
the chapter limits the PSCORE to include CEO characteristics with publicly available 
data, e.g. data that can be collected from CEOs’ curriculum vitae or from financial 
statements. Therefore, I am satisfied that the PSCORE does cover some significant 
categories established by previous research on CEO profiles, which serves the situation 
well. The hypothesis is as follows. 
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H1: the PSCORE is positively associated with low earnings quality 
3.4. Validity tests of the PSCORE 
3.4.1. Sample selection 
Selection begins with all firms listed on the London Stock Exchange from 2005 to 2012. 
The sample starts from 2005 to avoid the effect of IFRS adoption (2005) in the UK on 
earnings quality, and it ends at 2012 to avoid the effect of a new corporate governance 
code released by the Financial Reporting Council (Financial Reporting Council (FRC), 
2012) which replaced the Corporate Governance Code issued in 1992 by the Cadbury 
Committee. The sample includes only live stocks as of 31st December 2012. While 
survivorship bias may exist, I omit dead stocks because the research requires extensive 
data of CEOs and corporate governance, which may not be available for delisted firms. 
Financial statements and International Securities Identification Number (ISIN hereafter) 
are downloaded from Datastream. The sample excludes banks, insurance companies, 
financial services, and utility firms. Companies with negative market values or negative 
book values of equity are also deleted. 
To calculate deviations of first digits of figures reported in financial statements from 
Benford’s Law, a measure of earnings quality, the analysis firstly replaces missing values 
with zeros.13 Because the research studies the first digits from one to nine, replacing 
missing values with zeros has no effect on the analyses. The next step is to extract the 
first digits of all items in balance sheets, income statements, and cash flow statements. 
                                                 
13 This approach is only applied for the calculation of deviations of first digits from Benford’s 
Law. 
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Similar to Amiram et al. (2015), the research takes the first digit after the negative sign if 
a number is negative, and takes the first non-zero digit if a number has an absolute value 
less than one. Total first digits for each company in each year are counted. Finally, I 
exclude observations with fewer than 50 first digits (or 50 figures in financial statements) 
in total to avoid measurement errors because those firms might be too young or not in 
continuing operations, and therefore including those companies may reduce the statistical 
meaning of the findings (Amiram et al., 2015).  
In the next step, I construct CEO data. In the first stage, I use ISIN codes to search the 
company in the Bloomberg database; then I identify the CEO position for each company 
in each year. When I do not find the CEO position in a particular year in Bloomberg, I 
download annual reports from Key Note to find the CEO under the role description 
section or based on signatures (with role description) on CEO reports and financial 
statements, as managing directors or executive chairpersons could play the role of CEOs. 
If there is an appointment of a new CEO in a particular year, I choose the new CEO 
because I believe that the latest CEO is the person who has a higher influence on the 
financial statements which are prepared after year end. Companies with missing CEOs or 
with joint CEOs are deleted. In the second stage, I search for the biographies of CEOs in 
Bloomberg. If Bloomberg does not provide the biography for any CEO, I search in the 
Key Note platform using the CEO’s name and ISIN code. If there is no biography of any 
CEO after the above procedures, I read the annual reports downloaded from Key Note to 
search for CEO information in the role description section. Then I search in the Financial 
Times and LinkedIn for missing biographies. Finally, if I cannot find sufficient 
information for the calculation of the PSCORE, I delete corresponding observations. 
Regarding the data of press coverage, I follow the procedure as stated in Section 3.3.2. I 
count the number of newspapers found in the search result. 
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To collect data on corporate governance for control variables, I proceed as follows. The 
information on external auditors, boards of directors, and audit committees is collected 
from Bloomberg. Missing information is read from Key Note. I also search for 
compensation and other information in the annual reports. Observations with missing data 
are removed. 
Finally, I match financial data, CEO data, and corporate governance data together, based 
on the ISIN code and fiscal year. The research derives 3,395 firm-year observations (615 
unique companies) in 48 industries (Datastream level-six) with sufficient data to study 
PSCORE with abnormal accruals. To mitigate the influence of outliers, all continuous 
variables in the samples are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
3.4.2. Earnings quality measures 
I use three types of measures of earnings quality: abnormal accruals, proxies for real 
earnings management, and financial statement errors. 
3.4.2.1. Abnormal accruals 
Under the accounting standards, accruals are used to recognise incomes and expenses 
when they occur rather than when they are received or paid. Prior research (Dechow et 
al., 2010; DeFond, 2010) indicates that abnormal accruals can be used as a proxy for 
earnings quality. The underlying assumption of accrual-based models to estimate 
earnings quality is how much accruals should be used depends on firms’ characteristics. 
Therefore, the residuals (or error terms) in the regressions between accruals and firms’ 
characteristics are treated as abnormal accruals (e.g., Jones, 1991; Dechow et al., 1995; 
Peasnell et al., 2000b; Dechow and Dichev, 2002; Kothari et al., 2005). Higher levels of 
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abnormal accruals suggest lower earnings quality. Peasnell et al. (2000b) show that the 
modified Jones model is the best model for estimating abnormal accruals in the UK. 
In this chapter, I use the modified-Jones model (Jones, 1991; Dechow et al., 1995) to 
measure abnormal accruals, where accruals are total accruals or working capital accruals. 
I run the following cross-sectional regressions for each (Datastream level-six) industry 
and each year and require at least ten observations for each regression. 
Equation 3-2: The modified-Jones model 
𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1 (
1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽2 (
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽3  (
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
Where: 𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑡 is total accruals (𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐼𝐵𝑖,𝑡 - 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡; in which 𝐼𝐵𝑖,𝑡 is net income before 
extraordinary items, 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 is cash flows from operations); 𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 is total opening assets; 
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 are sale in year t minus sale in year t-1; and 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is gross PPE; i is firm i; t is 
year; and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is the error term. Abnormal total accruals (𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑡) are calculated as follows: 
Equation 3-3: Calculation of abnormal accruals 
𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = |
𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
− [?̂? + ?̂?1 (
1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + ?̂?2 (
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 − ∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + ?̂?3  (
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
)]| 
Where: ?̂?, ?̂?1, ?̂?2, ?̂?3 are the coefficients estimated by the Equation 3-2; ∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡 are 
receivables in year t minus receivables in year t-1. 
𝐷𝐴𝐶 is the first proxy for earnings quality. Here I use absolute values of abnormal 
accruals because the PSCORE is designed to signal earnings quality without a particular 
emphasis on the directional effects of accruals on earnings. Residuals from the accrual-
based models reflect the amount of earnings being transferred from one year to another 
year, therefore both income-inflating and income-deflating accruals are more likely to 
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result in low earnings quality regardless of the directional effects of the amount of 
earnings transferred (Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006). Later studies also support the use 
of absolute values of accruals as a measure of earnings quality (Armstrong et al., 2010; 
Dechow et al., 2010; Jiang et al., 2010). 
In addition to total accruals, I also use working capital accruals14 as an alternative measure 
of accruals to avoid the affect of long-term accruals, e.g. depreciation accruals (Hribar 
and Collins, 2002). Using the same process with Equation 3-2 and Equation 3-3, I 
estimate abnormal working capital accruals (denoted as DWAC), which is used as the 
second proxy for earnings quality.  
Next, I apply the margin model of Peasnell et al. (2000b) to estimate abnormal working 
capital accruals because the margin model is found to be effective in estimating abnormal 
accruals in the UK. I run cross-sectional regressions following Peasnell et al. (2000b) 
with each industry-year (Datastream level-six) with at least ten observations: 
Equation 3-4: The margin model 
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1 (
𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽2 (
𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 − ∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
                                                 
14 Working capital accruals are calculated as follows: WACi,t = (∆CAi,t − ∆CHEi,t) − (∆CLi,t-
− ∆STDi,t); where WACi,t is working capital accruals, ∆CAi,t is current assets in year t minus 
current assets in year t-1, ∆CHEi,t is cash and cash equivalents in year t minus cash and cash 
equivalent in year t-1, ∆CLi,t is current liabilities in year t minus current liabilities in year t-1, and 
∆STDi,t is short-term debts in year t minus short-term debts in year t-1. 
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Where: 𝑊𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑡 is working capital accruals; 𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 is total assets; 𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 is sales; ∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡 
is receivables in year t minus receivables in year t-1; i is firm i; and t is year.  
Abnormal working capital accruals following Peasnell et al. (2000b), denoted 𝐷𝐴𝑀𝑃𝑖,𝑡, 
are the residuals of Equation 3-4. 𝐷𝐴𝑀𝑃𝑖,𝑡 is the third measure of earnings quality. 
Table 3-1 reports the average coefficients of Equation 3-2 and Equation 3-4 for 1995–
2012 of UK listed companies. Those estimates are similar to those reported by Peasnell 
et al. (2000b) and Nguyen (2016). The reason to report coefficients of the regressions for 
a long period is to verify whether estimations are reliable. Because accrual-based models 
are run for each industry-year, the findings here, using a sample from 2005 to 2012, are 
not affected.   
Table 3-1: Estimations of the accrual-based models 
  DAC (a) DWAC (b) DAMP (c) 
 Coefficien
t 
t-
statistic 
Coefficien
t 
t-
statistic 
Coefficien
t 
t-statistic 
Intercept -0.043*** -10.93 -0.002 -0.77 0.005* 1.96 
1/𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 -2.563 -0.06 73.533** 1.99   
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡/𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 0.032*** 3.78 0.047*** 6.83   
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡/𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.009 -0.44 0.025* 1.71   
𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡/𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1     0.478*** 17.59 
(𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 −
∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡)/𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1     -0.484*** -17.77 
Adjusted R2 0.333  0.374  0.372  
Note: The table reports the average parameters of Equation 3-2 (columns a and b) and Equation 
3-4 (column c) for the period from 1995 to 2012 of UK listed companies. The equations are run 
with at least ten observations for each industry-year (Datastream level-six). Variables definitions 
are presented in the Appendix at the end of this chapter. *, **, *** indicates significance level at 
10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
 
3.4.2.2. Proxies for real earnings management 
As discussed on Chapter 1, Section 2.2.4.2, Roychowdhury (2006) develop models to 
estimate abnormal cash flows, abnormal production costs, and abnormal discretionary 
expenditures. Later research shows that the models of Roychowdhury (2006) are effective 
97 
 
in detecting real earnings management (Athanasakou et al., 2009; Cohen and Zarowin, 
2010; Zang, 2012). The chapter applies models of Roychowdhury (2006). Similar to 
abnormal accruals, I use absolute values of abnormal cash flows, abnormal production 
costs, and abnormal discretionary expenses as proxies for real earnings management. 
To estimate abnormal cash flows, I run the following cross-sectional regression for each 
(Datastream level-six) industry and each year and require at least ten observations for 
each regression:  
Equation 3-5: Model to estimate abnormal cash flows 
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1 (
1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽2 (
𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽3 (
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
Where: 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 is net cash flows from operations; 𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 is total opening assets; 𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 is 
sales; ∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 is sales in year t minus sales in year t-1; i is firm i; t is year; and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is the 
error term. Abnormal cash flows (denoted DCF) are the absolute values of the residuals 
of Equation 3-5. 
To estimate abnoral production costs, I run the following cross-sectional regression for 
each (Datastream level-six) industry and each year and require at least ten observations 
for each regression:  
Equation 3-6: Model to estimate abnormal production costs 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
= 𝛼
1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽1
𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽2
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽3
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
Where: 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑖,𝑡 is production costs, which equals to sum of cost of goods sold and change 
in inventories from year t-1 to year t; 𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 is sales; ∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 is sales in year t minus sales 
in year t-1; ∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡−1 is sales in year t-1 minus sales in year t-2; 𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 is total opening 
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assets; i is firm i; t is year; 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is the error term. Abnormal production costs (denoted 
DPROD) are absolute values of residuals of Equation 3-6. 
To estimate abnormal discretionary expenses, I run the following cross-sectional 
regression for each (Datastream level-six) industry and each year and require at least ten 
observations for each regression:   
Equation 3-7: The model to estimate abnormal discretionary expenses 
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
= 𝛼
1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽1
𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
Where: 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖,𝑡 is discretionary expenditures, which equals to R&D expenses plus 
selling and administrative expenses; 𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 is total opening assets; 𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 is sales in year 
t-1; i is firm i; t is year; 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is the error term. Abnormal discretionary expenses (denoted 
DDISEXP) are the absolute values of the residuals of Equation 3-7. 
Table 3-2 reports the average coefficients of Equation 3-5, Equation 3-6, and Equation 
3-7 for 1995-2012 of UK listed companies. Those estimates are similar to those reported 
by Nguyen (2016). The reason to report coefficients of the regressions for a long period 
is to verify whether estimations are reliable. Because earnings management models are 
run for each industry-year, the findings of this chapter, using a sample from 2005 to 2012, 
are not affected. 
Table 3-2: Estimations of the Roychowdhury (2006) models 
 Variable DCF DPROD DDISEXP 
 Coefficient 
t-
statistic 
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient 
t-
statistic 
Intercept 0.028** 2.01 -0.199*** -15.21 0.178*** 12.51 
1/Ai,t−1 -734.570*** -8.00 -664.537*** -4.07 1705.314*** 9.65 
REVi,t/Ai,t−1 0.070*** 3.96 0.772*** 62.88   
REVi,t−1/Ai,t−1     0.106*** 8.59 
∆REVi,t/Ai,t−1 -0.021 -0.45 -0.005 -0.24   
∆REVi,t−1/Ai,t−1   -0.014 -0.61   
Adjusted R2 0.489  0.856 
 0.433  
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Note: The table reports the average parameters of Equation 3-5, Equation 3-6, and Equation 3-7 for the 
period from 1995 to 2012 of UK listed companies. Each equation is run with at least ten observations for 
each industry-year (Datastream level-six). Variables definitions are presented in the Appendix at the end 
of this chapter. *, **, *** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
 
In addition to the above three proxies for real earnings management, motivated by 
previous studies (e.g., Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Nguyen, 2016), I have a measure for 
total real earnings management (denoted REM), which is the sum of abnormal cash flows, 
abnormal production costs, and abnormal discretionary expenditures. The calculation of 
total real earnings management is as follows: 
Equation 3-8: Calculation of total real earnings management 
𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡  =  𝐷𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐷𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖,𝑡 
3.4.2.3. Financial statement errors  
Although the accrual and real earnings management models mentioned above are widely 
applied in accounting research, they are criticized because of some limitations, e.g. model 
misspecification (e.g., Fields et al., 2001; Dechow et al., 2010; Ball, 2013; Owens, Wu, 
and Zimmerman, 2013). Therefore, here I employ an innovative measure of earnings 
quality based on Benford’s Law, which is recently introduced by Amiram et al. (2015). 
Benford’s Law refers to the “law” of distributions of digits in a data set. In the absence 
of errors, every digit from 0 to 9 follows a particular frequency of distribution (Nigrini, 
1996; Amiram et al., 2015). The application of Benford’s Law to study earnings quality 
is one of the main focuses of the thesis, and a comprehensive overview of Benford’s Law 
and its’ application in accounting studies are presented in Chapter 5. This chapter briefly 
summarises the usefulness of Benford’s Law to study earnings quality.  
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There is a large and growing body of accounting studies applying Benford’s Law (see, 
e.g., Carslaw, 1988; Thomas, 1989; Nigrini, 1996; Niskanen and Keloharju, 2000; 
Caneghem, 2002; Nigrini and Miller, 2009; Carlos Gomes da Silva and Carreira, 2013; 
Amiram et al., 2015). Recently, Amiram et al. (2015) mathematically prove that an 
introduction of errors in financial statements results in more divergence from Benford’s 
Law of the first digits of figures reported in financial statements. They also find that 
deviations from Benford’s Law are associated with abnormal accruals and are helpful to 
predict material accounting misstatements. In their research, Amiram et al. (2015) offer 
a measure of deviations of first digits of figures reported in financial statements from 
what are expected by Benford’s Law, namely FSD_SCORE. Compared with other 
proxies for earnings quality, FSD_SCORE has some significant advantages (Amiram et 
al., 2015). Firstly, FSD_SCORE needs only firm-year data to calculate. Secondly, 
FSD_SCORE does not need a model to estimate, and it is simply statistics without biases. 
Finally, it is likely that there is no ex-ante relationship between FSD_SCORE and firm 
characteristics and firm performance. Using a similar approach, Nigrini (2015) also 
applies Benford’s Law to study abnormal patterns in accounting data of the US capital 
markets.  
In this chapter, following Amiram et al. (2015) and Nigrini (2015), I use the mean 
absolute deviation of the first digits of figures reported in financial statements from what 
are expected by Benford’s Law, or FSD_SCORE, as the next measure of earnings quality. 
The calculation of FSD_SCORE is as follows: 
Equation 3-9: FSD_SCORE calculation 
𝐹𝑆𝐷_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡 =
∑ |𝑂𝐵𝑆𝐸𝑅𝑉𝐸𝐷𝑑,𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐸𝐷𝑑|
9
𝑑=1
9
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Where: 𝐹𝑆𝐷_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is the mean absolute deviation of the first digits of figures reported 
in financial statements from what are expected by Benford’s Law; 𝑂𝐵𝑆𝐸𝑅𝑉𝐸𝐷𝑑,𝑖,𝑡 is the 
observed (actual) probability of the first digit d; 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐸𝐷𝑑 is the expected probability 
of the first digit d as defined by Benford’s Law; d = 1, 2, …, 9; i is firm i; and t is year.  
When financial statements are free of errors, FSD_SCORE equals zero because financial 
statements follow Benford’s Law (Amiram et al., 2015). An introduction of errors (which 
may result from intentional or unintentional acts) in financial statements increases the 
deviations of the first digits, and therefore FSD_SCORE can be used as a proxy for 
earnings quality. A higher FSD_SCORE suggests a lower earnings quality. 
Next, I use the KS statistic as the last measure of earnings quality. The KS statistic also 
relies on Benford’s Law, but it is the maximum deviation of digits from Benford’s Law, 
where the deviation is defined as the cumulative absolute difference between the observed 
and expected probabilities of each digit (Amiram et al., 2015). The calculation of the KS 
statistic is as follows: 
Equation 3-10: KS statistic calculation 
𝐾𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥{|𝑂𝐷1,𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐸𝐷1|, |(𝑂𝐷1,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑂𝐷2,𝑖,𝑡) − (𝐸𝐷1
+ 𝐸𝐷2)|, … , |(𝑂𝐷1,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑂𝐷2,𝑖,𝑡 + ⋯ + 𝑂𝐷9,𝑖,𝑡) − (𝐸𝐷1 + 𝐸𝐷2 + ⋯
+ 𝐸𝐷9)|}         
Where 𝐾𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is the maximum cumulative absolute deviation of the first digits of items 
reported in financial statements from that expected by Benford’s Law; 𝑂𝐷𝑑,𝑖,𝑡 is the 
cumulative observed probability of the first digit d (d = 1, 2, …, 9); 𝐸𝐷𝑑  is the expected 
probability of the first digit d (d = 1, 2, …, 9) as defined by Benford’s Law; i is firm i; 
and t is year. 
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In summary, to test the validity of the PSCORE in signalling the quality of earnings, I use 
nine different proxies for earnings quality: three measures of accrual earnings 
management (DAC, DWAC, and DAMP), four measures of real earnings management 
(DCF, DPROD, DDISEXP, and REM), and two measures of financial statement errors 
(FSD_SCORE and KS) which are based on Benford’s Law. 
3.4.3. Control variables 
In the main test, the study examines whether PSCORE is positively associated with the 
established measures of earnings quality. To differentiate the effect of other factors, I 
control for major determinants of earnings management. 
Equity issuance 
Firstly, the study controls for equity issuances. Firms are more likely to manage earnings 
before equity issuances because earnings are used for pricing shares. Prior research 
provides evidence that earnings are managed before equity offering (Teoh et al., 1998a; 
Teoh et al., 1998b; Iqbal, Espenlaub, and Strong, 2009; Iqbal and Strong, 2010) or before 
share-financed mergers and acquisitions (Erickson and Wang, 1999; Botsari and Meeks, 
2008). Therefore, I control seasoned equity offerings (𝑆𝐸𝑂) and share-financed mergers 
and acquisitions (𝑀&𝐴). SEO is a dummy variable which is equal to one if a firm issues 
a significant portion of equity (outstanding shares increase at least 5 percent and proceeds 
from equity issuance are positive), and zero otherwise (Nguyen et al., 2015b). M&A is a 
dummy variable which is equal to one if a firm announces a share-financed merger and 
acquisition deal, and zero otherwise. I expect the coefficients of both 𝑆𝐸𝑂 and 𝑀&𝐴 to 
be positive. 
Corporate governance factors 
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The second group of determinants of earnings quality are corporate governance factors. 
Firstly, the board of directors plays an important role in monitoring managers by 
reviewing and approving financial reports prepared by CEOs (see, e.g., Financial 
Reporting Council (FRC), 2003, 2012). The board is also involved in appointing or firing 
CEOs as well as setting CEOs’ compensation.15 As a way of providing board oversight 
and review, independent directors significantly contribute to higher-quality monitoring 
activities. Previous studies show that the independence of boards of directors affects 
earnings quality (Klein, 2002a; Peasnell et al., 2005; Iqbal and Strong, 2010). Thus, I use 
the control variable 𝑎𝐵𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐷, which is industry-adjusted board independence, where 
board independence is the percentage of independent members on a board of directors.16 
I expect the coefficient of 𝑎𝐵𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐷 to be negative. 
Secondly, the audit committee oversees the effectiveness of internal control systems, the 
integrity of financial statements, and the work performed by external auditors (see, e.g., 
Financial Reporting Council (FRC), 2003, 2012); therefore it might help to increase 
earnings quality. Empirical evidence shows that the independence of an audit committee 
negatively affects earnings management, which is related to low earnings quality 
(Chtourou et al., 2001; Klein, 2002a; Bédard et al., 2004; Vafeas, 2005). Following the 
previous research, the next control variable is industry-adjusted independence of audit 
                                                 
15 The board may directly or indirectly be involved in such activities through its subcommittees, 
such as those for compensation and nomination. 
16 The chapter uses the industry-adjusted values because the measures of accrual and real earnings 
management are calculated from industry-year. Industry-adjusted values are equal to actual values 
minus the corresponding industry-year mean. 
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committees (𝑎𝐴𝐶𝐼𝑁𝐷), where audit committee independence is the percentage of 
independent members of an audit committee. I expect the coefficient of aACIND to be 
negative. 
Thirdly, external auditors are found to be related to earnings quality, i.e., to constrain 
earnings management (Becker, Defond, Jiambalvo, and Subramanyam, 1998b; Balsam, 
Krishnan, and Yang, 2003; Krishnan, 2003). For example, Krishnan (2003) shows that 
firms having auditors with high expertise exhibit lower abnormal accruals than firms 
having auditors with low expertise. Similarly, Becker et al. (1998b) show that, compared 
with clients of non-Big Six auditors, clients of Big Six auditors display lower abnormal 
accruals. Later research (Peasnell, Pope, and Young, 2000a; Peasnell et al., 2005; Iatridis, 
2012) uses a dummy variable to control for the effect of big audit firms17 on earnings 
quality. In line with prior research, here I control for Big Four audit firm (𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇),18 
assigning one if a firm is audited by a Big Four audit firm, and zero otherwise. I expect 
the coefficient of 𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇 to be negative. 
Firm characteristics 
                                                 
17 The definitions of a big audit firm vary from study to study due to the specific sample. The 
audit market experienced several major waves of mergers and acquisitions since 1990; therefore 
prior research may use the Big Four, Big Five, Big Six, or even Big Eight firms. 
18 The Big Four audit companies are KPGM, Ernst and Young, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, and 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers. Missing data are replaced by zeros, as I assume that the firms are 
audited by non-Big Four auditors. 
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The next control variables are firm characteristics. I firstly control for firms’ financial 
distress (𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆) by calculating ZSCORE following Taffler (1983). DISTRESS is 
equal to one if ZSCORE is negative, and zero otherwise; where ZSCORE is calculated as 
follows (Taffler, 1983):  
ZSCORE = 3.2 +  12.18 ∗ X1  +  2.50 ∗ X2  −  10.68 ∗ X3  +  0.029 ∗ X4; where X1 =
 
Profit before tax
current liabilities
; X2 =  
Current assets
Total liabilities
; X3 =  
Current liabilities
Total assets
; X4 =
 
(Quick assets−Current liabilities)
(Sales−Pretax income−Depreciation)/365
 
Taffler (1983) and Agarwal and Taffler (2007) indicate that the probability of bankruptcy 
is highly associated with a negative ZSCORE. When the ZSCORE is low, firms are likely 
to face financial distress. Firms with financial distress might have pressure to inflate 
earnings to conceal their poor financial performance (Lara, Osma, and Neophytou, 2009). 
Therefore, I expect the coefficient on 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆 to be positive. 
The business life cycle is another factor influencing earnings quality. Beneish (1997) 
presents evidence that, in order to raise money from the capital market for the first time, 
young listed firms manipulate earnings to meet the expectation of the market. Lee, Li, 
and Yue (2006) find that firms having higher performance or a growth rate that exceeds 
expectations are likely to overstate earnings due to an increase in price responsiveness. 
Following Dickinson (2011), this study controls for the business life cycle (𝐶𝑌𝐶𝐿𝐸). 
CYCLE is equal to one if a firm has negative cash flows from operation (CFO), negative 
cash flows from investing activities (CFI), and positive cash flows from financing 
activities (CFF) (young firm), or has positive CFO, negative CFI, and positive CFF 
(growth firm); and is equal to zero if a firm has positive CFO, negative CFI, and negative 
CFF (mature firm). I expect the coefficient of CYCLE to be positive. 
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The next control variable is the industry-adjusted firm size (𝑎𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑀𝑉𝐸), where firm size 
(LOGMVE) equals the natural log of the market value of equity (e.g., Peasnell et al., 
2000a). Lang and Lundholm (1993) propose that, due to high scrutiny, larger firms are 
reluctant to manipulate earnings. Dechow and Dichev (2002) also report a negative 
relationship between firm size and low earnings quality. I expect the coefficient of 
𝑎𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑀𝑉𝐸 to be negative.  
The literature also documents that market overvaluation is a determinant of earnings 
quality. Firms with overvalued shares have incentives to inflate earnings to maintain high 
market value (Jensen, 2005). Empirical evidence supports the notion that overvaluation 
is positively associated with income-increasing earnings management (Chi and Gupta, 
2009; Houmes and Skantz, 2010). To control for overvaluation, I use industry-adjusted 
market-to-book ratio (𝑎𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑀𝑇𝐵), where the market-to-book ratio (LOGMTB) is the 
natural log of the ratio of market value divided by the book value of equity. I expect the 
coefficient of 𝑎𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑀𝑇𝐵 to be positive. 
The next characteristic which needs to be controlled for is financial leverage. On the one 
hand, Press and Weintrop (1990) find that debt levels are positively correlated with 
accruals. Debt contracts often include accounting-based covenants. Previous research 
shows that earnings are inflated to avoid violating debt covenants (DeFond and 
Jiambalvo, 1994; Sweeney, 1994). On the other hand, high financial leverage may 
contractually lead to conservative accounting (Watts, 2003a, 2003b), suggesting less 
positive abnormal accruals. Empirical evidence shows that financial leverage is 
negatively associated with low earnings quality (Pae, 2007). Following prior research 
(Peasnell et al., 2000a; Peasnell et al., 2005), I use industry-adjusted financial leverage 
(𝑎𝐿𝐸𝑉), where leverage (LEV) equals the sum of long-term debts and short-term debts, 
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scaled by total assets. I do not expect a specific sign of the coefficient of variable 𝑎𝐿𝐸𝑉 
because the previous findings are mixed. 
Lastly, the literature documents that earnings quality is affected by the ability to use 
accruals in the current period. Under the accrual basis of accounting, accruals are reversed 
in the later periods. Overstatement of net operating assets, as a result of inflating earnings 
in prior periods, would limit the ability to use accruals in later periods (Barton and Simko, 
2002). Baber, Kang, and Li (2011) argue that the magnitude and reversal speed of 
abnormal accruals in later periods affect the ability to manage earnings. To deal with this 
issue, I use the industry-adjusted net operating asset ratio (𝑎𝑁𝑂𝐴), where 𝑁𝑂𝐴 =
[𝐶𝐸𝑄 + (𝐷𝐿𝑇𝑇 + 𝐷𝐿𝐶) − 𝐶𝐻𝐸]/𝑅𝐸𝑉, in which CEQ is total book value of equity, 
DLTT is long-term debts, DLC is short-term debts, CHE is cash and cash equivalent, and 
REV is sales. I expect the coefficient of 𝑎𝑁𝑂𝐴 to be negative. Detailed calculations of 
control variables are in the Appendix. 
3.4.4. Multivariate regression models 
This study uses three sets of multivariate regression models to test the relationships 
between PSCORE and accrual earnings management, real earnings management, and 
financial statement errors. 
Equation 3-11: PSCORE and abnormal accruals 
𝐸𝑄𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡+𝛽3𝑀&𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑎𝐵𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝑎𝐴𝐶𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑌𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝑎𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑀𝑉𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽10𝑎𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽11𝑎𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽12𝑎𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀 
Where: 𝐸𝑄𝑖,𝑡 can be are DACi,t, DWACi,t, and DAMPi,t (used as substitutes). 
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Equation 3-12: PSCORE and proxies for real earnings management 
𝐸𝑄𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡+𝛽3𝑀&𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑎𝐵𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝑎𝐴𝐶𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐶𝑌𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝑎𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑀𝑉𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽9𝑎𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽10𝑎𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀 
Where: EQi,t can be DCFi,t, DPRODi,t, DDISEXPi,t, or REMi,t (used as substitutes). In 
Equation 3-12, I do not include auditor and net operating accruals as control variables, 
because there is little knowledge of how those factors influence real earnings 
management. 
Equation 3-13: PSCORE and financial statement errors 
𝐸𝑄𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡+𝛽3𝑀&𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐵𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐴𝐶𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑌𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑀𝑉𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽10𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽11𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽12𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
+  𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅/𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆 +  𝜀 
Where: 𝐸𝑄𝑖,𝑡 can be FSD_SCOREi,t or KSi,t (used as substitutes). In the Equation 3-13, 
as I include fixed effects, I use firm values of board independence (𝐵𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡), audit 
committee independence (𝐴𝐶𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡), firm size (𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑀𝑉𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1), market to book ratio 
(𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1), financial leverage (𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1) and net operating asset ratio (𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1). 
If coefficients 𝛽1 in the Equation 3-11, Equation 3-12, and Equation 3-13 are positive and 
significant, this is evidence that PSCORE can indicate poor earnings quality. 
3.5. Findings 
3.5.1. Descriptive statistics and correlations 
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Table 3-3 reports the descriptive statistics of firm characteristics, individual factors of 
PSCORE, proxies for earnings quality, and control variables in main regressions. At first 
glance, the numbers of observations of FSD_SCORE and KS are smaller than those of 
abnormal accruals because, as discussed in Section 3.4.1, the calculation of deviations 
from Benford’s Law requires firms with more than 50 items (or first digits) reported in 
financial statements. Looking at Panel A, the descriptive statistics of a firm’s 
characteristics are broadly similar to those reported by Goh and Gupta (2016) which use 
similar data. The descriptive statistics on individual factors of PSCORE reported in Panel 
B show that, on average, CEOs have low financial expertise (medians of all proxies for 
financial expertise are 1) and high reputation (medians of pPRESS, pROA and pEARLY 
are 1, 0 and 0, respectively). The statistics also indicate that fewer CEOs are chairpersons 
or founders of firms (medians of pCHAIRMAN and pFOUNDER are 0). Turning to Panel 
C, I observe that the values of DAC are the highest in all aspects (mean, standard 
deviation, median, 25th and 75th percentiles), and the values of DAMP are the lowest. 
Previous studies support these findings: Botsari and Meeks (2008) find that the approach 
of using total accruals has a tendency to result in larger abnormal accruals than the method 
of using working capital accruals, and Peasnell et al. (2000b) indicate that the Jones and 
modified-Jones models produce higher abnormal accruals than those estimated by the 
margin model when cash flows are unusually high. I also observe that the mean and 
standard deviation of FSD_SCORE of listed companies in the UK from 2005 to 2012 are 
0.0318 and 0.0097, respectively. These are similar to those of listed companies in the US 
reported by Amiram et al. (2015).19 In Panel D, the mean and median of PSCORE are 
                                                 
19  Amiram et al. (2015) report that the mean and the standard deviation of FSD_SCORE of listed 
companies in the US from 2001 to 2011 are 0.0296 and 0.0087, respectively. 
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3.8065 and 4 respectively, suggesting that the difference in the number of firms having 
CEOs with high PSCORE and firms having CEOs with low PSCORE is not large, given 
that PSCORE empirically ranges from zero to eight.20 Panel D also displays that the 
sample has more firms without equity issuance than firms with equity issuance (all 
medians of SEO and M&A are 0), has more firms audited by the Big Four than firms not 
audited by the Big Four (median of AUDIT is 1), has more firms not facing financial 
distress than firms facing financial distress (median of DISTRESS is 0), and has more 
mature firms than young or growth firms (median of CYCLE is 0). 
Table 3-4 reports Pearson correlations. The evidence shows that all correlations between 
PSCORE and proxies for earnings quality are positive and significant at the 1% level, 
suggesting positive relationships between PSCORE and earnings quality. While there are 
many insignificant correlations among independent variables, I still test 
for multicollinearity between independent variables using variance inflation factors 
(VIFs) obtained from the ordinary least squares regressions. The results (not tabulated) 
indicate that all VIFs are less than 2.47, which is well below 10, the indicative level of 
multicollinearity suggested by Neter, Kutner, Nachtsheim, and Wasserman (1996). 
3.5.2. Principal component analysis 
I employ a principal component analysis to see whether the methodology to construct 
PSCORE is defensible. In Table 3-5, Panel A shows that most correlation coefficients are 
very small (absolute values are less than 0.15), except for the correlations between 
                                                 
20 While PSCORE theoretically varies from zero to nine, there is no CEO with a PSCORE of nine 
in the sample. 
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pCERT and pCFO (0.4822) and between pEARLY and pROLE (0.5159). Many 
correlations are statistically insignificant. The findings indicate that auto-correlation 
among individual factors is not a concern with the construction of PSCORE. Panel B 
shows that CEO characteristics have multiple dimensions, as the first component can 
explain only 17.86% of the variance of original data and the cumulative variance 
explained by the fourth component is 58.04%. In Panel C, I observe that no individual 
factor has a loading that is too high.  
In summary, the principal component analysis suggests that no individual factor 
dominates other factors in explaining the variances of PSCORE; therefore, PSCORE can 
be used as a single measure of CEO characteristics with multiple dimensions. 
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Table 3-3: Descriptive statistics 
Statistics N MIN MAX MEAN STD MEDIAN P25 P75 
Panel A: Firm characteristics        
Total assetsi,t (£’000) 3395 1,392 28,411,781 990,192 3,623,169 79,632 18,599 419,650 
Salesi,t (£’000) 3395 17 18,057,594 792,155 2,393,480 78,888 14,404 421,338 
Net income before extraordinary 
itemsi,t (£’000) 
3395 
-84,000 2,875,916 66,335 327,540 2,535 -479 22,022 
Market valuesi,t (£’000) 3395 1,222 40,444,127 1,065,417 4,692,480 62,107 15,566 389,453 
Market to book ratioi,t 3395 0.1815 21.7704 2.8619 3.3567 1.7818 1.0306 3.2930 
Leveragei,t 3395 0 0.5929 0.1483 0.1492 0.1148 0.0051 0.2407 
Panel B: Individual factors of PSCORE             
pCFOi,t 3395 0 1 0.8251 0.3799 1 1 1 
pCERTi,t 3395 0 1 0.6393 0.4803 1 0 1 
pROLEi,t 3395 0 1 0.5339 0.4989 1 0 1 
pPRESSi,t 3395 0 1 0.7697 0.4211 1 1 1 
pROAi,t 3395 0 1 0.1820 0.3859 0 0 0 
pEARLYi,t 3395 0 1 0.2488 0.4324 0 0 0 
pFOUNDERi,t 3395 0 1 0.1628 0.3693 0 0 0 
pCHAIRMANi,t 3395 0 1 0.1007 0.3010 0 0 0 
pAGEi,t 3395 0 1 0.3442 0.4752 0 0 1 
Panel C: Earnings quality proxies             
DACi,t 3395 0.0010 0.5185 0.0782 0.0877 0.0503 0.0241 0.0991 
DWACi,t 3395 0.0007 0.3986 0.0617 0.0703 0.0388 0.0171 0.0786 
DAMPi,t 3395 0.0006 0.3827 0.0579 0.0658 0.0371 0.0167 0.0751 
DCFi,t 3139 0.0013 1.6551 0.1408 0.2313 0.0769 0.0334 0.1507 
DPRODi,t 3014 0.0024 1.0903 0.1780 0.1955 0.1183 0.0525 0.2264 
DDISEXPi,t 2650 0.0018 1.4821 0.2031 0.2488 0.1235 0.0502 0.2505 
REMi,t 2547 0.0040 2.7164 0.3649 0.4327 0.2380 0.1049 0.4413 
113 
 
FSD_SCOREi,t 3197 0.0132 0.0623 0.0318 0.0097 0.0309 0.0249 0.0374 
KSi,t 3197 0.0272 0.2147 0.0894 0.0387 0.0817 0.0610 0.1114 
Panel D: Independent variables of main regressions 
PSCOREi,t 3395 0 8 3.8065 1.5009 4 3 5 
SEOi,t 3395 0 1 0.2153 0.4111 0 0 0 
M&Ai,t 3395 0 1 0.0418 0.2002 0 0 0 
AUDITi,t 3395 0 1 0.5642 0.4959 1 0 1 
aBDINDi,t 3395 -0.4200 0.4370 0.0154 0.2153 0.0422 -0.1477 0.1752 
aACINDi,t 3395 -0.5000 0.9091 0.0100 0.2739 0.0000 -0.0909 0.0000 
CYCLEi,t 3395 0 1 0.0259 0.1589 0 0 0 
DISTRESSi,t-1 3395 0 1 0.2741 0.4461 0 0 1 
aLOGMVEi,t-1 3395 -3.7015 5.9248 0.2022 1.9650 0.0423 -1.2163 1.3871 
aLOGMTBi,t-1 3395 -1.9314 2.4059 -0.0365 0.8207 -0.0530 -0.5730 0.4558 
aLEVi,t-1 3395 -0.6185 0.3844 -0.0272 0.1568 -0.0472 -0.1205 0.0709 
aNOAi,t-1 3395 -113.0504 61.4047 -2.3055 16.7590 -0.1371 -0.5842 0.2959 
Note: Panel A, B, C, and D reports the number of observations (N), minimum (MIN), maximum (MAX), mean (MEAN), standard deviation (STD), 
median (MEDIAN), 25th (P25), and 75th (P75) percentiles of firm characteristics, individual factors of PSCORE, proxies for earnings quality, and 
variables of main regressions. Definitions of variables are in the Appendix. 
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Table 3-4: Pearson correlations 
    DAC DWAC DAMP DCF DPROD DDISEXP REM FSD_SCORE KS SEO 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
DACi,t (1) 1.00          
DWACi,t (2) 0.47* 1.00         
DAMPi,t (3) 0.37* 0.73* 1.00        
DCFi,t (4) 0.21* 0.19* 0.17* 1.00       
DPRODi,t (5) 0.10* 0.14* 0.19* 0.14* 1.00      
DDISEXPi,t (6) 0.19* 0.18* 0.18* 0.49* 0.37* 1.00     
REMi,t (7) 0.13* 0.13* 0.17* 0.54* 0.70* 0.60* 1.00    
FSD_SCOREi,t (8) 0.11* 0.08* 0.06* 0.08* 0.03 0.10* 0.06* 1.00   
KSi,t (9) 0.07* 0.07* 0.06* 0.05 0.00 0.07* 0.03 0.73* 1.00   
SEOi,t (10) 0.17* 0.15* 0.14* 0.08* -0.01 0.09* 0.01 0.07* 0.04 1.00 
M&Ai,t (11) 0.05 0.09* 0.09* 0.02 0.06* 0.06* 0.06* -0.01 0.01 0.21* 
AUDITi,t (12) -0.18* -0.16* -0.15* -0.07* -0.06* -0.06* -0.05 -0.22* -0.18* -0.12* 
aBDINDi,t (13) -0.08* -0.10* -0.10* -0.02 -0.02 -0.06* -0.02 -0.14* -0.11* -0.09* 
aACINDi,t (14) -0.08* -0.08* -0.09* 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.11* -0.10* -0.09* 
CYCLEi,t (15) 0.08* 0.10* 0.06* 0.06* 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 
DISTRESSi,t-1 (16) 0.13* 0.07* 0.05 0.12* -0.00 0.09* 0.03 0.13* 0.11* 0.25* 
aLOGMVEi,t-1 (17) -0.16* -0.17* -0.16* -0.04 -0.06* -0.08* -0.04 -0.25* -0.19* -0.19* 
aLOGMTBi,t-1 (18) 0.05 0.11* 0.13* 0.09* 0.19* 0.15* 0.16* 0.01 0.01 -0.02 
aLEVi,t-1 (19) -0.10* -0.11* -0.10* -0.07* -0.09* -0.13* -0.12* -0.12* -0.09* 0.03 
aNOAi,t-1 (20) -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.06* 0.05 0.05 -0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.01 
       
 
 
 
                  
  M&A AUDIT aBDIND aACIND CYCLE DISTRESS aLOGMVE aLOGMTB aLEV aNOA 
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(Continued)  (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
M&A (11) 1.00          
AUDIT (12) -0.02 1.00         
aBDIND (13) 0.02 0.36* 1.00        
aACIND (14) -0.02 0.25* 0.34* 1.00       
CYCLE (15) 0.05 -0.06* -0.03 -0.05 1.00      
DISTRESSt-1 (16) -0.01 -0.10* -0.14* -0.12* 0.12* 1.00     
aLOGMVEt-1 (17) -0.02 0.47* 0.58* 0.48* -0.11* -0.26* 1.00    
aLOGMTBt-1 (18) 0.01 0.08* 0.10* 0.17* -0.03 -0.02 0.34* 1.00   
aLEVt-1 (19) -0.03 0.17* 0.10* 0.11* -0.04 0.05 0.20* 0.03 1.00  
aNOAt-1 (20) 0.00 -0.05 -0.09* -0.07* -0.01 -0.01 -0.12* -0.01 -0.04 1.00 
Note: The table reports the Pearson correlation coefficients between selected variables. * is significance at 1% level. Definitions of variables are in the 
Appendix. 
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Table 3-5: Principal component analysis 
Panel A: Correlation Matrix of individual factors of PSCORE 
 pCFOi,t pCERTi,t pROLEi,t pPRESSi,t pROAi,t pEARLYi,t pFOUNDERi,t pCHAIRMANi,t pAGEi,t 
pCFOi,t 1         
pCERTi,t 0.4822 1        
pROLEi,t -0.0449 0.0012 1       
pPRESSi,t 0.0335 0.0596 0.0189 1      
pROAi,t 0.0243 0.0507 0.0919 0.0404 1     
pEARLYi,t 0.0678 0.0224 0.5159 0.0187 0.1116 1    
pFOUNDERi,t 0.0918 0.0905 -0.1426 -0.0391 0.0318 -0.0730 1   
pCHAIRMANi,t 0.0433 0.0333 -0.0463 0.0366 0.0045 -0.0115 0.0777 1  
pAGEi,t -0.0025 -0.0185 0.0869 0.0312 0.0117 0.0489 0.0380 -0.0118 1 
Panel B: Eigen values of the Correlation Matrix             
  Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative           
1 1.6077 0.0634 0.1786 0.1786      
2 1.5443 0.4907 0.1716 0.3502      
3 1.0537 0.0357 0.1171 0.4673      
4 1.0180 0.0240 0.1131 0.5804      
5 0.9940 0.0301 0.1104 0.6909      
6 0.9640 0.1356 0.1071 0.7980      
7 0.8284 0.2829 0.0920 0.8900      
8 0.5455 0.1010 0.0606 0.9506      
9 0.4445  0.0494 1.0000      
Panel C: Eigen vectors                 
  Prin1 Prin2 Prin3 Prin4 Prin5 Prin6 Prin7 Prin8 Prin9 
pCFOi,t -0.0011 0.6662 -0.1929 -0.0468 0.0852 0.0672 -0.1056 -0.5705 0.4104 
pCERTi,t 0.0061 0.6660 -0.1946 0.0046 0.0731 -0.0011 -0.0903 0.6172 -0.3523 
pROLEi,t 0.6674 -0.0309 -0.0104 -0.0730 -0.0396 0.1430 0.1291 0.3894 0.5982 
117 
 
pPRESSi,t 0.0724 0.1169 0.1951 0.8550 0.2369 -0.1135 0.3763 -0.0350 0.0173 
pROAi,t 0.2156 0.1259 0.3403 0.0285 -0.3359 -0.7664 -0.3454 -0.0268 0.0284 
pEARLYi,t 0.6494 0.0757 0.0150 -0.1098 -0.1281 0.1497 0.2117 -0.3692 -0.5834 
pFOUNDERi,t -0.2298 0.2396 0.5048 -0.4153 -0.0628 -0.0884 0.6661 0.0494 0.0680 
pCHAIRMANi,t -0.0891 0.1379 0.5101 0.2182 -0.4843 0.5806 -0.3035 0.0337 0.0147 
pAGEi,t 0.1427 -0.0007 0.5056 -0.1689 0.7496 0.0858 -0.3502 -0.0129 -0.0579 
Note: The table reports the results of the principal component analysis. Panel A reports the correlations between individual factors. Italic values indicate 
that coefficients are not significant at 5% level. Panel B (C) reports the Eigen values (vectors) of the correlation matrix resulted from the principal 
component analyses on nine individual components of the PSCORE. Definitions of variables are in the Appendix. 
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3.5.3. Univariate tests 
The univariate tests study how earnings quality variables change when PSCORE changes. 
It can be seen in Table 3-6 that the mean values of earnings quality proxies increase 
monotonically when PSCORE increases. Additionally, the last four rows of Table 5 report 
the results of the t-test under the null that the means of earnings quality proxies for the 
high-PSCORE group (PSCORE equals 6, 7, or 8) are the same as those of the low-
PSCORE group (PSCORE equals 0, 1, or 2). The findings demonstrate that, compared to 
the low-PSCORE group, the high-PSCORE group exhibit higher levels of abnormal 
accruals, abnormal cash flows, abnormal productions costs, abnormal expenditures, and 
deviations of first digits from Benford’s Law. The mean differences in earnings quality 
between the two groups are statistically significant at the 1% level.21 In general, the 
findings suggest that PSCORE is positively related to earnings quality.  
In the next pages, while Figure 3-1 illustrates the distribution of PSCORE, Figure 3-2, 
Figure 3-3, and Figure 3-4 help to visualise the distributions of abnormal accruals, proxies 
for real earnings management, and deviations of first digits from Benford’s Law by each 
PSCORE. Also, Table 3-7 describes firm characteristics by each PSCORE.  
 
                                                 
21 As a robustness test (not tabulated), I also define PSCORE groups in another way where the 
low-PSCORE group includes PSCORE ranging from 0 to 4 and the high-PSCORE group includes 
PSCORE ranging from 5 to 8. Alternatively, I use the median to define high and low PSCORE. 
The findings do not qualitatively change. 
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Table 3-6: Earnings quality by each group of PSCORE 
PSCORE N DAC DWAC DAMP DCF DPROD DDISEXP REM FSD_SCORE KS 
0 38 0.036 0.029 0.028 0.067 0.108 0.125 0.191 0.029 0.080 
1 156 0.059 0.057 0.044 0.102 0.147 0.162 0.289 0.029 0.077 
2 443 0.061 0.052 0.048 0.109 0.156 0.160 0.294 0.030 0.086 
3 832 0.073 0.056 0.054 0.135 0.178 0.194 0.369 0.031 0.085 
4 827 0.078 0.057 0.052 0.138 0.190 0.204 0.384 0.032 0.088 
5 662 0.085 0.069 0.069 0.147 0.186 0.226 0.384 0.033 0.093 
6 307 0.095 0.077 0.073 0.209 0.209 0.249 0.441 0.035 0.101 
7 116 0.111 0.088 0.089 0.201 0.226 0.249 0.484 0.036 0.103 
8 14 0.164 0.128 0.084 0.246 0.241 0.124 0.337 0.036 0.112 
High 
(PSCORE=6,7,8) 437 0.102 0.082 0.077 0.208 0.215 0.245 0.449 0.035 0.102 
Low 
(PSCORE=0,1,2) 637 0.059 0.052 0.046 0.105 0.151 0.159 0.287 0.030 0.084 
Difference  0.043 0.030 0.032 0.103 0.064 0.086 0.162 0.006 0.018 
t-statistics  7.581*** 7.084*** 5.977*** 4.597*** 4.389*** 6.254*** 4.599*** 7.19*** 3.058*** 
Note: The table reports the means by each PSCORE for each measure of earnings quality. The last four rows of the table show the means of the high-
PSCORE and the low-PSCORE groups, the mean differences between two groups and t-statistics of the t-test.  
Variable definitions are in the Appendix. *, **, *** are significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
120 
 
 
Figure 3-1: Distribution of PSCORE 
 
 
 
Figure 3-2: Abnormal accruals by PSCORE 
 
 
38
156
443
832 827
662
307
116
14
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
PSCORE
0.000
0.020
0.040
0.060
0.080
0.100
0.120
0.140
0.160
0.180
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
PSCORE
DAC
DWAC
DAMP
121 
 
Figure 3-3: Real earnings management by PSCORE 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-4: Deviations from Benford's Law by PSCORE 
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Table 3-7: Firm characteristics by PSCORE 
  PSCORE 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Assetsi,t (millions) 4507 3453 1712 1273 767 231 122 56 61 
Salesi,t (millions) 3798 2634 1327 974 611 268 144 43 38 
Earnings before extraordinary itemsi,t 
(millions) 359 266 107 85 56 10 -1 -2 -7 
pCFOi,t 0.000 0.263 0.542 0.840 0.909 0.959 0.993 0.991 1.000 
pCERTi,t 0.000 0.019 0.233 0.595 0.735 0.825 0.938 0.974 1.000 
pROLEi,t 0.000 0.141 0.305 0.332 0.538 0.793 0.912 0.991 1.000 
pPRESSi,t 0.000 0.449 0.576 0.736 0.823 0.876 0.941 0.966 1.000 
pROAi,t 0.000 0.038 0.036 0.077 0.179 0.228 0.489 0.595 1.000 
pEARLYi,t 0.000 0.006 0.038 0.070 0.185 0.455 0.645 0.888 1.000 
pFOUNDERi,t 0.000 0.026 0.084 0.077 0.184 0.219 0.280 0.474 0.714 
pCHAIRMANi,t 0.000 0.013 0.025 0.043 0.108 0.159 0.179 0.345 0.286 
pAGEi,t 0.000 0.045 0.163 0.231 0.339 0.486 0.622 0.776 1.000 
SEOi,t 0.184 0.103 0.138 0.183 0.192 0.264 0.362 0.397 0.286 
M&Ai,t 0.026 0.032 0.036 0.041 0.044 0.047 0.046 0.026 0.143 
AUDITi,t 0.842 0.763 0.729 0.647 0.551 0.450 0.349 0.345 0.143 
aBDINDi,t 0.117 0.111 0.086 0.046 0.018 -0.044 -0.074 -0.059 -0.122 
aACINDi,t 0.141 0.132 0.080 0.039 -0.003 -0.048 -0.057 -0.061 -0.115 
CYCLEi,t 0.000 0.013 0.016 0.019 0.021 0.036 0.055 0.043 0.000 
DISTRESSi,t-1 0.079 0.167 0.208 0.213 0.271 0.338 0.410 0.431 0.571 
aLOGMVEi,t-1 2.277 1.655 0.955 0.564 0.168 -0.465 -0.854 -0.868 -1.317 
aLOGMTBi,t-1 0.199 0.102 -0.032 -0.036 -0.051 -0.111 -0.022 0.184 -0.134 
aLEVi,t-1 0.082 0.013 -0.011 -0.016 -0.030 -0.045 -0.055 -0.063 -0.054 
aNOAi,t-1 -6.296 -2.053 -3.058 -1.876 -2.735 -2.098 -1.093 -3.539 2.985 
Observations 38 156 443 832 827 662 307 116 14 
Note: the table reports mean of firm characteristics by each PSCORE.
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3.5.4. Multivariate regression findings 
3.5.4.1. PSCORE and abnormal accruals 
This section reports the findings of the main regressions. Table 3-8 presents the results of 
the set of Equation 3-11. Consistent with the hypothesis, I find a positive coefficient on 
PSCORE. The positive relationships are statistically significant in all models where 
dependent variables are DAC (column a), DWAC (column b), and DAMP (column c). 
While the PSCORE coefficients are slightly different among the models, the qualitative 
effects are consistent. In terms of economic significance, the coefficient on DAC suggests 
that a one unit increase in PSCORE is associated with an increase of 0.0118 (= 
0.309/100*3.8, given that 3.8 is the mean of PSCORE as reported in Table 3-3) in DAC, 
which accounts for 15% of its mean (15% = 0.012/0.0782, given that 0.0782 is the mean 
of DAC as reported in Table 3-3). Similarly, an increase in PSCORE by one unit is 
associated with an increase of 0.0078 in DWAC (or 12.7% of its mean) and 0.0019 in 
DAMP (or 20.5% of its mean). In general, the findings provide evidence that PSCORE 
could signal a red flag of high levels of abnormal accruals or low earnings quality. The 
evidence supports the Hypothesis H1.
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Table 3-8: Relationship between PSCORE and abnormal accruals 
Variable 
Expected 
sign 
DAC (a)   DWAC (b)   DAMP (c) 
Coefficient t-statistic   Coefficient t-statistic   Coefficient t-statistic 
PSCOREi,t + 0.309*** 2.95  0.206** 2.47  0.313*** 4.02 
SEOi,t + 3.134*** 8.33  2.241*** 7.47  1.86*** 6.62 
M&Ai,t + 1.276* 1.74  3.056*** 5.22  3.004*** 5.49 
AUDITi,t - -2.132*** -6.34  -0.984*** -3.67  -1.018*** -4.06 
aBDINDi,t - -0.015 -0.01  -0.131 -0.18  0.294 0.47 
aACINDi,t - -0.22 -0.36  0.122 0.26  -0.1 -0.22 
CYCLEi,t + 2.25** 2.46  2.147*** 2.94  0.811 1.19 
DISTRESSi,t-1 + 0.936*** 2.70  -0.036 -0.12  -0.361 -1.39 
aLOGMVEi,t-1 - -0.212* -1.83  -0.436*** -4.75  -0.43*** -5.01 
aLOGMTBi,t-1 + 0.927*** 4.84  1.379*** 9.04  1.355*** 9.50 
aLEVi,t-1  -4.329*** -4.55  -3.381*** -4.46  -2.849*** -4.02 
aNOAi,t-1 - -0.009 -1.00  -0.018*** -2.65  -0.009 -1.35 
Constant  6.747*** 13.93  5.289*** 13.70  4.765*** 13.19 
Observations  3395   3395 
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Adjusted R2   0.093     0.103     0.103   
Note: The table reports the estimations of Equation 3-11: 𝐸𝑄𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡+𝛽3𝑀&𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑎𝐵𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽6𝑎𝐴𝐶𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑌𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝑎𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑀𝑉𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽10𝑎𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽11𝑎𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽12𝑎𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀;  
where 𝐸𝑄𝑖,𝑡 is DACi,t, DWACi,t or DAMPi,t in the column (a), (b) or (c), respectively. All coefficients are multiplied by 100 for easy reading. Variable 
definitions are in the Appendix. *, **, *** are significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 3-8 also indicates that control variables have predicted signs and most coefficients 
are consistently significant across different models. As expected, the positive coefficients 
𝑆𝐸𝑂 and M&A suggest that equity issuance increases earnings management or reduces 
earnings quality. In addition, the coefficients on 𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇, 𝑎𝐵𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐷, and 𝑎𝐴𝐶𝐼𝑁𝐷 are 
negative, implying that strong corporate governance reduces earnings management or 
increases earnings quality. Also, while large firms are less likely to manipulate earnings, 
over-valued firms engage in more earnings management evident by higher abnormal 
accruals.  
3.5.4.2. PSCORE and proxies for real earnings management 
In regard to real earnings management, Table 3-9 shows the results of Equation 3-12. 
Control variables are also consistently significant across different models and have the 
expected signs. The findings indicate that the coefficients on all proxies for real earnings 
management are positive and statistically significant at least at the 10% level. In terms of 
economic significance, a one-unit increase in PSCORE leads to an increase of 0.043 in 
DCF (or 30.9% of its mean), 0.0187 in DPROD (or 10.5% of its mean), 0.023 in 
DDISEXP (or 11.3% of its mean), and 0.074 in REM (or 20.3% of its mean). Generally, 
the results support the notion that PSCORE is positively associated with the established 
proxies of real earnings management.  
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Table 3-9: Relationship between PSCORE and proxies for real earnings management 
Variable 
Expected 
sign 
DCF (a)   DPROD (b)   DDISEXP (c)   REM (d) 
Coefficient t-statistic   Coefficient t-statistic   Coefficient t-statistic   Coefficient t-statistic 
PSCOREi,t + 1.142*** 3.78  0.491* 1.87  0.604* 1.78  1.949*** 3.09 
SEOi,t + 3.5*** 3.23  -1.362 -1.43  3.144*** 2.61  -1.456 -0.64 
M&Ai,t + 2.43 1.17  5.62*** 3.09  3.941* 1.72  10.301** 2.4 
aBDINDi,t - -1.571 -0.64  2.709 1.3  -0.625 -0.23  -0.95 -0.18 
aACINDi,t - 3.868** 2.23  1.018 0.68  3.725* 1.88  9.197** 2.51 
CYCLEi,t + 5.84** 2.22  5.132** 2.25  3.465 1.21  5.235 0.99 
DISTRESSi,t-1 + 4.503*** 4.41  -0.239 -0.26  3.414*** 2.99  1.685 0.79 
aLOGMVEi,t-1 - -0.248 -0.77  -1.783*** -6.49  -1.424*** -3.97  -2.239*** -3.37 
aLOGMTBi,t-1 + 3.73*** 6.76  5.978*** 12.39  5.848*** 9.53  10.491*** 9.11 
aLEVtm1i,t-1 ? -12.414*** -4.55  -5.955** -2.51  -19.408*** -6.46  -26.335*** -4.71 
Constant  7.451*** 5.92  16.822*** 15.48  15.854*** 11.16  28.923*** 11 
Observations  3139   3014 
 
 2650 
 
 2547 
 
Adjusted R2   0.052     0.068     0.077     0.057   
Note: The table reports the estimations of Equation 3-12: 𝐸𝑄𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡+𝛽3𝑀&𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑎𝐵𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑎𝐴𝐶𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽6𝐶𝑌𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝑎𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑀𝑉𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝑎𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽10𝑎𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀  
where 𝐸𝑄𝑖,𝑡 is DCFi,t, DPRODi,t, DDISEXPi,t, or REMi,t in the column (a), (b), (c), or (d), respectively (used as substitutes). All coefficients are multiplied 
by 100 for easy reading. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. *, **, *** are significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.  
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3.5.4.3. PSCORE and deviations of first digits from Benford’s Law 
In respect to financial statement errors, Table 3-10 reports the findings from the set of 
Equation 3-13. The results show that the coefficients on PSCORE (Panel A) and KS 
(Panel B) in four different specifications are all positive and statistically significant. In 
terms of economic significance, for example in column (d), where the model controls for 
industry and year fixed effects, a one-unit increase in PSCORE is associated with an 
increase of 0.0012 in FSD_SCORE (or 3.7% of its mean) and 0.004 in KS (or 4.56% of 
its mean). In general, the results demonstrate that PSCORE can capture the deviations of 
the first digits of figures reported in financial statements from what are expected by 
Benford’s Law.  
To summarise, the findings of the multivariate regressions indicate that PSCORE is 
positively associated with the established proxies for earnings quality. The relationships 
are statistically and economically significant. The findings support Hypothesis H1 and 
suggest that PSCORE can be a useful tool to signal red flags of low earnings quality in 
individual firms.
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Table 3-10: Relationship between PSCORE and deviations of first digits from Benford’s Law 
 Expected 
sign 
(a)  (b)  (c)  (d) 
 Coefficient 
t-
statistic  Coefficient 
t-
statistic  Coefficient 
t-
statistic  Coefficient 
t-
statistic 
Panel A: FSD_SCORE           
PSCOREi,t + 0.034** 2.81  0.035** 2.92  0.030* 2.52  0.031** 2.59 
SEOi,t + 0.023 0.54  0.026 0.61  -0.019 -0.44  -0.015 -0.35 
M&Ai,t + -0.161* -1.96  -0.149 -1.81  -0.148 -1.81  -0.138 -1.68 
AUDITi,t - -0.119** -3.04  -0.117** -2.99  -0.087* -2.17  -0.085* -2.11 
aBDINDi,t - -0.098 -1.09  -0.095 -1.06  0.070 0.75  0.075 0.81 
aACINDi,t - 0.027 0.48  -0.011 -0.18  0.035 0.62  0.005 0.08 
CYCLEi,t + -0.104 -1.01  -0.111 -1.07  -0.141 -1.38  -0.149 -1.45 
DISTRESSi,t-1 + 0.132*** 3.39  0.131*** 3.36  0.098* 2.43  0.098* 2.42 
aLOGMVEi,t-1 - -0.093*** -8.01  -0.091*** -7.79  -0.129*** -9.68  -0.129*** -9.54 
aLOGMTBi,t-1 + 0.124*** 6.71  0.129*** 6.70  0.149*** 7.49  0.153*** 7.37 
aLEVi,t-1 ? -0.463*** -4.10  -0.445*** -3.93  -0.384** -3.19  -0.369** -3.06 
aNOAi,t-1 ? 0.000** 2.61  0.000* 2.51  0.000* 2.38  0.000* 2.27 
Constant  0.042*** 31.76  0.041*** 28.49  0.046*** 26.62  0.046*** 24.91 
Year fixed effects  No   Yes   No   Yes  
Industry fixed effects  No   No   Yes   Yes  
Observations  3197   3197   3197   3197  
Adjusted R2  0.1049   0.1052   0.1293   0.1297  
Panel B: KS statistic          
PSCOREi,t + 0.130** 2.66  0.134** 2.75  0.104* 2.10  0.107* 2.16 
SEOi,t + -0.026 -0.15  -0.009 -0.05  -0.170 -0.95  -0.149 -0.83 
M&Ai,t + -0.342 -1.02  -0.299 -0.89  -0.302 -0.90  -0.265 -0.79 
AUDITi,t - -0.622*** -3.90  -0.600*** -3.76  -0.461** -2.79  -0.438** -2.65 
aBDINDi,t - -0.182 -0.50  -0.171 -0.47  0.317 0.83  0.342 0.90 
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aACINDi,t - -0.031 -0.13  -0.169 -0.66  -0.026 -0.11  -0.120 -0.47 
CYCLEi,t + -0.211 -0.50  -0.258 -0.61  -0.284 -0.67  -0.333 -0.79 
DISTRESSi,t-1 + 0.455** 2.86  0.461** 2.89  0.370* 2.24  0.376* 2.27 
aLOGMVEi,t-1 - -0.256*** -5.43  -0.252*** -5.29  -0.377*** -6.87  -0.379*** -6.84 
aLOGMTBi,t-1 + 0.395*** 5.22  0.403*** 5.13  0.477*** 5.84  0.480*** 5.65 
aLEVi,t-1 ? -1.563*** -3.39  -1.489** -3.22  -1.296** -2.62  -1.237* -2.50 
aNOAi,t-1 ? 0.000 0.95  0.000 0.80  0.000 0.67  0.000 0.52 
Constant  0.116*** 21.77  0.112*** 19.08  0.127*** 17.84  0.124*** 16.42 
Year fixed effects  No   Yes   No   Yes  
Industry fixed effects  No   No   Yes   Yes  
Observations  3197   3197   3197   3197  
Adjusted R2  0.0682   0.0704   0.0837   0.0858  
Note: The table reports the estimations of Equation 3-13: 𝐸𝑄𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡+𝛽3𝑀&𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐵𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽6𝐴𝐶𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑌𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑀𝑉𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽10𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽11𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽12𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌/
𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆 +  𝜀.  
Where 𝐸𝑄𝑖,𝑡 is FSD_SCOREi,t (Panel A) or KSi,t (Panel B). All coefficients are multiplied by 100 for easy reading. Industry fixed effects are based on 
Datastream’s level-six codes. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. *, **, *** are significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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3.5.5. Additional analysis 
3.5.5.1. Equity-based incentives 
So far, the chapter provides evidence that the PSCORE can signal the presence of poor 
earnings quality. This section studies the impact of CEO’s equity-based incentives on the 
relationship between the PSCORE and poor earnings quality.  
Previous research indicates that CEOs’ equity-based incentives negatively affect earnings 
quality (Cheng and Warfield, 2005; Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006; Chava and 
Purnanandam, 2010; Jiang et al., 2010). For example, Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) 
find that firms exhibit abnormally high accruals when there is a high association between 
the CEO’s total compensation and changes in firms’ share prices. Later studies support 
the idea that earnings quality is affected by CEOs’ equity-based incentives (Cheng and 
Warfield, 2005; Jiang et al., 2010). Therefore, it is reasonable to predict that when CEOs 
have a high PSCORE and have high equity-based incentives, e.g. their compensations 
and wealth are highly tied to reported earnings, they have high tendencies to manage 
earnings numbers. In general, I conjecture that the relationships between PSCORE and 
the proxies for earnings quality are stronger for firms which have a CEO with high equity-
based incentives.  
I follow prior studies to estimate CEO’s equity-based incentives (e.g., Bergstresser and 
Philippon, 2006; Armstrong et al., 2010; Jiang et al., 2010; Feng et al., 2011; Armstrong, 
Larcker, Ormazabal, and Taylor, 2013) as follows: 
Equation 3-14: Calculation of equity-based Incentives 
𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑉𝐸 =
𝑂𝑁𝐸𝑃𝐶𝑇
(𝑂𝑁𝐸𝑃𝐶𝑇 +  𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐴𝑅𝑌 +  𝐵𝑂𝑁𝑈𝑆)
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𝑂𝑁𝐸𝑃𝐶𝑇 = 0.01 𝑥 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸 𝑥 (𝑆𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐸 + 𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁) 
Where: 𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑉𝐸 is equity-based incentives of CEOs; 𝑂𝑁𝐸𝑃𝐶𝑇 is change in CEOs’ 
equity holdings corresponding to the change in stock price by one percent; 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸 is share 
price at the end of fiscal year; 𝑆𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐸 is shares held by CEOs; 𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁 is options held 
by the CEOs; 𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐴𝑅𝑌 is total cash salary CEOs receive; and 𝐵𝑂𝑁𝑈𝑆 is cash bonus 
CEOs receive. 
I, then, re-run Equation 3-11, Equation 3-12, and Equation 3-13 using subsamples of firms 
which have CEOs with high or low equity-based incentives. Firms are defined as having 
CEOs with a high (low) equity-based incentive if INCENTIVE is greater than or equal to 
(lower than) the median of all firms. 
Table 3-11, Table 3-12, and Table 3-13 report the findings of Equation 3-11, Equation 
3-12, and Equation 3-13, respectively. The evidence shows that the coefficients on 
PSCORE are higher in subsamples with high equity-based incentive CEOs than in 
subsamples with low equity-based incentive CEOs in nearly every case. Importantly, the 
coefficients on PSCORE are mostly statistically significant when CEOs have high equity-
based incentives (e.g. columns 1, 3, and 5 in Table 3-11; columns 1, 3, 5, and 7 in Table 
3-12; and columns 1 and 3 in Table 3-13), while they are not significant when CEOs have 
low equity-based incentives (e.g. columns 2, 4, and 6 in Table 3-11; columns 2, 4, 6, and 
8 in Table 3-12; and columns 2 and 4 in Table 3-13). In general, the results are consistent 
with the conjecture that the relationships between PSCORE and abnormal accruals, 
proxies for earnings management, and financial statement errors are stronger for firms 
which have CEOs with high equity-based incentives.
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Table 3-11: The effect of equity-based incentive on the relationship between PSCORE and abnormal accruals  
  DAC   DWAC   DAMP 
 High Incentive Low Incentive   High Incentive Low Incentive   High Incentive Low Incentive 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
PSCOREi,t 0.384* 0.172  0.182 0.158  0.354** 0.185 
 (2.48) (1.25)  (1.46) (1.46)  (3.00) (1.85) 
SEOi,t 3.348*** 2.732***  2.765*** 1.379***  2.421*** 1.047** 
 (6.25) (5.27)  (6.42) (3.38)  (5.94) (2.78) 
M&Ai,t 1.678 0.329  2.193** 4.276***  2.680*** 3.301*** 
 (1.68) (0.30)  (2.74) (5.04)  (3.53) (4.21) 
AUDITi,t -1.907*** -2.322***  -0.884* -0.998**  -0.716 -1.130*** 
 (-3.88) (-5.18)  (-2.24) (-2.83)  (-1.91) (-3.47) 
aBDINDi,t -0.007 0.008  0.010 -0.011  0.006 0.001 
 (-0.52) (0.76)  (1.04) (-1.21)  (0.63) (0.13) 
aACINDi,t 0.007 -0.012  0.007 -0.006  0.006 -0.010 
 (0.74) (-1.65)  (0.97) (-0.95)  (0.90) (-1.85) 
CYCLEi,t 3.497* 0.979  0.752 3.289***  -0.688 1.913* 
 (2.55) (0.83)  (0.68) (3.53)  (-0.66) (2.22) 
DISTRESSi,t-1 0.913 1.040*  0.012 0.104  -0.546 0.044 
 (1.76) (2.31)  (0.03) (0.29)  (-1.39) (0.14) 
aLOGMVEi,t-1 -0.003 -0.001  -0.006*** -0.003*  -0.005*** -0.003** 
 (-1.83) (-0.63)  (-4.23) (-2.34)  (-4.20) (-3.00) 
aLOGMTBi,t-1 0.013*** 0.003  0.018*** 0.008***  0.016*** 0.010*** 
 (4.73) (1.33)  (8.04) (3.67)  (7.79) (5.11) 
aLEVi,t-1 -0.053*** -0.030*  -0.036** -0.027**  -0.034** -0.021* 
 (-3.78) (-2.38)  (-3.22) (-2.77)  (-3.21) (-2.29) 
aNOAi,t-1 -0.000 0.000  -0.000 -0.000**  -0.000 -0.000 
 (-1.91) (0.84)  (-0.75) (-2.81)  (-0.49) (-1.15) 
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Constant 0.064*** 0.070***  0.055*** 0.051***  0.046*** 0.050*** 
 (8.80) (11.14)  (9.43) (10.27)  (8.35) (10.87) 
Observations 1750 1645  1750 1645  1750 1645 
Adjusted R2 0.0978 0.0732   0.1007 0.0915   0.1030 0.0860 
Note: The table reports the estimations of Equation 3-11: 𝐸𝑄𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡+𝛽3𝑀&𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑎𝐵𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽6𝑎𝐴𝐶𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑌𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝑎𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑀𝑉𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽10𝑎𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽11𝑎𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽12𝑎𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀;  
where 𝐸𝑄𝑖,𝑡 is DACi,t (column 1 and 2), DWACi,t (column 3 and 4), or DAMPi,t (column 5 and 6). I run regressions for subsamples of high and low 
equity-based incentive of CEOs. Firms are defined as having CEOs with high (low) equity-based incentive if INCENTIVE is greater than or equal (lower 
than) the median of all firms. All coefficients are multiplied by 100 for easy reading. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. Variable definitions are in 
the Appendix. *, **, *** are significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 3-12: The effect of equity-based incentive on the relationship between PSCORE and proxies for real earnings management 
  DCF   DPROD   DDISEXP   REM 
 
High 
Incentive 
Low 
Incentive  
High 
Incentive 
Low 
Incentive  
High 
Incentive 
Low 
Incentive  
High 
Incentive 
Low 
Incentive 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8) 
PSCOREi,t 1.204** 1.010*  0.218 0.624  1.144* 0.088  2.171* 1.439 
 (2.82) (2.34)  (0.56) (1.79)  (2.42) (0.18)  (2.24) (1.77) 
SEOi,t 1.487 6.095***  -1.792 -1.304  1.646 5.051**  -1.852 -1.883 
 (1.01) (3.81)  (-1.33) (-1.00)  (1.01) (2.79)  (-0.56) (-0.63) 
M&Ai,t 4.674 -1.018  4.367 6.794*  2.049 7.228*  7.482 13.837* 
 (1.73) (-0.31)  (1.75) (2.54)  (0.69) (1.97)  (1.23) (2.30) 
aBDINDi,t 0.007 -0.044  0.096** -0.038  -0.070 0.064  0.063 -0.072 
 (0.19) (-1.30)  (3.06) (-1.36)  (-1.88) (1.66)  (0.84) (-1.14) 
aACINDi,t 0.104*** -0.021  0.001 0.015  0.048 0.024  0.175** 0.003 
 (4.01) (-0.90)  (0.05) (0.83)  (1.67) (0.86)  (3.02) (0.07) 
CYCLEi,t 5.720 5.846  6.186 3.336  1.248 6.425  3.999 6.181 
 (1.52) (1.61)  (1.80) (1.12)  (0.30) (1.62)  (0.48) (0.94) 
DISTRESSi,t 3.530* 5.303***  -0.972 0.967  2.963 3.792*  1.181 2.469 
 (2.42) (3.71)  (-0.73) (0.84)  (1.84) (2.33)  (0.36) (0.92) 
aLOGMVEi,t -0.008 0.005  -0.025*** -0.010**  -0.010* -0.016**  -0.027** -0.016 
 (-1.75) (1.08)  (-6.10) (-2.71)  (-2.12) (-3.09)  (-2.68) (-1.89) 
aLOGMTBi,t 0.047*** 0.023**  0.077*** 0.034***  0.066*** 0.048***  0.121*** 0.075*** 
 (6.24) (2.77)  (10.86) (5.11)  (7.97) (5.13)  (7.09) (4.84) 
aLEVi,t -0.068 -0.188***  -0.097** -0.010  -0.158*** -0.233***  -0.243** -0.277*** 
 (-1.78) (-4.86)  (-2.78) (-0.31)  (-3.80) (-5.35)  (-2.87) (-3.84) 
Constant 0.082*** 0.067***  0.194*** 0.146***  0.144*** 0.165***  0.306*** 0.279*** 
 (4.44) (3.85)  (11.53) (10.38)  (6.92) (8.24)  (7.22) (8.52) 
Observations 1615 1523  1530 1483  1359 1290  1291 1255 
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Adjusted R2 0.0506 0.0562   0.0907 0.0316   0.0768 0.0710   0.0526 0.0466 
Note: The table reports the estimations of Equation 3-12: 𝐸𝑄𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡+𝛽3𝑀&𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑎𝐵𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑎𝐴𝐶𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽6𝐶𝑌𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝑎𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑀𝑉𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝑎𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽10𝑎𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀;  
where 𝐸𝑄𝑖,𝑡 is DCFi,t (column 1 and 2), DPRODi,t (column 3 and 4), DDISEXPi,t (column 5 and 6) or REMi,t  (column 7 and 8). I run regressions for 
subsamples of high and low equity-based incentive of CEOs. Firms are defined as having CEOs with high (low) equity-based incentive if INCENTIVE 
is greater than or equal (lower than) the median of all firms.  
All coefficients are multiplied by 100 for easy reading. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. *, **, *** are 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 3-13: The effect of equity-based incentive on the relationship between PSCORE and deviations of first digits from Benford’s Law 
 FSD_SCORE   KS 
 High Incentive Low Incentive   High Incentive Low Incentive 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
PSCOREi,t 0.048** 0.027  0.176* 0.084 
 (2.81) (1.50)  (2.49) (1.15) 
SEOi,t -0.001 -0.040  -0.149 -0.235 
 (-0.02) (-0.60)  (-0.62) (-0.86) 
M&Ai,t -0.178 -0.048  -0.618 0.341 
 (-1.70) (-0.37)  (-1.43) (0.63) 
AUDITi,t -0.120* -0.039  -0.364 -0.604* 
 (-2.18) (-0.62)  (-1.61) (-2.36) 
BDINDi,t 0.047 0.134  0.123 0.818 
 (0.35) (0.96)  (0.23) (1.43) 
ACINDi,t 0.018 0.022  -0.124 -0.105 
 (0.20) (0.25)  (-0.33) (-0.29) 
CYCLEi,t -0.216 0.003  -0.105 -0.288 
 (-1.51) (0.02)  (-0.18) (-0.46) 
DISTRESSi,t-1 0.076 0.086  0.198 0.445 
 (1.32) (1.46)  (0.85) (1.84) 
LOGMVEi,t-1 -0.103*** -0.170***  -0.317*** -0.437*** 
 (-5.64) (-8.10)  (-4.21) (-5.07) 
LOGMTBi,t-1 0.160*** 0.154***  0.441*** 0.576*** 
 (5.51) (4.94)  (3.70) (4.48) 
LEVi,t-1 -0.370* -0.283  -0.858 -1.446 
 (-2.18) (-1.53)  (-1.23) (-1.90) 
NOAi,t-1 -0.001 0.000**  -0.003* 0.000 
 (-1.96) (2.87)  (-2.03) (0.96) 
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Constant 0.041*** 0.051***  0.108*** 0.136*** 
 (15.14) (19.41)  (9.74) (12.49) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 1638 1559  1638 1559 
Adjusted R2 0.1236 0.1487   0.0761 0.0993 
Note: The table reports the estimations of Equation 3-13: 𝐸𝑄𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡+𝛽3𝑀&𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐵𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽6𝐴𝐶𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑌𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑀𝑉𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽10𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽11𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽12𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌/
𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆 +  𝜀.  
Where 𝐸𝑄𝑖,𝑡 is FSD_SCOREi,t (column 1 and 2) or KSi,t (column 3 and 4). I run regressions for subsamples of high and low equity-based incentive of 
CEOs. Firms are defined as having CEOs with high (low) equity-based incentive if INCENTIVE is greater than or equal (lower than) the median of all 
firms.  
All coefficients are multiplied by 100 for easy reading. Industry fixed effects are based on Datastream’s level-six codes. Figures in parentheses are t-
statistics. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. *, **, *** are significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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3.5.5.2. A practical version of PSCORE 
One concern with my approach to construct PSCORE is that the measure of pPRESS 
(press coverage) may be biased. Although Milbourn (2003), Francis et al. (2008), and 
Jian and Lee (2011) find that overall the newspapers fairly present the reputation of CEOs, 
Lafond (2008) argues that not all news is good news for CEOs’ reputation. Also, while 
one of the main purposes of the chapter is to develop a tool which can be easily applied, 
average practitioners may find that it is difficult to measure press coverage. To deal with 
those concerns, I build a practical version of PSCORE, denoted as PSCORE_P, which 
excludes pPRESS. The calculation of PSCORE now becomes: 
Equation 3-15: The practical PSCORE 
𝑃𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸_𝑃𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑝𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑝𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑝𝑅𝑂𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑝𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑝𝐸𝐴𝑅𝐿𝑌𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝑝𝐹𝑂𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑝𝐶𝐻𝐴𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑁𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑝𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡 
The practical PSCORE includes only measures whose data are collected from the 
curriculum vitae of CEOs and financial statements of their companies. Then, I re-run 
Equation 3-11, Equation 3-12, and Equation 3-13 where PSCORE is replaced by 
PSCORE_P.  
Table 3-14 reports the findings of Equation 3-11. The evidence indicates that the 
coefficients on PSCORE_P are still positive and statistically significant. In other words, 
there are strong positive relationships between PSCORE_P and abnormal accruals. I find 
similar results in Table 3-15 and Table 3-16. In general, the findings suggest that average 
practitioners can apply the PSCORE_P to signal cases where reported earnings have low 
quality. 
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Table 3-14: Practical PSCORE and abnormal accruals 
  DAC (a)  DWAC (b)  DAMP (c) 
  Coefficient t-statistic  Coefficient t-statistic  Coefficient t-statistic 
PSCORE_Pi,t 0.188 (1.67)  0.192* (2.14)  0.357*** (4.24) 
SEOi,t 3.190*** (8.53)  2.234*** (7.49)  1.894*** (6.78) 
M&Ai,t 1.194 (1.64)  3.063*** (5.26)  2.969*** (5.45) 
AUDITi,t -2.170*** (-6.50)  -0.986*** (-3.70)  -0.930*** (-3.73) 
aBDINDi,t -0.000 (-0.01)  -0.001 (-0.19)  0.003 (0.45) 
aACINDi,t -0.002 (-0.36)  0.001 (0.19)  -0.002 (-0.42) 
CYCLEi,t 2.297* (2.52)  2.129** (2.94)  0.640 (0.94) 
DISTRESSi,t-1 0.970** (2.81)  -0.006 (-0.02)  -0.302 (-1.18) 
aLOGMVEi,t-1 -0.003* (-2.44)  -0.005*** (-5.08)  -0.005*** (-5.60) 
aLOGMTB i,t-1 0.010*** (5.22)  0.014*** (9.13)  0.014*** (9.86) 
aLEV i,t-1 -0.042*** (-4.48)  -0.033*** (-4.36)  -0.028*** (-4.02) 
aNOA i,t-1 -0.000 (-1.09)  -0.000* (-2.48)  -0.000 (-1.17) 
Constant 0.074*** (17.31)  0.055*** (16.18)  0.049*** (15.34) 
Observations 3395   3395   3395  
Adjusted R2 0.0890   0.0985   0.1008  
Note: The table reports findings with the practical version of PSCORE, which excludes press coverage.  
The table shows the findings of a different version of Equation 3-11: 𝐸𝑄𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸_𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡+𝛽3𝑀&𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽5𝑎𝐵𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑎𝐴𝐶𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑌𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝑎𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑀𝑉𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽10𝑎𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽11𝑎𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽12𝑎𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀;  
Where: 𝑃𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸_𝑃𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑝𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑝𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑝𝑅𝑂𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑝𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑝𝐸𝐴𝑅𝐿𝑌𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑝𝐹𝑂𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑝𝐶𝐻𝐴𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑁𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑝𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡; 𝐸𝑄𝑖,𝑡 can be DAC 
(column a), DWAC (column b), and DAMP (column c) (used as substitutes). All coefficients are multiplied by 100 for easy reading. Figures in 
parentheses are t-statistics. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. *, **, *** are significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.  
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Table 3-15: Practical PSCORE and proxies for real earnings management 
  DCF (a)  DPROD (b)  DDISEXP (c)  REM (d) 
  Coefficient t-statistic  Coefficient t-statistic  Coefficient t-statistic  Coefficient t-statistic 
PSCORE_Pi,t 0.994** (3.04)  0.479 (1.69)  0.405 (1.11)  1.924** (2.83) 
SEOi,t 3.618*** (3.34)  -1.318 (-1.40)  3.235** (2.69)  -1.265 (-0.56) 
M&Ai,t 2.415 (1.16)  5.619** (3.08)  3.904 (1.70)  10.234* (2.39) 
aBDINDi,t -0.014 (-0.60)  0.028 (1.34)  -0.006 (-0.22)  -0.005 (-0.11) 
aACINDi,t 0.037* (2.15)  0.010 (0.65)  0.036 (1.82)  0.089* (2.44) 
CYCLEi,t 5.922* (2.25)  5.177* (2.27)  3.535 (1.24)  5.440 (1.03) 
DISTRESSi,t-1 4.720*** (4.62)  -0.168 (-0.19)  3.535** (3.10)  1.988 (0.94) 
aLOGMVE i,t-1 -0.004 (-1.27)  -0.018*** (-6.84)  -0.015*** (-4.31)  -0.025*** (-3.80) 
aLOGMTB i,t-1 0.038*** (6.96)  0.060*** (12.49)  0.059*** (9.66)  0.106*** (9.23) 
aLEV i,t-1 -0.126*** (-4.61)  -0.060* (-2.53)  -0.195*** (-6.50)  -0.263*** (-4.71) 
Constant 0.089*** (8.29)  0.173*** (18.66)  0.170*** (13.97)  0.308*** (13.68) 
Observations 3138   3013   2649   2546  
Adjusted R2 0.0471   0.0649   0.0724   0.0526  
Note: The table reports findings with the practical version of PSCORE, which excludes press coverage.  
The table shows the findings of a different version of Equation 3-12: 𝐸𝑄𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸_𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡+𝛽3𝑀&𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑎𝐵𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽5𝑎𝐴𝐶𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐶𝑌𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝑎𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑀𝑉𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝑎𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽10𝑎𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀;  
Where: 𝑃𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸_𝑃𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑝𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑝𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑝𝑅𝑂𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑝𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑝𝐸𝐴𝑅𝐿𝑌𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑝𝐹𝑂𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑝𝐶𝐻𝐴𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑁𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑝𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡; 𝐸𝑄𝑖,𝑡 is DCFi,t 
(column a), DPRODi,t (column b), DDISEXPi,t (column c), or REMi,t (column d) (used as substitutes). All coefficients are multiplied by 100 for easy 
reading. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. *, **, *** are significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
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Table 3-16: Practical PSCORE and deviations of first digits from Benfords’ Law 
  FSD (a)  KS (b) 
  Coefficient t-statistic  Coefficient t-statistic 
PSCORE_Pi,t 0.010 (0.74)  0.032 (0.60) 
SEOi,t -0.012 (-0.27)  -0.137 (-0.77) 
M&Ai,t -0.139 (-1.70)  -0.272 (-0.81) 
AUDITi,t -0.087* (-2.15)  -0.444** (-2.68) 
BDINDi,t 0.069 (0.74)  0.321 (0.84) 
ACINDi,t -0.001 (-0.02)  -0.141 (-0.55) 
CYCLEi,t -0.145 (-1.42)  -0.321 (-0.76) 
DISTRESSi,t-1 0.103* (2.55)  0.394* (2.38) 
LOGMVE i,t-1 -0.135*** (-10.16)  -0.400*** (-7.34) 
LOGMTB i,t-1 0.158*** (7.62)  0.497*** (5.87) 
LEV i,t-1 -0.384** (-3.18)  -1.288** (-2.60) 
NOA i,t-1 0.000* (2.24)  0.000 (0.50) 
Constant 0.047*** (26.84)  0.129*** (17.86) 
Year fixed effects Yes   Yes  
Industry fixed effects Yes   Yes  
Observations 3197   3197  
Adjusted R2 0.1279   0.0846  
Note: Note: The table reports findings with the practical version of PSCORE, which excludes press coverage.  
The table shows the findings of a different version of Equation 3-13: 𝐸𝑄𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸_𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡+𝛽3𝑀&𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽5𝐵𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐴𝐶𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑌𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑀𝑉𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽10𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽11𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽12𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌/
𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆 +  𝜀.  
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Where: 𝑃𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸_𝑃𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑝𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑝𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑝𝑅𝑂𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑝𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑝𝐸𝐴𝑅𝐿𝑌𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑝𝐹𝑂𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑝𝐶𝐻𝐴𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑁𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑝𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡; 𝐸𝑄𝑖,𝑡 is 
FSD_SCOREi,t (column a) or KSi,t (column b). All coefficients are multiplied by 100 for easy reading. Industry fixed effects are based on Datastream’s 
level-six codes. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. *, **, *** are significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively. 
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3.5.5.3. Propensity score matching 
A potential problem with a non-experimental study is that estimations of multiple 
regressions may be biased due to confounding factors (Gow, Larcker, and Reiss, 2016; 
Shipman, Swanquist, and Whited, 2017). For example, there may be confounding factors 
such as boards of directors’ preferences or interests, which determine both earnings 
quality and the allocation of CEOs with a high or low PSCORE. Prior studies show that 
the propensity score matching method, which is proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin 
(1983) to match treatments with controls based on multiple dimensional factors, is 
common in accounting research to mitigate the effects of confounding factors (Gow et 
al., 2016; Shipman et al., 2017). 
In this study, I use the propensity score matching method to reduce the bias of estimations 
caused by confounding factors (Gow et al., 2016; Shipman et al., 2017). The procedure 
is as follows. First, I need to identify observations with high PSCORE and low PSCORE. 
I create a dummy variable namely ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑃𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸, which is equal to one if the PSCORE 
of a CEO is greater than or equal to the median of all firms, and zero otherwise. I classify 
observations into two groups: treatment (ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑃𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸 = 1) and control (ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑃𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸 
= 0). Second, I run the following logistic regression between ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑃𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸 and 
explanatory variables which are control variables in the main regressions:   
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Equation 3-16: Logistic regression modelling for the probability of having CEOs with a 
high PSCORE 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑃𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 1)  
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡+𝛽2𝑀&𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐵𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐴𝐶𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐶𝑌𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑀𝑉𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽9𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽10𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽11𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 
Third, I match (without replacement) each treatment with one control which has the 
closest odds ratio and I require a maximum caliper of 0.01 (odds ratio). Fourth, to assess 
the match quality, I use a simple t-test to see whether the remaining differences between 
the treatments and controls are insignificant. The above four-step procedure for 
propensity score matching is similar to recommendations of Shipman et al. (2017). The 
results of the logistic regression are presented in Table 3-17. In Panel A, the evidence 
shows that the probability of having CEOs with high PSCOREs is highly correlated with 
firm characteristics. In Panel B, the findings indicate that the matching process has good 
quality.  
Using the propensity-score-matching sample, Table 3-18 shows the findings on the 
relationships between PSCORE and abnormal accruals. The evidence shows that 
PSCORE is positively associated with DAC, DWAC, and DAMP. The relationships are 
still statistically significant in nearly every case. I also find positive relationships between 
PSCORE and proxies for real earnings management and deviations of first digits from 
Benford’s Law. The results are consistent with the main findings reported above. 
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Table 3-17: Propensity score matching 
Panel A: Logistic model       
  Coefficient z-statistic           
SEOi,t 0.104* 1.72      
M&Ai,t -0.03 -0.26      
AUDITi,t -0.138** -2.57      
BDINDi,t -0.303** -2.41      
ACINDi,t -0.297*** -3.7      
CYCLEi,t 0.135 0.91      
DISTRESSi,t-1 0.183*** 3.35      
LOGMVE i,t-1 -0.141*** -8.72      
LOGMTB i,t-1 0.133*** 5.06      
LEV i,t-1 -0.404** -2.56      
NOA i,t-1 0 -1.08      
Constant 1.893*** 12.26      
Observations 3,395       
Pseudo R2 0.0958            
Panel B: Mean differences in firm characteristics before and after matching 
 Before matching (a)  After matching (b) 
 Treated Control t-statistic  Treated Control t-statistic 
SEOi,t 0.306 0.172 8.37***  0.182 0.182 0 
M&Ai,t 0.045 0.04 0.72  0.042 0.043 -0.1 
AUDITi,t 0.407 0.639 -13.11***  0.609 0.621 -0.56 
BDINDi,t 0.298 0.416 -14.14***  0.395 0.398 -0.33 
ACINDi,t 0.035 0.152 -12.62***  0.095 0.088 0.61 
CYCLEi,t 0.042 0.018 3.54***  0.023 0.021 0.29 
DISTRESSi,t-1 0.371 0.227 8.46***  0.216 0.234 -1 
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LOGMVE i,t-1 10.3 11.745 -20.76***  11.405 11.413 -0.11 
LOGMTB i,t-1 0.702 0.682 0.54  0.669 0.644 0.63 
LEV i,t-1 0.119 0.16 -7.5***  0.141 0.146 -0.9 
NOA i,t-1 10.581 9.558 0.15  8.144 4.534 1 
Observations 1099 2296   1,090 1,090  
Note: The table reports the results of the propensity score matching approach.  
Panel A reports the estimations of the following logistic regression: 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑃𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 1)  = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡+𝛽2𝑀&𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽4𝐵𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐴𝐶𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐶𝑌𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑀𝑉𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽10𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽11𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1. I match each 
treatment (highPSCORE=1) with one control (highPSCORE = 0) without replacement; where highPSCORE equals to one if PSCORE is greater than or 
equals the median of all firms, zero otherwise. I require a maximum caliper of 0.01 (odds ratio) for matched samples.  
Panel B reports the means of firm characteristics before matching (column a) and after matching (column b), and t-statistic for t-test under the null that 
the mean difference between treated and control groups is zero.  
Variable definitions are in the Appendix. *, **, *** are significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 3-18: Propensity score matching: PSCORE and abnormal accruals 
  DAC (a)   DWAC (b)   DAMP (c) 
  Coefficient t-statistic   Coefficient t-statistic   Coefficient t-statistic 
PSCOREi,t 0.280* (2.39)  0.089 (0.94)  0.180* (2.05) 
SEOi,t 2.130*** (4.83)  1.253*** (3.55)  1.237*** (3.75) 
M&Ai,t 1.996* (2.43)  4.293*** (6.53)  3.468*** (5.64) 
AUDITi,t -2.250*** (-6.16)  -1.186*** (-4.06)  -1.163*** (-4.26) 
aBDINDi,t 0.004 (0.39)  -0.013 (-1.67)  -0.012 (-1.69) 
aACINDi,t -0.003 (-0.40)  0.001 (0.22)  -0.004 (-0.73) 
CYCLEi,t 2.272* (2.04)  1.592 (1.78)  0.453 (0.54) 
DISTRESSi,t-1 1.195** (2.97)  0.179 (0.56)  -0.226 (-0.75) 
aLOGMVEi,t-1 -0.002 (-1.47)  -0.003** (-2.98)  -0.003** (-2.71) 
aLOGMTBi,t-1 0.008*** (3.78)  0.011*** (6.29)  0.011*** (6.69) 
aLEVi,t-1 -0.037*** (-3.37)  -0.023** (-2.63)  -0.024** (-2.92) 
aNOAi,t-1 0.000 (0.41)  -0.000 (-1.64)  -0.000 (-0.39) 
Constant 0.069*** (13.20)  0.058*** (13.91)  0.053*** (13.66) 
Observations 2180   2180   2180  
Adjusted R2 0.0624     0.0712     0.0709   
 Note: Using the propensity-score-matching sample, the table shows the results of Equation 3-11: 𝐸𝑄𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡+𝛽3𝑀&𝐴𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽4𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑎𝐵𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑎𝐴𝐶𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑌𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝑎𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑀𝑉𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽10𝑎𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽11𝑎𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝛽12𝑎𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀; 
Where: 𝐸𝑄𝑖,𝑡 can be DAC (column a), DWAC (column b), and DAMP (column c) (used as substitutes). All coefficients are multiplied by 100 for easy 
reading. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. *, **, *** are significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.  
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Table 3-19: Propensity score matching: PSCORE and proxies for real earnings management 
  DCF   DPROD   DDISEXP   REM 
  Coefficient t-statistic   Coefficient t-statistic   Coefficient t-statistic   Coefficient t-statistic 
PSCOREi,t 0.498 (1.44)  0.417 (1.38)  0.437 (1.17)  1.636* (2.28) 
SEOi,t 1.944 (1.52)  -0.721 (-0.64)  1.138 (0.83)  -2.460 (-0.94) 
M&Ai,t 1.921 (0.81)  4.567* (2.17)  6.591** (2.63)  6.676 (1.38) 
aBDINDi,t -0.013 (-0.46)  0.010 (0.43)  -0.027 (-0.89)  -0.035 (-0.62) 
aACINDi,t 0.042* (2.03)  0.018 (1.03)  0.051* (2.27)  0.098* (2.31) 
CYCLEi,t 3.177 (0.99)  0.244 (0.09)  1.587 (0.48)  -2.444 (-0.38) 
DISTRESSi,t-1 3.593** (3.01)  0.720 (0.69)  4.308*** (3.30)  4.017 (1.61) 
aLOGMVEi,t-1 0.001 (0.23)  -0.015*** (-4.63)  -0.010* (-2.45)  -0.013 (-1.69) 
aLOGMTBi,t-1 0.025*** (3.86)  0.060*** (10.51)  0.042*** (6.00)  0.103*** (7.57) 
aLEVi,t-1 -0.122*** (-3.81)  -0.074** (-2.64)  -0.184*** (-5.39)  -0.280*** (-4.29) 
Constant 0.094*** (6.73)  0.166*** (13.70)  0.164*** (10.84)  0.296*** (10.23) 
Observations 2112   2035   1775   1714  
Adjusted R2 0.0204     0.0585     0.0505     0.0495   
Note: Using the propensity-score-matching sample, the table reports the estimations of Equation 3-12: 𝐸𝑄𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽2𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡+𝛽3𝑀&𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑎𝐵𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑎𝐴𝐶𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐶𝑌𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝑎𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑀𝑉𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝑎𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽10𝑎𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀  
where 𝐸𝑄𝑖,𝑡 is DCFi,t, DPRODi,t, DDISEXPi,t, or REMi,t in the column (a), (b), (c), or (d), respectively (used as substitutes). All coefficients are multiplied 
by 100 for easy reading. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. *, **, *** are significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively. 
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Table 3-20: Propensity score matching: PSCORE and deviations of first digits from Benford’s Law 
  FSD_SCORE (a)   KS (b) 
  Coefficient t-statistic   Coefficient t-statistic 
PSCOREi,t 0.031* (2.18)  0.108 (1.86) 
SEOi,t -0.024 (-0.45)  -0.014 (-0.06) 
M&Ai,t -0.143 (-1.50)  -0.450 (-1.13) 
AUDITi,t -0.068 (-1.48)  -0.424* (-2.22) 
BDINDi,t 0.093 (0.82)  0.516 (1.11) 
ACINDi,t 0.007 (0.09)  -0.336 (-1.06) 
CYCLEi,t -0.036 (-0.27)  -0.180 (-0.33) 
DISTRESSi,t-1 -0.031 (-0.64)  -0.100 (-0.50) 
LOGMVEi,t-1 -0.121*** (-7.24)  -0.345*** (-5.00) 
LOGMTBi,t-1 0.108*** (4.23)  0.317** (2.99) 
LEVi,t-1 -0.131 (-0.89)  -0.537 (-0.88) 
NOAi,t-1 -0.000 (-1.00)  -0.001 (-0.94) 
Constant 0.045*** (21.05)  0.121*** (13.62) 
Year fixed effects Yes   Yes  
Industry fixed effects Yes   Yes  
Observations 2155   2155  
Adjusted R2 0.0749     0.0535   
Note: The table reports the estimations of Equation 3-13: 𝐸𝑄𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡+𝛽3𝑀&𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐵𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐴𝐶𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽7𝐶𝑌𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑀𝑉𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽10𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽11𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽12𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌/𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆 +  𝜀.  
Where 𝐸𝑄𝑖,𝑡 is FSD_SCOREi,t (column a) or KSi,t (column b). All coefficients are multiplied by 100 for easy reading. Industry fixed effects are based on Datastream’s 
level-six codes. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. *, **, *** are significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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3.6. Conclusions 
This research develops a composite score, namely PSCORE, which captures the profile 
of CEOs and examines whether PSCORE could signal the quality of earnings. Based on 
prior research, PSCORE aggregates nine aspects of the profile of CEOs. I employ thee 
different types of proxies for earnings quality, accrual earnings management (Jones, 
1991; Dechow et al., 1995; Peasnell et al., 2000b), real earnings management 
(Roychowdhury, 2006), and financial statement errors measured by deviations of first 
digits of figures reported in financial statements from Benford’s Law (Amiram et al., 
2015). Using a sample of 3,395 firm-year observations (615 unique firms) of listed 
companies on the London Stock Exchange from 2005 to 2012, the study finds that 
PSCORE is positively associated with abnormal accruals, abnormal cash flows, abnormal 
production costs, abnormal discretionary expenditures, and deviations of first digits from 
Benford’s Law. The relationships are statistically and economically significant. Also, 
further analyses indicate that the associations between PSCORE and established proxies 
for earnings quality become more pronounced when CEOs have high equity-based 
incentives. The findings are robust for a practical version of the PSCORE and propensity 
score matching method. In general, the results demonstrate that PSCORE can be used as 
an effective tool to signal red flags of poor earnings quality.  
The paper contributes to the existing literature and practice in several ways. First, the 
PSCORE developed here is easy to construct because it mainly requires data collected 
from the curriculum vitae of CEOs. Second, the study is the first of its kind to aggregate 
various characteristics of CEOs to signal earnings quality. Third, the PSCORE could 
highlight the presence of three different kinds of earnings manipulation – accrual earnings 
management, real earnings management, and financial statement errors – regardless of 
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whether biases in financial statements result from intentional or unintentional acts of 
managers. This suggests that the PSCORE could be a useful risk indicator for 
practitioners who need an easy way to identify risks of poor earnings quality. The findings 
are relevant for research not only in the UK but also in the US and other international 
contexts. 
However, the chapter has some limitations. First, the PSCORE does not cover all CEO 
characteristics. Due to resource and time constraints, the PSCORE exclude some potential 
factors such as marital status (Hilary et al., 2016), gender (Barua et al., 2010), and some 
other factors (e.g., Ahmed and Duellman, 2013; Demerjian et al., 2013; Jia et al., 2014; 
Kuang et al., 2014; Davidson et al., 2015; Davis et al., 2015; Capalbo et al., 2018). Future 
studies should take into account a larger group of CEO characteristics. Second, the 
construction of the PSCORE uses an equally-weighted binary variable. Future research 
may develop a measure of CEO profile based on a weighted index (e.g., Beneish, 1999; 
Dechow et al., 2011), and principal component analysis (e.g., Larcker et al., 2007; 
Florackis and Ozkan, 2009; Florackis and Sainani, 2018). While the weighted index takes 
into account the possibility that each factor may have different weight on earnings quality, 
the principal component analysis helps to mitigate potential multicollinearity of 
individual factors further. Third, the validation of PSCORE is not based on exposed 
earnings manipulation. The validity tests of the PSCORE use model-based measures 
(Jones, 1991; Dechow et al., 1995; Peasnell et al., 2000b; Roychowdhury, 2006) and 
Benford’s Law-based measures (Amiram et al., 2015) of earnings quality. While model-
based measures of earnings quality may be biased (Holthausen et al., 1995; Fields et al., 
2001; Dechow et al., 2010; Ball, 2013), Benford’s Law-based measures of earnings 
quality do not differentiate fraud from errors. Therefore, future studies should use 
exposed earnings management to revalidate the PSCORE. 
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Appendix 1: Variable definitions for Chapter 3 
Variables Definitions 
Individual factors of PSCORE 
pAGE equals to one if either (i) the age of a CEO equals to or less than the 
25th percentile of industry-year (identified by Datastream level-six) or 
(ii) the age of CEOs is one year or less close to the retirement age, 
zero otherwise. The retirement age of men and women in the UK are 
65 and 60, respectively, for the period from 1948 to 2010; and from 
April 2010 to March 2020 the retirement age of women increases one 
month every month until it reaches 65 (Bozio et al., 2010). 
pCERT equals to one if a CEO does not have an MBA or CPA equivalent, 
zero otherwise. CPA equivalent refers to professional qualifications 
provided by accounting bodies accredited by the Financial Reporting 
Council (FRC, 2016a). 
pCFO  equals to one if a CEO does not have working experience as a chief 
financial officer, zero otherwise. 
pCHAIRMAN equals to one if a CEO serves as the chairperson of the board of 
directors of firms, zero otherwise. 
pEARLY equals to one if a CEO is within the first three years of service in the 
firm, zero otherwise. 
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pFOUNDER equals to one if a CEO serves as the founder or co-founder of the firm, 
zero otherwise. 
pPRESS equals to one if the number of newspapers which simultaneously cites 
the name of a CEO and the company the CEO is working for in a year 
is less than the corresponding industry mean (identified by 
Datastream level-six), zero otherwise. 
pROA equals to one if the average of industry-adjusted returns on assets 
(aveROA) during the last three years of CEO’s tenure is negative, zero 
otherwise; where aveROA is (i) the average of industry-adjusted 
returns on assets in year t, t-1 and t-2 if a CEO is in the third year of 
tenure, or (ii) the average of industry-adjusted returns on assets in year 
t and t-1 if a CEO is in the second year of tenure, or (iii) the industry-
adjusted return on assets in year t if a CEO is in the first year of tenure. 
Return on assets equals to net income before extraordinary items 
divided by total assets. 
 pROLE equals to one if the number of years a CEO works as a chief executive 
officer is less than the corresponding industry-year mean (identify by 
Datastream level-six), zero otherwise. 
PSCORE = pCFO + pCERT + pROLE + pPRESS + pROA + pEARLY
+ pFOUNDER + pCHAIRMAN + pAGE 
PSCORE_P = pCFO + pCERT + pROLE + pROA + pEARLY + pFOUNDER
+ pCHAIRMAN + pAGE 
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Proxies for earnings quality 
DAC Absolute values of discretionary total accruals (DAC) estimated by 
the modified-Jones models (Jones, 1991; Dechow et al., 1995) for 
each (Datastream level-six) industry and each year with at least ten 
observations.  
𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = |
𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
− [?̂? + ?̂?1 (
1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + ?̂?2 (
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) +
?̂?3  (
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
)]|;  
Where:  ?̂?, ?̂?1, ?̂?2, ?̂?3 are coefficients estimated by the model:  
𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1 (
1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽2 (
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽3  (
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡;  
Where: 𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑡 is total accruals (𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐼𝐵𝑖,𝑡 - 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡; in which 𝐼𝐵𝑖,𝑡 is 
net income before extraordinary items, 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 is cash flows from 
operations); 𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 is total opening assets; ∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 are sale in year t 
minus sale in year t-1; and 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is gross PPE; i is firm i; t is year; 
and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is the error term. 
DAMP Absolute values of discretionary working capital accruals (DAMP) 
estimated by the margin model of Peasnell et al. (2000b) for each 
(Datastream level-six) industry and each year with at least ten 
observations. DAMP are absolute values of residuals of the following 
regression:  
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1 (
𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽2 (
𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
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Where: WACi,t = (∆CAi,t −  ∆CHEi,t) − (∆CLi,t − ∆STDi,t); where 
WACi,t is working capital accruals, ∆CAi,t is current assets in year t 
minus current assets in year t-1, ∆CHEi,t is cash and cash equivalents 
in year t minus cash and cash equivalent in year t-1, ∆CLi,t is current 
liabilities in year t minus current liabilities in year t-1, and ∆STDi,t is 
short-term debts in year t minus short-term debts in year t-1 
DCF Absolute values of abnormal cash flows. DCF are the absolute values 
of the residuals of the  following regression by each (Datastream 
level-six) industry and each year with at least ten observations:  
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1 (
1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽2 (
𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽3 (
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
Where: 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 is net cash flows from operations; 𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 is total 
opening assets; 𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 is sales; ∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 is sales in year t minus sales 
in year t-1; i is firm i; t is year; and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is the error term. 
DDISEXP Absolute values of abnormal discretionary expenditures. DDISEXP 
are the absolute values of the residuals of the following regression by 
each (Datastream level-six) industry and each year with at least ten 
observations:  
DISEXPi,t
Ai,t−1
= α
1
Ai,t−1
+ β1
REVi,t−1
Ai,t−1
+ εi,t  
Where: 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖,𝑡 is discretionary expenditures, which equals to 
R&D expenses plus selling and administrative expenses; 𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 is total 
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opening assets; 𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 is sales in year t-1; i is firm i; t is year; 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
is the error term. 
DPROD Absolute values of abnormal production costs. DPROD are absolute 
values of the residuals of the  following regression by each 
(Datastream level-six) industry and each year with at least ten 
observations:  
PRODit
Ai,t−1
= α
1
Ai,t−1
+ β1
REVi,t
Ai,t−1
+ β2
∆REVi,t
Ai,t−1
+ β3
∆REVi,t−1
Ai,t−1
+ εi,t  
Where: 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑖,𝑡 is production costs, which equals to sum of cost of 
goods sold and change in inventories from year t-1 to year t; 𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 is 
sales; ∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 is sales in year t minus sales in year t-1; ∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡−1 is 
sales in year t-1 minus sales in year t-2; 𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 is total opening assets; 
i is firm i; t is year; 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is the error term. 
DWAC Absolute values of discretionary working capital accruals (DWAC) 
estimated by the modified-Jones models (Jones, 1991; Dechow et al., 
1995) for each (Datastream level-six) industry and each year with at 
least ten observations.  
𝐷𝑊𝐶𝐴𝑖,𝑡 = |
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
− [?̂? + ?̂?1 (
1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + ?̂?2 (
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) +
?̂?3  (
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
)]|;  
where ?̂?, ?̂?1, ?̂?2, ?̂?3 are coefficients estimated by the model:  
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1 (
1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽2 (
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽3  (
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡;  
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Where: WACi,t = (∆CAi,t −  ∆CHEi,t) − (∆CLi,t − ∆STDi,t); where 
WACi,t is working capital accruals, ∆CAi,t is current assets in year t 
minus current assets in year t-1, ∆CHEi,t is cash and cash equivalents 
in year t minus cash and cash equivalent in year t-1, ∆CLi,t is current 
liabilities in year t minus current liabilities in year t-1, and ∆STDi,t is 
short-term debts in year t minus short-term debts in year t-1 
FSD_SCORE Mean absolute deviation of the first digits of figures reported in 
financial statements of firm i in year t from what are expected by 
Benford’s Law.  
𝐹𝑆𝐷_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡 =
∑ |𝑂𝐵𝑆𝐸𝑅𝑉𝐸𝐷𝑑,𝑖,𝑡−𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐸𝐷𝑑|
9
𝑑=1
9
 ;  
Where: 𝐹𝑆𝐷_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is the mean absolute deviation of the first 
digits of figures reported in financial statements from what are 
expected by Benford’s Law; 𝑂𝐵𝑆𝐸𝑅𝑉𝐸𝐷𝑑,𝑖,𝑡 is the observed (actual) 
probability of the first digit d; 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐸𝐷𝑑 is the expected 
probability of the first digit d as defined by Benford’s Law; d = 1, 2, 
…, 9; i is firm i; and t is year. 
KS The maximum cumulative absolute deviation of the first digits of 
items reported in financial statements from that expected by 
Benford’s Law 
𝐾𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥{|𝑂𝐷1,𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐸𝐷1|, |(𝑂𝐷1,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑂𝐷2,𝑖,𝑡) − (𝐸𝐷1
+ 𝐸𝐷2)|, … , |(𝑂𝐷1,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑂𝐷2,𝑖,𝑡 + ⋯ + 𝑂𝐷9,𝑖,𝑡)
− (𝐸𝐷1 + 𝐸𝐷2 + ⋯ + 𝐸𝐷9)|}         
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Where 𝑂𝐷𝑑,𝑖,𝑡 is the cumulative observed probability of the first digit 
d (d = 1, 2, …, 9) of firm i in year t; 𝐸𝐷𝑑  is the expected probability 
of the first digit d (d = 1, 2, …, 9), as defined by Benford’s Law.  
REM Total real earnings management. REM = DCF + DPROD + 
DDISEXP 
Control variables 
aACIND industry-adjusted audit committee independence, where audit 
committee independence is the percentage of independent members 
in an audit committee. Industry-adjusted values equal to firm values 
minus the means of the corresponding industry-year. 
aBDIND industry-adjusted board independence, where board independence is 
the percentage of independent directors on a board. 
aLEV The industry-adjusted leverage; where leverage (LEV) equals to the 
sum of long-term debts and short-term debts, scaled by total assets. 
aLOGMBT the industry-adjusted market-to-book ratio, where the market-to-book 
ratio (LOGMTB) is the natural log of the ratio of market value divided 
by book value of equity. 
aLOGMVE the industry-adjusted firm size, where firm size (LOGMVE) equals to 
natural log of the market value of equity. 
aNOA the industry-adjusted net operating asset ratio (NOA); where 𝑁𝑂𝐴 =
[𝐶𝐸𝑄 + (𝐷𝐿𝑇𝑇 + 𝐷𝐿𝐶) − 𝐶𝐻𝐸]/𝑅𝐸𝑉, where: CEQ is total book 
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value of equity; DLTT is long-term debts; DLC is short term debts; 
CHE is cash and cash equivalent; REV is sales. 
AUDIT equals to one if a firm is audited by a Big Four audit firm, zero 
otherwise. 
CYCLE Business life cycle is calculated based on Dickinson (2011), which 
equals to one if a firm has negative CFO, negative CFI and positive 
CFF (young firm), or has positive CFO, negative CFI and positive 
CFF (growth firm), and zero if a firm as positive CFO, negative CFI 
and negative CFF (mature firm); where CFO is cash flows from 
operating activities, CFI is cash flows from investing activities, and 
CFF is cash flows from financing activities. 
DISTRESS equals to one if ZSCORE is negative, zero otherwise; where ZSCORE 
following Taffler (1983) is calculated as follows:  
ZSCORE = 3.2 +  12.18 ∗ X1  +  2.50 ∗ X2  −  10.68 ∗ X3  +
 0.029 ∗ X4; where X1 =  
Profit before tax
current liabilities
; X2 =  
Current assets
Total liabilities
; X3 =
 
Current liabilities
Total assets
; X4 =  
(Quick assets−Current liabilities)
(Sales−Pretax income−Depreciation)/365
 
INCENTIVE equity-based incentives of CEOs.  
𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑉𝐸 =
𝑂𝑁𝐸𝑃𝐶𝑇
(𝑂𝑁𝐸𝑃𝐶𝑇 +  𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐴𝑅𝑌 +  𝐵𝑂𝑁𝑈𝑆)
  
𝑂𝑁𝐸𝑃𝐶𝑇 = 0.01 𝑥 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸 𝑥 (𝑆𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐸 + 𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁) 
Where: 𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑉𝐸 is equity-based incentives of CEOs; 𝑂𝑁𝐸𝑃𝐶𝑇 
is change in CEOs’ equity holdings corresponding to the change in 
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stock price by one percent; 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸 is share price at the end of fiscal 
year; 𝑆𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐸 is shares held by CEOs; 𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁 is options held by the 
CEOs; 𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐴𝑅𝑌 is total cash salary CEOs receive; and 𝐵𝑂𝑁𝑈𝑆 is 
cash bonus CEOs receive. Compensation data are manually collected 
in Bloomberg database. 
M&A equals to one if a firm announces a share-financed merger and 
acquisition deal, zero otherwise. 
SEO equals to one if a firm issues a significant portion of equity 
(outstanding shares increase at least 5 percent and proceeds from 
equity issuance are positive), zero otherwise. 
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4. Chapter 4: ACCOUNTING CONSERVATISM AND 
BANKING EXPERTISE ON BOARDS OF DIRECTORS 
Abstract 
This chapter examines the role of banking expertise on the board of directors on 
accounting conservatism, another aspect of earnings quality. I provide an innovative 
way to measure banking expertise based on the working history in banks of all 
individual directors on the board. I argue that directors with banking expertise would 
have an information advantage about the market-level demand for accounting 
conservatism; hence, having them on the board can help non-financial firms avoid 
excessive conservatism. Moreover, directors with banking expertise often possess an 
interpersonal network in the banking industry that can act as a private communication 
channel in debt contracting, resulting in less demand for accounting conservatism at 
the firm-specific level. I find that accounting conservatism is negatively affected by 
banking expertise on the board. Also, the evidence shows that banking expertise on 
the board has a more pronounced impact on accounting conservatism when firms have 
high bankruptcy risk, and when firms have high financial leverage. The evidence has 
some implications for boards of directors. 
Keywords: accounting conservatism, banking expertise, boards of directors  
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4.1. Introduction  
Accounting conservatism is major debt contracting mechanism (Basu, 1997; Watts, 
2003a; Mora and Walker, 2015). Accounting conservatism results in lower book 
values relative to economic (or neutral) values of net assets due to lower verification 
requirements for the recognition of losses relative to gains (Mora and Walker, 2015). 
Therefore, it facilitates the violation of debt covenants, which usually are based on 
accounting numbers, so that debtholders may take proactive actions, such as debt 
renegotiation or restructuring, to protect their interests (Ahmed et al., 2002; Watts, 
2003a; Nikolaev, 2010). Hence, it is in the debtholders’ main interest to demand 
accounting conservatism. 
Recently, previous studies indicate that the demand for accounting conservatism is 
affected by the presence of a banker on the board of directors, but the evidence is 
mixed. On the one hand, Erkens et al. (2014) show that executives of lending banks 
serving on boards of directors of borrowing firms (affiliated bankers) can act as a 
private channel to provide lending banks with the creditworthiness of borrowing firms, 
leading to a decline in accounting conservatism. Thus, affiliated bankers help 
borrowing firms avoid costs associated with accounting conservatism (e.g., Nash et 
al., 2003; Chava and Roberts, 2008; Nini et al., 2012; Kravet, 2014; Bhaskar et al., 
2017; Gao et al., 2017). On the other hand, Bonetti et al. (2017) document a positive 
relationship between accounting conservatism and the presence of unaffiliated bankers 
on the board, e.g. those who are ex-bankers or bankers from non-lending banks, during 
the mandatory IFRS adoption of international financial reporting standards (IFRS) in 
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Europe. However, Erkens et al. (2014) and Bonetti et al. (2017) do not examine cases 
where a firm employs both an affiliated and an unaffiliated banker on the board. Also, 
they fail to consider the importance of working history of all individual directors on 
the board, who might have in-depth knowledge about debt market and therefore know 
how much accounting conservatism is needed for debt monitoring.  
In this paper, I examine whether it is not just the presence of a banker on the board that 
matters, but the levels of banking expertise on the board that makes a difference.  I 
argue that banking expertise on the board helps to reduce accounting conservatism. 
First, because directors who have worked in the banking industry for many years may 
provide boards of directors with information about market-level demand for 
accounting conservatism so that borrowing firms can avoid excessive accounting 
conservatism. Borrowing firms may prefer having directors with banking expertise for 
debt contracting because they do not face the conflicts of interests between 
shareholders and debtholders, so that they could help to mitigate costs related to the 
presence of an affiliated banker (e.g., Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Rajan, 1992; Kracaw 
and Zenner, 1998; Burak Güner, Malmendier, and Tate, 2008; Hilscher and Şişli-
Ciamarra, 2013). Second, directors with banking expertise might bring an 
interpersonal network in the banking industry (Engelberg et al., 2012), which can act 
as a private information-sharing channel to provide debtholders with better financial 
information about borrowing firms for debt monitoring, the intuition promoted by 
Erkens et al. (2014). This argument is consistent with previous evidence showing that 
an interpersonal network of directors is important to access debt markets, such as 
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raising debts with lower costs and having better subsequent stock performance 
(Engelberg et al., 2012). Third, I expect to provide an alternative explanation for the 
relationship between boards of directors and accounting conservatism. Accounting 
conservatism is not necessary a good organisational outcome because it can lead to 
biased financial statements (Mora and Walker, 2015; Glover and Lin, 2018) and reduce 
shareholders’ wealth (Beneish and Press, 1993; Nash et al., 2003; Bhaskar et al., 2017; 
Gao et al., 2017). If banking expertise contributes to a stronger board of directors, it is 
possible that it helps to reduce costly accounting conservatism. In short, I hypothesise 
that banking expertise on the board negatively affects accounting conservatism. 
To test the hypotheses of the study, I utilise data on the working history of individual 
directors on the board of companies listed on the London Stock Exchange from 2005 
to 2012. I measure banking expertise on the board by using (i) the total number of 
years all directors on the board have worked as executives in banks, (ii) the total 
number of banks for which all directors on the board have worked as executives, and 
(iii) the presence of at least one director on the board who has worked as an executive 
in a bank. I calculate firm-year accounting conservatism following previous studies 
(Basu, 1997; Khan and Watts, 2009; García Lara et al., 2016). The baseline regression 
results show that accounting conservatism is negatively correlated with the measures 
of banking expertise on the board. The relationship is statistically and economically 
significant. The findings hold strongly for various robustness checks, namely 
alternative measures of firm-year accounting conservatism and banking expertise on 
the board, the propensity score matching method to deal with confounding factors, and 
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alternative methodologies to estimate the effect of banking expertise on accounting 
conservatism. In general, the evidence supports the hypothesis that banking expertise 
on the board helps to reduce accounting conservatism. In final analyses, I investigate 
the impact of bankruptcy risk and financial leverage on the link between banking 
expertise and accounting conservatism. I conjecture and find that banking expertise on 
the board has more pronounced impacts on accounting conservatism when firms have 
high bankruptcy risk (low ZSCORE) and when firms have high financial leverage.  
The research makes the following contributions to the existing literature. First, I offer 
an innovative way to measure banking expertise based on the working history in the 
banking industry of all directors on the board, which is not considered in recent studies 
on the effect of the presence of affiliated bankers (Erkens et al., 2014) and unaffiliated 
bankers (Bonetti et al., 2017) on accounting conservatism. Second, the research sample 
is different from that of Erkens et al. (2014) and Bonetti et al. (2017). In contrast with 
Erkens et al. (2014), I do not require that the firms in the sample have an outstanding 
lending contract with affiliated banks. Thus, the findings of this study may be more 
generalised. Third, because the research period in this study is the post-IFRS adoption 
(2005) period in the United Kingdom (UK), change in accounting conservatism is 
unlikely caused by the shift from local to international accounting standards, as 
documented in the work of Bonetti et al. (2017).  
The results have some implications for boards of directors. The evidence suggests that 
boards of directors should consider the benefits of having directors with banking 
expertise on the board. However, I do not recommend that the board should 
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differentiate between directors who have many years of working experience in the 
banking industry from directors who have worked for many banks, because both are 
relevant in reducing costly accounting conservatism. 
The remaining part of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 provides relevant 
literature and hypothesis development. Section 4.3 explains the methodology, 
including sample selection, measures of banking expertise and accounting 
conservatism, and regression models. Section 4.4 presents findings and discussions. 
Section 4.5 provides concluding remarks. 
4.2. Literature review and hypothesis development 
4.2.1. Accounting conservatism and bankers on boards 
Previous studies show that, together with debt covenants, accounting conservatism can 
be used as another mechanism to mitigate the conflicts of interests of managers and 
shareholders with debtholders (Ahmed et al., 2002; Watts, 2003a; Nikolaev, 2010). 
Debt covenants help to transfer control rights from shareholders to debtholders in 
certain situations, e.g. when borrowing firms face financial distress, so that debtholders 
may take appropriate actions to protect themselves in a timely manner (Watts, 2003a). 
Accounting conservatism, which involves the recognition of all possible losses but not 
unverifiable gains, results in lower book values relative to economic (or neutral) values 
of net assets (Basu, 1997; Watts, 2003a; Mora and Walker, 2015). It facilitates the 
violation of debt covenants, so that debtholders may take proactive actions, e.g. debt 
renegotiation or restructuring, to protect themselves (Watts, 2003a). Although 
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accounting conservatism can be beneficial for firms (Ahmed et al., 2002; Beatty et al., 
2008; Zhang, 2008; Nikolaev, 2010; García Lara et al., 2011; Louis et al., 2012; García 
Lara et al., 2016; Kim and Zhang, 2016), there is emerging evidence that it is costly 
for borrowing firms (Nash et al., 2003; Chava and Roberts, 2008; Nini et al., 2012; 
Bhaskar et al., 2017; Gao et al., 2017). 22 
Recently, the literature documents that having a banker on the board of directors 
affects the level of conservatism, but the evidence is mixed (e.g., Erkens et al., 2014; 
Bonetti et al., 2017). On the one hand, the existing evidence indicates that board 
members, who are working as executives for lending banks (affiliated bankers), can 
serve as an alternative mechanism to mitigate the agency problems of debts (Kroszner 
and Strahan, 2001; Byrd and Mizruchi, 2005; Dittmann, Maug, and Schneider, 2010; 
Erkens et al., 2014). Kroszner and Strahan (2001) find that affiliated bankers on the 
board of large firms are actively involved in debt monitoring. Byrd and Mizruchi 
(2005) also show that the debt ratio is negatively associated with the existence of 
affiliated bankers on the board, suggesting that affiliated bankers play the monitoring 
role in borrowing firms. Erkens et al. (2014) provide evidence that affiliated bankers 
on the board lead to a decrease in accounting conservatism in borrowing firms. They 
explain that the affiliated bankers on the board provide lending banks with better 
information for monitoring debt contracts so that the lending banks can take 
                                                 
22 See Chapter 2, Section 2.3, for a comprehensive review of demand for accounting 
conservatism and its costly consequences. 
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appropriate disciplinary actions, such as debt renegotiation in a timelier manner, 
resulting in less demand for accounting conservatism. This private channel can help 
borrowing firms avoid costs related to accounting conservatism, as documented in 
previous studies (Smith and Warner, 1979; Beneish and Press, 1993; Nash et al., 2003; 
Chava and Roberts, 2008; Nini et al., 2012; Kravet, 2014; Bhaskar et al., 2017; Gao et 
al., 2017).   
On the other hand, Bonetti et al. (2017) examine the effect of unaffiliated bankers on 
boards, such as those who are currently working or used to work for banks that do not 
have a lending contract with the firm, on accounting conservatism before and after the 
mandatory IFRS adoption in Europe. They find that, compared with firms that do not 
have unaffiliated bankers on the board, firms that have unaffiliated bankers on the 
board exhibit higher accounting conservatism in the post-IFRS period. The authors 
argue that, unlike affiliated bankers, unaffiliated bankers do not face the conflicts of 
interests between shareholders and debtholders so that they contribute to strong boards 
of directors that are more committed to providing higher accounting conservatism 
(Ahmed and Duellman, 2007; García Lara, García Osma, et al., 2009a). 
In general, previous studies provide mixed evidence on how bankers on the board of 
directors contribute to the use of accounting conservatism. However, Erkens et al. 
(2014) and Bonetti et al. (2017) do not examine cases where a firm has both an 
affiliated banker and an unaffiliated banker on the board. Also, there are increasing 
concerns that having bankers on the board as a debt monitoring mechanism is costly 
for borrowing firms. Affiliated bankers on the board potentially constrain risky 
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investment, which may be preferred by shareholders (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Firms 
with affiliated bankers on the board are more likely to make acquisitions that are 
favourable for lenders but damage shareholders’ value (Burak Güner et al., 2008; 
Hilscher and Şişli-Ciamarra, 2013). In the presence of information asymmetry, the 
conflicts of interests between shareholders and debtholders may result in rent 
extraction from the banks having a close relationship with firms (Rajan, 1992; Kracaw 
and Zenner, 1998). Kracaw and Zenner (1998) also show that the renewal of loans 
provided by the affiliated banks, which have executives who are also serving on the 
board of borrowing firms, leads to negative reactions of the stock market. Moreover, 
the monopoly of information may arise if a firm has a close relationship with a bank 
(Rajan, 1992; Kracaw and Zenner, 1998). The affiliated bank may take advantage of 
the information-based monopoly to match the exact cost of debts with the risk of the 
project (Leland and Pyle, 1977). Rajan (1992) indicates that banks without superior 
information from a close relationship with firms are less likely to compete for lending 
opportunities. The reason may be that, if banks with inferior information want to win 
the competition to provide loans for borrowing firms, they may overpay due to 
uncertainty in estimating borrowers’ cash flows (Kagel and Levin, 1986). This leads 
to my argument that not just the presence of bankers on boards of directors that matters; 
banking expertise on the board also makes a difference. 
4.2.2. The role of banking expertise on boards of directors 
In this study, I believe that it is not just the presence of bankers on boards of directors 
that matters; banking expertise on the board also makes a difference. I augment the 
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concept by examining the levels of banking expertise on the board. I measure banking 
expertise in several different ways by using (i) the total number of years all directors 
on the board have worked as executives in banks, (ii) the total number of banks for 
which all directors on the board have worked as executives, and (iii) the presence of 
at least one director on the board who has worked as an executive in a bank. The 
measures of banking expertise are important because individual directors may have 
different working histories so that they can provide the board with varying levels of 
banking expertise. Additionally, the aggregate measures of banking expertise possibly 
explain the net effect of bankers on the board on accounting conservatism, given the 
mixed evidence documented by Erkens et al. (2014) and Bonetti et al. (2017). I 
hypothesise that banking expertise on the board helps to reduce accounting 
conservatism for several reasons. 
Firstly, I argue that boards of directors with banking expertise would have an 
information advantage about the market-level demand for conservatism; hence, having 
them on the boards can help non-financial firms avoid excessive accounting 
conservatism. Without banking expertise on the board, borrowing firms might adopt 
too much accounting conservatism because they are too worried about the costly 
consequences of debt-covenant violation, which are increasingly documented in 
previous studies (Beneish and Press, 1993; Nash et al., 2003; Chava and Roberts, 2008; 
Gigler et al., 2009; Nini et al., 2012; Li, 2013; Denis and Wang, 2014; Kravet, 2014; 
Bhaskar et al., 2017; Gao et al., 2017). In other words, there would be unnecessary 
conservatism. With banking expertise on the board, borrowing firms could use 
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accounting conservatism at a needed level so that they may avoid costs related to 
accounting conservatism. Furthermore, the banking expertise on the board can help 
firms mitigate the costs associated with the presence of affiliated bankers on the board 
due to conflicts of interests between shareholders and debtholders (Stiglitz and Weiss, 
1981; Rajan, 1992; Kracaw and Zenner, 1998; Burak Güner et al., 2008; Hilscher and 
Şişli-Ciamarra, 2013). 
Secondly, boards of directors with banking expertise often possess an interpersonal 
network in the banking industry that can act as a private communication channel for 
debt contracting. Engelberg et al. (2012) find that an interpersonal network of directors 
of borrowing firms and managers of lending banks, who previously worked or studied 
together, can help borrowing firms raise debts with lower costs and have better 
subsequent stock performance. Erkens et al. (2014) show that affiliated bankers on the 
board can act as a private channel that provides lending banks with better information 
to take appropriate disciplinary actions in a timelier manner. Therefore, lending banks 
require less accounting conservatism as a monitoring mechanism. In this study, I argue 
that all directors who have worked as executives in banks can provide the boards with 
a network in the banking industry. This private network can also give lenders private 
information of borrowing firms, because it is directly related to debt markets, resulting 
in less demand for accounting conservatism at the firm-specific level. 
Thirdly, I expect to provide an alternative explanation for the relationship between 
boards of directors and accounting conservatism. Previous research argues that boards 
of directors can play the monitoring role, which results in higher organisational 
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outcomes (Larcker et al., 2007). A strong board of directors requires managers to 
report more conservative earnings, which are beneficial for firms (Ahmed and 
Duellman, 2007; García Lara, García Osma, et al., 2009a). The presence of bankers on 
the board contributes to a better monitoring role, resulting in higher accounting 
conservatism (Bonetti et al., 2017). This argument is based on an important assumption 
that accounting conservatism is an indication of good organisational outcome and is a 
result of strong corporate governance. However, there is evidence that the above 
assumption is questionable. Recent accounting standards remove the requirement of 
prudence (or conservatism) as a characteristic of financial statements because 
conservatism can mislead investors about the fundamental performance of reporting 
firms (Mora and Walker, 2015). In other words, from the accounting standard setters, 
accounting conservatism can distort the true performance of firms. Therefore, it is 
possible that a strong board of directors, such as a board with banking expertise, can 
help to reduce accounting conservatism. 
To summarise, I hypothesise that firms with banking expertise on the board exhibit 
lower accounting conservatism. I provide further explanations on the relationship 
between boards of directors and accounting conservatism, which would add 
significantly to the studies of Erkens et al. (2014) and Bonetti et al. (2017). The 
hypothesis is as follows: 
H1: Ceteris paribus, the banking expertise on the board of directors is negatively 
associated with accounting conservatism. 
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4.3. Data and methodology 
4.3.1. Data 
I use a sample of all companies (both dead and alive) listed on the London Stock 
Exchange from 2005 to 2012. I remove financial and utility firms as they are highly 
regulated firms so that motivations for accounting conservatism may be different (see, 
e.g., Watts, 2003a). The sample covers the period following the mandatory IFRS 
adoption in the United Kingdom23 so that I can control for changes in accounting 
conservatism due to changes in accounting standards (see, e.g., Bonetti et al., 2017). 
To mitigate the influence of outliers on the estimation of accounting conservatism, I 
follow Khan and Watts (2009) to delete firms ranked annually in the top 1st and 99th 
percentiles of earnings, depreciation, returns, size, market-to-book ratio, and leverage 
in each fiscal year. I derive an initial sample of 3,428 firm-year observations with 
sufficient data for the calculation of all variables in the main regression models. Table 
4-1 shows the sample selection procedure. 
Table 4-1: Sample selection procedure 
Procedure 
Firm-year 
observations 
Datastream's firm-year observations from 2005 to 2012 
(excluding financial, insurance and utility firms) 24,168 
Less:  
 
- Observations with missing share price and financial 
data for measures of accounting conservatism -14,692 
                                                 
23 European countries, including the United Kingdom, adopted the IFRS in 2005. 
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- Observations where the share price is less than 0.5 
pence -4,120 
 
- Observations where book values of equity are less 
than 0.5 million -226 
 
- Observations where financial statements are not in 
Sterling Pound -14 
 
- Observations with missing data for financial 
expertise of boards of directors -1,688 
Final sample 3,428 
 
4.3.2. Measures of banking expertise 
This section presents how I construct data for banking expertise of the board of 
directors. Based on the list of companies downloaded from Datastream, I firstly search 
for a list of directors for each company in each fiscal year in the Bloomberg database. 
Then I search for the working history of each board member in Bloomberg using the 
full name of directors and the name of companies in which directors are currently 
serving on the boards (if there is no result, I omit the first name and middle name of 
the director). For each director, I compile a list of companies he/she has worked for in 
the past. If I cannot find a director’s working history in Bloomberg, I use the same 
searching strategy as explained above in the Financial Times, then on LinkedIn. For 
the remaining directors who are still missing, I download the corresponding annual 
reports from Key Note and scan the reports for any information on the directors 
working history. I scan the working history of each director to determine whether a 
director has current or previous working experience in a bank, and I document the 
working position (if available). I determine a director as having working experience in 
a bank if at least one of the companies the director has worked for is on the ‘List of 
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Banks’ provided by the Bank of England (Bank of England, 2016)24 or has the 
keywords ‘bank’, ‘BANK’, ‘banks’, or ‘BANKS’ in its name. I also require that the 
working position in banks is executive, which is defined as the position from the head 
of a division and above, excluding the non-executive chairman, independent director, 
supervisory board member, and other roles that are not directly involved in bank 
business. If I cannot identify the working position, I assume it is not an executive role. 
For each company, I capture the banking expertise of all directors on the board who 
have served on the board of firms for at least three months to make sure that directors 
have a significant influence on the board. I measure banking expertise in three different 
ways. The first measure is the total number of years all directors on the board have 
worked as executives in banks (𝑦𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑆𝐸), and I refer to this variable as 
cumulative banking expertise on the board. A higher 𝑦𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑆𝐸 indicates higher 
banking expertise on the board, because individual directors may accumulate banking 
expertise during many years working as executives in banks. The second measure is 
the total number of banks for which all directors on the board have worked as 
executives (𝑎𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑆𝐸), and I refer to this variable as industry-level banking 
expertise on the board. A higher 𝑎𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑆𝐸 indicates higher banking expertise on 
                                                 
24 Our measure of directors’ working experience in the banking industry is reasonably reliable. 
If a director has worked for a bank outside the UK, the name of the bank may also be included 
in the list, because London has been known as one of the leading financial centres in the world 
for many years. 
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the board at the industry level, because working in different banks may help individual 
directors gain market-level banking expertise. While 𝑦𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑆𝐸 and 
𝑎𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑆𝐸 are the aggregate measures of levels of banking expertise on the board, 
I have the third measure for the presence of banking expertise on the board 
(𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑆𝐸), which is equal to one if a company has at least one director on the 
board who has worked as an executive in a bank, and zero otherwise. 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑆𝐸 
indicates whether the board has banking expertise and captures both bankers and ex-
bankers. 
4.3.3. The measure of accounting conservatism 
Prior research shows that one of the most cited models to estimate accounting 
conservatism is the model offered by Basu (1997) (Ryan, 2006; Ball et al., 2013b). In 
this model, the asymmetric timeliness of bad news over good news is used as a measure 
of accounting conservatism. However, a significant disadvantage of this model is it is 
less efficient to test hypotheses at the firm or industry levels because it can only 
estimate the measure of accounting conservatism at the market level in each year 
(Ryan, 2006; Khan and Watts, 2009). Based on the work of Basu (1997), Khan and 
Watts (2009) develop a model to estimate firm-year conservatism. They develop 
empirical measures of the timeliness of good news (𝐺_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸) and the incremental 
timeliness of bad news over good news (𝐶_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸) based on firm characteristics 
(financial leverage, firm size, and market-to-book ratio), which are showed in the literature to 
be linked with accounting conservatism. Later, García Lara et al. (2016) further improve 
the measure of accounting conservatism based on the work of Basu (1997) and Khan 
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and Watts (2009). García Lara et al. (2016) incorporate the measure of the asymmetric 
timeliness of bad news over good news and the measure of the timeliness of good news 
together, and they refer the new measure as total conservatism.  
For the purpose of this study, I use the measure of total accounting conservatism 
following García Lara et al. (2016), which is based on Basu (1997) and Khan and 
Watts (2009), because the banking expertise of the boards may change across firms, 
industries and time, and because total conservatism is better at capturing the total effect 
of conservative accounting on earnings. The use of firm-year conservatism is also 
documented in the work of Bonetti et al. (2017), which studies accounting 
conservatism and bankers on boards surrounding the mandatory adoption of IFRS in 
the EU.25 The remaining part of this section describes the calculation of total 
conservatism following Basu (1997), Khan and Watts (2009), and García Lara et al. 
(2016). 
In the model of Basu (1997), the asymmetric timeliness of bad news over good news 
is calculated as follows: 
                                                 
25 A great deal of previous research uses Khan and Watts (2009) measure to study the 
relationship of accounting conservatism with director characteristics (Ahmed and Duellman, 
2007) managerial overconfidence (Lafond and Roychowdhury, 2008) and corporate lobbying 
(Kong, Radhakrishnan, and Tsang, 2017), to name just a few.  
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Equation 4-1: Basu (1997) model 
𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
Where: 𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡 is net income before extraordinary items, scaled by opening market 
value of equity; 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡 is buy-and-hold stock returns over the fiscal year; 𝐷𝑖,𝑡 is a 
dummy variable that equals one if 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡 < 0, and zero otherwise; i represents company 
i and t represents fiscal year t. The coefficient 𝛽3 is the measure of good news 
timeliness. The coefficient 𝛽4 is a measure of accounting conservatism, which is the 
incremental timeliness for bad news over good news. 𝛽3 + 𝛽4 is the total timeliness of 
bad news. In the model, 𝛽3 and 𝛽4 are expected to be positive. Regression (1) is run 
for each year in the sample. 
Based on the model of Basu (1997), Khan and Watts (2009) construct the empirical 
measures of the timeliness of good news (𝐺𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸) and the incremental timeliness of 
bad news over good news (𝐶𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸) based on firm characteristics as follows: 26 
                                                 
26 Khan and Watts (2009)use SIZE, MTB, and LEV in year t to estimate GSCORE and 
CSCORE. In this paper, I use SIZE, MTB, and LEV in year t-1. I argue that earnings are the 
incomes of the whole year so that firms may rely on the conditions (characterised by LEV, 
SIZE, and MTB) in year t-1 to make decisions on how much accounting numbers should be 
conservative in year t. The idea of using firm characteristics in year t-1 is also stipulated by 
Ball et al. (2013a). An example of using the same approach to estimate GSCORE and 
CSCORE is the work of Banker, Basu, Byzalov, and Chen (2012). 
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Equation 4-2: Khan and Watts (2009)'s calculations of GSCORE and CSCORE 
𝐺𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽3 = 𝜇1 + 𝜇2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜇3𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜇4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 
𝐶𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽4 = 𝛾1 + 𝛾2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾3𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 
Where: 𝜇𝑗 and 𝛾𝑗 (j = 1-4) are obtained from the following annual cross-sectional 
regressions: 
Equation 4-3: Khan Watts (2009)'s model to estimate firm-year accounting 
conservatism 
𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + (𝜇1 + 𝜇2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜇3𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜇4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1)𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 
(𝛾1 + 𝛾2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾3𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1)𝐷𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 
(𝛿1𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛿2𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛿3𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛿4𝐷𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛿5𝐷𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛿6𝐷𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑖−1 is the natural log of opening market value of equity; 𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑖−1 is the opening 
market-to-book ratio; and 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 is the sum of opening long-term and opening short-
term debts, scaled by the opening market value of equity. The coefficients estimated 
from Equation 4-3 are used in Equation 4-2 to calculate 𝐺𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸 and 𝐶𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸.  
To estimate total conservatism following García Lara et al. (2016), I add 𝐺𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡 
and 𝐶𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡 together for each company in each year, and I refer to the new variable 
as 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑖,𝑡. The calculation is as follows: 
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Equation 4-4: García Lara et al. (2016)' calculation of total accounting conservatism 
𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑖,𝑡 =  𝐺𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐶𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡 
After that, I calculate the average of 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆 across years t-2, t-1, and t (denoted 
𝑎𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑖,𝑡); rank 𝑎𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑖,𝑡 of all firms for each year; and divide the ranked values by 
N+1, where N is the total observations in each rank group. I refer to the new variable 
as the annual fractional rank of total accounting conservatism, denoted 
𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆_𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑖,𝑡. 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆_𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑖,𝑡 ranges from 0 to 1, and a higher 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆_𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑖,𝑡 
indicates higher accounting conservatism. The use of rank values helps to mitigate 
nonlinearity concerns and errors in measurements (García Lara et al., 2016; Goh et al., 
2017).  
To check the validity of firm-year conservatism measures, I follow García Lara et al. 
(2016) and Khan and Watts (2009) and regress the measures of firm-year total 
accounting conservatism (CONS and CONS_RANK) on determinants of accounting 
conservatism, which are firm size (SIZE), financial leverage (LEV), and market-to-
book ratio (MTB). For the comparison purpose, I also run regressions between the 
three-year average of the original CSCORE following Khan and Watts (2009) (denoted 
aCSCORE) and the annual fractional rank of aCSCORE (denoted CSCORE_RANK) 
with determinants of accounting conservatism. Based on Khan and Watts (2009), I 
expect that there is a negative relationship between measures of accounting 
conservatism and firm size, while there is a positive relationship between measures of 
accounting conservatism and financial leverage. Market-to-book is also expected to be 
correlated with measures of accounting conservatism, but the relationship may be 
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either positive (Khan and Watts, 2009) or negative (Roychowdhury and Watts, 2007; 
García Lara et al., 2016). 
Table 4-2 and Table 4-3 reports estimations of the regressions between four measures 
of accounting conservatism and their determinants in year t-1 and year t, respectively.  
The findings show that all four measures of firm-year accounting conservatism are 
highly correlated with firm size, financial leverage, and market-to-book ratio. 
Especially, adjusted R2 values and number of significant coefficients are significantly 
higher in the models which use the annual fractional rank values than in the other 
models, suggesting that the use of fractional rank values may be more relevant. This 
is in line with the ideas that the use of rank values helps to mitigate nonlinearity 
concerns and errors in measurements (García Lara et al., 2016; Goh et al., 2017). In 
short, the findings show that the measures of firm-year accounting conservatism are 
valid. In this paper, I use CONS_RANK in main tests and CSCORE_RANK in 
robustness tests. 
 
182 
  
 
Table 4-2: Validity tests of firm-year measures of accounting conservatism against determinants of conservatism in year t 
 
Predicted 
signs 
(a) 
CONSt   
(b) 
CONS_RANKt   
(c) 
CSCOREt   
(d) 
CSCORE_RANKt 
  Coefficient 
t-
statistic   Coefficient 
t-
statistic   Coefficient 
t-
statistic   Coefficient t-statistic 
SIZEt - -0.198*** -26.93  -0.116*** -87.78  -0.248*** -32.57  -0.122*** -95.79 
LEVt + 0.326*** 11.10  0.115*** 21.80  0.082*** 2.68  0.009* 1.73 
MTBt + 0.002 0.46  0.002** 2.49  0.004 0.82  0.002*** 2.93 
Constant   2.476*** 27.68  1.867*** 115.99  3.068*** 33.04  1.974*** 127.16 
Observations  3428   3428   3428   3428  
Adjusted R2   0.209   0.715   0.245   0.735  
Note: the table reports the validity test of the measures of firm-year accounting conservatism. Each measure of firm-year accounting 
conservatism is regressed on determinants of conservatism in year t, which are the firm size (SIZEt), financial leverage (LEVt), and market-to-
book ratio (MTBt). 
Column (a) shows the estimations of the following model: 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. 
Column (b) shows the estimations of the following model: 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆_𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. 
Column (c) shows the estimations of the following model: 𝐶𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. 
Column (d) shows the estimations of the following model: 𝐶𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸_𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. 
Definitions of variables are in the Appendix. *, **, *** are significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 4-3: Validity tests of firm-year measures of accounting conservatism against determinants of conservatism in year t-1 
 
Predicted 
signs 
(a) 
CONSt   
(b) 
CONS_RANKt   
(c) 
CSCOREt   
(d) 
CSCORE_RANKt 
  Coefficient t-statistic   Coefficient 
t-
statistic   Coefficient 
t-
statistic   Coefficient t-statistic 
SIZEt-1 - -0.200*** -28.31  -0.115*** -88.51  -0.256*** -35.67  -0.122*** -102.94 
LEVt-1 + 0.099*** 9.26  0.022*** 11.29  0.067*** 6.14  -0.001 -0.68 
MTBt-1 +/- -0.003** -2.36  -0.000* -1.90  -0.003** -2.30  -0.000* -1.67 
Constant  2.576*** 29.61  1.887*** 117.78  3.168*** 35.87  1.971*** 135.72 
Observations  3428   3428   3428   3428  
Adjusted R2   0.216   0.705   0.285   0.757  
Note: the table reports the validity test of the measures of firm-year accounting conservatism. Each measure of firm-year accounting 
conservatism is regressed on determinants of conservatism in year t-1, which are the firm size (SIZEt-1), financial leverage (LEVt-1), and 
market-to-book ratio (MTBt-1). 
Column (a) shows the estimations of the following model: 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. 
Column (b) shows the estimations of the following model: 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆_𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. 
Column (c) shows the estimations of the following model: 𝐶𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. 
Column (d) shows the estimations of the following model: 𝐶𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸_𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. 
Definitions of variables are in the Appendix. *, **, *** are significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively 
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4.3.4. Main regressions 
To examine the association between accounting conservatism and the banking 
expertise on the board, I run the following regressions: 
Equation 4-5: Baseline regression between accounting conservatism and banking 
expertise on the board 
𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆_𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑖,𝑡
=  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛾𝑗𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡  +  𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆
+ 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
Where: 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆_𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑖,𝑡 is the annual fractional rank of the average of total accounting 
conservatism in year t. 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 can be 𝑦𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡, 𝑎𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡, or 
𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡 (used as substitutes). 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡 is a vector of firm characteristics 
associated with accounting conservatism. All continuous variables are winsorised at 
1st and 99th percentiles in each year. The following part briefly discusses related 
literature on control variables.  
Leverage (𝐿𝐸𝑉) is the first control variable. Prior studies (Watts, 2003a; Ahmed and 
Duellman, 2007; LaFond and Watts, 2008; García Lara, García Osma, et al., 2009b; 
Khan and Watts, 2009; García Lara et al., 2016) show that the conflicts of interests 
between shareholders and debtholders are high in firms with high 𝐿𝐸𝑉, so that there is 
a higher contracting demand for accounting conservatism for firms with higher 𝐿𝐸𝑉. 
I expect that 𝐿𝐸𝑉 has a positive sign. 
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Firm size (𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸) is the next control variable. Large companies may have higher 
litigation demand for accounting conservatism (LaFond and Watts, 2008; Khan and 
Watts, 2009). However, large companies may need less accounting conservatism 
because those firms are more visible to the capital markets or have less information 
asymmetry (Ahmed and Duellman, 2007; LaFond and Watts, 2008; Khan and Watts, 
2009). I expect that 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 has a negative sign, as documented in most empirical 
evidence (Ahmed and Duellman, 2007; LaFond and Watts, 2008; Khan and Watts, 
2009; García Lara et al., 2016).  
The next control variable is the market-to-book ratio (𝑀𝑇𝐵). Firms with a high 𝑀𝑇𝐵 
might need more accounting conservatism in response to the increased agency costs 
resulting from more growth options (LaFond and Watts, 2008; Khan and Watts, 2009). 
Also, a high 𝑀𝑇𝐵 is directly associated with understatement (or conservatism) of net 
assets (Givoly and Hayn, 2000; LaFond and Watts, 2008; Khan and Watts, 2009). 
However, begining MTB may be negatively correlated with accounting conservatism 
due to a reduction in loss recognition which results from unrecognition of increase in 
asset values (Roychowdhury and Watts, 2007; García Lara et al., 2016). Therefore, 
MTB might be positive or negative. 
Following Ahmed and Duellman (2013), I also control for profitability by using cash 
flows from operations (𝐶𝐹𝑂), which is equal to cash flow from operations in year t 
scaled by assets at the end of year t. Prior research shows that firms with low 
profitability are more likely to suffer higher costs related to accounting conservatism; 
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hence, profitability is positively correlated with accounting conservatism (Ahmed et 
al., 2002). I expect that 𝐶𝐹𝑂 has a positive sign. 
The next control variable is the firm business cycle (𝐶𝑌𝐶𝐿𝐸). The existing literature 
provides mixed evidence. On the one hand, mature firms are more likely to face high 
litigation risks so that they demand a high degree of accounting conservatism (LaFond 
and Watts, 2008; Khan and Watts, 2009). On the other hand, mature firms need less 
external financing for business expansions (Dickinson, 2011); therefore, they need less 
accounting conservatism. I calculate 𝐶𝑌𝐶𝐿𝐸 following Dickinson (2011), which is a 
dummy variable with the value of one if (i) cash flows from operations in year t are 
positive and (ii) both cash flows from investing and financing activities in year t are 
negative (mature firm), and zero otherwise (young or growth firm). I expect that 
𝐶𝑌𝐶𝐿𝐸 is associated with accounting conservatism but do not predict its sign.  
Sale growth (∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸) is the next control variable. ∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸  is equal to change in sales 
from year t-1 to year t, scaled by total assets at the end of year t. The evidence is mixed 
about the effects of ∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸 on accounting conservatism. Firms with higher growth 
have more information asymmetry, which results in more demand for accounting 
conservatism (LaFond and Watts, 2008). In contrast, studies also document that it is 
possible that growth may result in less asymmetric timeliness of bad news over good 
news (Ball et al., 2013a). I expect that ∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸 is associated with accounting 
conservatism but do not predict its sign.  
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Next, I control for debt issuance (𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑈𝐸) and seasoned equity offering (𝑆𝐸𝑂). 
𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑈𝐸 is a dummy variable with the value of one if the change in short-term 
and long-term debts from the end of year t-1 to the end of year t, scaled by total assets 
at the end of year t, is positive and more than 5%, and zero otherwise. 𝑆𝐸𝑂 is a dummy 
variable with the value of one if a firm increases outstanding shares in year t by at least 
5% with positive proceeds from equity issuance, and zero otherwise. As discussed 
above, debt financing results in higher demand for accounting conservatism as a 
mechanism for debt monitoring (Watts, 2003a; Erkens et al., 2014; García Lara et al., 
2016; Goh et al., 2017). However, in a recent paper, Goh et al. (2017) show that 
accounting conservatism is positively correlated with the choice of equity issuance 
versus debt issuance when firms need significant external capital. Also, recent research 
(Kim, Li, Pan, and Zuo, 2013) provides empirical evidence that firms with 𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑠 use 
accounting conservatism to reduce the negative impact of information asymmetry on 
returns around 𝑆𝐸𝑂 announcements. Therefore, I expect that 𝑆𝐸𝑂 have a positive sign 
but do not expect a sign for DEBTISSUE. Variable calculations are presented in the 
Appendix at the end of this chapter. 
If 𝛽1 in the Equation 4-5 is negative and significant, it is evidence of a negative 
association between accounting conservatism and the banking expertise on the board 
in line with the hypothesis. 
4.4. Findings and discussions 
4.4.1. Descriptive statistics and correlations 
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Table 4-4 shows descriptive statistics of the selected variables. Firm characteristics’ 
statistics are similar to the findings from prior research that uses similar data (e.g., Goh 
and Gupta, 2016). The statistics show that the sample has more young and growth 
firms than mature firms (median of 𝐶𝑌𝐶𝐿𝐸 is 0) and more firms that do not have 
seasoned equity offering or debt issuance in the fiscal year than firms that do (medians 
of 𝑆𝐸𝑂 and 𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑈𝐸 are 0). In addition, the descriptive statistics indicate that 
y𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑆𝐸 has a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 42. This means that the number 
of years that all directors on the board have worked as executives in banks can reach 
42 years. On average, the boards have 2.57 years of experience in the banking industry 
(MEAN of 𝑦𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑆𝐸). Similarly, the statistics show that the largest number of 
banks for which all directors on the board have worked as executives is 6 (MAX of 
𝑎𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑆𝐸), and, on average, all directors on the board have worked for 0.44 banks 
(MEAN of 𝑎𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑆𝐸). Moreover, the mean and median of 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑆𝐸 are 0.23 
and 0, respectively, suggesting that more observations do not have banking expertise 
on the board than observations that do. Those impressive statistics suggest that banking 
expertise could make a difference in accounting practices, e.g. the use of accounting 
conservatism which is under investigation in this study.  
Table 4-5 reports differences in firm characteristics, firm-year accounting 
conservatism, and banking expertise on the board between two groups: observations 
that have banking expertise on the board (EXPERTISE = 1) and observations that do 
not have banking expertise on the board (EXPERTISE = 0). First, I find that accounting 
conservatism is lower in groups of observations with banking expertise on the board 
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than in those without banking expertise on the board, and mean differences in 
accounting conservatism between two groups are statistically significant. Second, 
further statistics on 𝑦𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑆𝐸 and 𝑎𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑆𝐸 indicate that the means of 
cumulative expertise and industry-level banking expertise of the first group are 11.23 
and 1.92, respectively, while those of the second group equal 0 by definition.  
Table 4-6 reports Pearson correlations among the selected variables. The negative and 
significant correlations of 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆_𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾 with 𝑦𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑆𝐸, 𝑎𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑆𝐸 and 
𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑆𝐸 suggest that the measures of banking expertise on the board are 
associated with a reduction in accounting conservatism. The correlations among the 
independent variables are generally not too high (no pair-wise correlation coefficient 
is higher than 0.29) and insignificant in many cases. Therefore, it is unlikely that 
multicollinearity among independent variables is a major concern in this study.  
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Table 4-4: Descriptive statistics 
  N MEAN MEDIAN STD MIN MAX 
ATi,t (millions) 3428 1,545 192 4,583 0 50,806 
SALEi,t (millions) 3428 1,296 188 3,796 0 60,931 
IBi,t (millions) 3428 103 8 451 -1,426 6,893 
RETi,t 3428 0.14 0.07 0.56 -0.98 6.21 
CONS_RANKi,t 3428 0.50 0.50 0.29 0.01 0.99 
CSCORE_RANKi,t 3428 0.50 0.50 0.29 0.01 0.99 
yEXPERTISEi,t 3428 2.57 0.00 6.87 0.00 42.00 
mEXPERTISEi,t 3428 1.05 0.00 2.22 0.00 10.00 
aEXPERTISEi,t 3428 0.44 0.00 1.04 0.00 6.00 
EXPERTISEi,t 3428 0.23 0.00 0.42 0.00 1.00 
LEVi,t 3428 0.32 0.16 0.50 0.00 3.12 
SIZEi,t 3428 12.16 12.08 2.03 7.63 17.38 
MTBi,t 3428 2.93 1.94 3.37 0.32 22.83 
CFOi,t 3428 0.08 0.08 0.11 -0.46 0.34 
∆SALEi,t 3428 0.11 0.07 0.25 -0.62 1.21 
CYCLEi,t 3428 0.06 0.00 0.24 0.00 1.00 
SEOi,t 3428 0.10 0.00 0.30 0.00 1.00 
DEBTISSUEi,t 3428 0.22 0.00 0.42 0.00 1.00 
PPEi,t 3428 0.44 0.34 0.37 0.01 1.53 
Note: The table reports descriptive statistics of selected variables, including the 
number of observations (N), mean (MEAN), median (MEDIAN), standard 
deviation (STD), min (MIN), and max (MAX). Definitions of variables are in the 
Appendix. 
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Table 4-5: Descriptive statistics by firms with and without banking expertise on the board 
  EPXERTISE = 1 (N = 785) EXPERTISE = 0 (N = 2,643) T-test 
  MEAN MEDIAN STD MIN MAX MEAN MEDIAN STD MIN MAX MEAN t-statistic 
ATi,t (millions) 3,647 813 7,574 3 50,806 921 131 2,918 0 39,499 -2,726*** -9.87 
SALEi,t (millions) 2,853 701 6,137 0 60,931 833 132 2,566 0 41,591 -2,020*** -8.99 
IBi,t (millions) 278 40 786 -1,426 6,893 51 5 262 -1,092 6,204 -227*** -7.97 
RETi,t 0.14 0.09 0.52 -0.90 4.79 0.13 0.06 0.57 -0.98 6.21 -0.008 -0.36 
CONS_RANKi,t 0.33 0.26 0.27 0.01 0.99 0.55 0.56 0.28 0.01 0.99 0.217*** 19.91 
CSCORE_RANKi,t 0.33 0.27 0.27 0.01 0.99 0.55 0.56 0.28 0.01 0.99 0.216*** 19.83 
yEXPERTISEi,t 11.23 8.00 10.45 1.00 42.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -11.232*** -30.11 
mEXPERTISEi,t 4.60 4.00 2.30 1.00 10.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -4.600*** -55.98 
aEXPERTISEi,t 1.92 1.00 1.38 1.00 6.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -1.922*** -38.99 
LEVi,t 0.29 0.16 0.46 0.00 3.12 0.33 0.15 0.52 0.00 3.12 0.044** 2.25 
SIZEi,t 13.45 13.49 2.01 7.63 17.38 11.78 11.74 1.88 7.63 17.38 -1.670*** -20.77 
MTBi,t 3.33 2.25 3.57 0.32 22.83 2.81 1.86 3.30 0.32 22.83 -0.526*** -3.68 
CFOi,t 0.10 0.09 0.09 -0.46 0.34 0.07 0.08 0.12 -0.46 0.34 -0.025*** -6.23 
∆SALEi,t 0.09 0.07 0.20 -0.62 1.21 0.11 0.07 0.27 -0.62 1.21 0.021** 2.36 
CYCLEi,t 0.07 0.00 0.25 0.00 1.00 0.06 0.00 0.24 0.00 1.00 -0.010 -1.00 
SEOi,t 0.06 0.00 0.25 0.00 1.00 0.11 0.00 0.32 0.00 1.00 0.048*** 4.48 
DEBTISSUEi,t 0.22 0.00 0.41 0.00 1.00 0.23 0.00 0.42 0.00 1.00 0.012 0.70 
PPEi,t 0.46 0.37 0.36 0.01 1.53 0.43 0.33 0.37 0.01 1.53 -0.017 -1.04 
Note: The table reports descriptive statistics by two groups: firms with banking expertise on the board (EXPERTISE = 1) and without banking 
expertise on the board (EXPERTISE = 0). The table also shows the mean differences between the two groups and the t-statistics of the t-tests. 
Variable definitions are in the Appendix. *, **, *** are significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 4-6: Correlations 
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
ATi,t  1 1.00          
SALEi,t  2 0.86* 1.00         
IBi,t  3 0.82* 0.71* 1.00        
RETi,t 4 -0.02 -0.02 0.01 1.00       
CONS_RANKi,t 5 -0.40* -0.40* -0.33* 0.04* 1.00      
CSCORE_RANKi,t 6 -0.43* -0.42* -0.33* 0.05* 0.93* 1.00     
yEXPERTISEi,t 7 0.31* 0.27* 0.27* 0.01 -0.28* -0.28* 1.00    
mEXPERTISEi,t 8 0.27* 0.25* 0.25* -0.00 -0.28* -0.28* 0.80* 1.00   
aEXPERTISEi,t 9 0.29* 0.24* 0.23* 0.01 -0.31* -0.31* 0.88* 0.71* 1.00  
EXPERTISEi,t 10 0.25* 0.22* 0.21* 0.01 -0.32* -0.32* 0.69* 0.87* 0.77* 1.00 
LEVi,t 11 0.08* 0.03* -0.05* -0.16* 0.23* 0.05* -0.03 -0.05* -0.01 -0.04* 
SIZEi,t 12 0.57* 0.54* 0.46* 0.11* -0.82* -0.86* 0.32* 0.32* 0.34* 0.35* 
MTBi,t 13 0.02 0.03 0.09* 0.15* -0.19* -0.16* 0.07* 0.07* 0.06* 0.07* 
CFOi,t 14 0.07* 0.08* 0.12* 0.16* -0.22* -0.23* 0.10* 0.10* 0.09* 0.09* 
∆SALEi,t 15 -0.04* -0.01 -0.02 0.13* 0.02 0.04* -0.04* -0.04* -0.03* -0.03* 
CYCLEi,t 16 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.04* 0.04* 0.03 0.02 
SEOi,t 17 -0.09* -0.10* -0.08* 0.05* 0.16* 0.17* -0.06* -0.06* -0.07* -0.07* 
DEBTISSUEi,t 18 0.04* 0.01 0.02 -0.09* -0.05* -0.06* -0.00 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 
PPEi,t 19 0.07* 0.05* 0.05* 0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 
 (Continued)   11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19  
LEVi,t 11 1.00          
SIZEi,t 12 -0.04* 1.00         
MTBi,t 13 -0.18* 0.21* 1.00        
CFOi,t 14 -0.07* 0.28* 0.04* 1.00       
∆SALEi,t 15 -0.08* 0.02 0.10* 0.16* 1.00      
CYCLEi,t 16 0.02 0.05* -0.03 0.02 -0.14* 1.00     
SEOi,t 17 -0.05* -0.14* 0.03 -0.29* 0.12* -0.05* 1.00    
DEBTISSUEi,t 18 0.18* 0.07* 0.05* -0.08* 0.18* -0.10* 0.06* 1.00   
PPEi,t 19 0.17* 0.08* -0.06* 0.17* -0.00 -0.04* -0.06* 0.17* 1.00  
Note: The table reports the Pearson correlation coefficients between selected variables. * is significance at 5%. Definitions of variables are in the Appendix. 
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4.4.2. Baseline regression results 
Table 4-7 reports the results of estimating the main regression (5) between 
𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆_𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾 and the measures of banking expertise on the board. The table shows 
that most control variables have expected signs and are statistically significant. The 
coefficients on 𝑦𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑆𝐸 (column a), 𝑎𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑆𝐸 (column b), and 
𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑆𝐸 (column c) are negative and significant (t-statistics are -1.78, -2.28, and 
-3.16, respectively). The relationships are also economically significant. Also, the 
relationships are economically significant. For example, in column (a), the coefficient 
on 𝑦𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑆𝐸 means that when the board has one additional year of banking 
expertise, 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆_𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾 decreases by 0.00072. Although a one-year increase in 
𝑦𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑆𝐸 is associated with only a reduction of 0.144% in 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆_𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾 
(=0.00072/0.5, where 0.5 is the mean of 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆_𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾 reported in Table 2), it is more 
likely that an individual director could work for banks in many years; therefore, the 
marginal effect of an appointment of a director with banking expertise on the board is 
significant in economic terms. In column (b), one unit increase in 𝑎𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑆𝐸 is 
associated with a decrease by 0.00612 (a 1.22% reduction) in 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆_𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾. Also, it 
is more likely that a director may work for several banks; therefore, the marginal effect 
of having a director with banking expertise on the board is economically significant. 
Similarly, in column (c), compared with firms without banking expertise on the board, 
firms with banking expertise on the board have less accounting conservatism by 
0.02127, a 4.25% reduction in 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆_𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾 which is non-trivial.
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Table 4-7: Baseline regression results on the relationship between CONS_RANK and measures of banking expertise on the board 
  
Expected 
signs 
yEXPERTISE (a)   aEXPERTISE (b)   EXPERTISE (c) 
Coefficient t-statistic   Coefficient t-statistic   Coefficient t-statistic 
yEXPERTISEi,t - -0.072* -1.78       
aEXPERTISEi,t -    -0.612** -2.28    
EXPERTISEi,t -       -2.127*** -3.16 
LEVi,t + 12.280*** 21.76  12.295*** 21.79  12.263*** 21.75 
SIZEi,t - -11.631*** -73.66  -11.596*** -72.65  -11.555*** -72.41 
MTBi,t +/- 0.099 1.23  0.097 1.21  0.100 1.24 
CFOi,t + 7.282*** 2.87  7.127*** 2.81  7.111*** 2.80 
∆SALEi,t +/- 5.176*** 4.78  5.186*** 4.79  5.177*** 4.79 
CYCLEi,t +/- 4.223*** 3.94  4.217*** 3.93  4.212*** 3.93 
SEOi,t + 6.256*** 6.91  6.223*** 6.88  6.232*** 6.89 
DEBTISSUEi,t +/- -2.163*** -3.33  -2.163*** -3.33  -2.189*** -3.37 
Constant  1.890*** 51.59  1.888*** 51.50  1.885*** 51.44 
Year fixed effects  Yes   Yes   Yes  
Industry fixed effects  Yes   Yes   Yes  
Observations  3428   3428   3428  
Adjusted R2   0.749     0.749     0.749   
Note: Column (a) reports the findings of the regression: 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆_𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑦𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6∆SALE𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑌𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽8𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡.  
Column (b) reports the findings of the regression: 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆_𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑎𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6∆SALE𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑌𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽9𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡.  
Column (c) reports the findings of the regression: 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆_𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6∆SALE𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑌𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽9𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡.  
All coefficients are multiplied by 100. Industry fixed effects are based on Datastream’s level six codes. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. *, **, *** are significance at 10%, 5% 
and 1%, respectively.  
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4.4.3. Alternative measures of accounting conservatism and 
banking expertise 
4.4.3.1. Alternative measures of firm-year accounting conservatism 
In the baseline regression, I use total accounting conservatism following García Lara 
et al. (2016), which is based on Basu (1997) and Khan and Watts (2009). Although 
García Lara et al. (2016, p. 236) indicate that their measure of total accounting 
conservatism is strongly related to determinants of accounting conservatism, the 
robustness tests employ two alternative measures of firm-year accounting 
conservatism.  
First, I use the measure of asymmetric timeliness of bad news over good news (Khan 
and Watts, 2009). In other words, I use CSCORE obtained from Equation 4-2 rather 
than CONS. I also calculate CSCORE_RANK, which is the annual fractional rank of 
the three-year average of CSCORE, in the same way with the calculation of 
CONS_RANK. I then use CSCORE_RANK as an alternative measure of firm-year 
accounting conservatism. Table 4-8 reports the findings of Equation 4-5 where 
CONS_RANK is replaced by CSCORE_RANK as the dependent variable. The 
evidence shows that there are negative and significant relationships between 
CSCORE_RANK with different measures of banking expertise on boards of directors. 
The results hold that banking expertise on the board of directors has a negative and 
significant impact on accounting conservatism. 
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Second, I calculate the negative accumulation of non-operating accruals introduced by 
Givoly and Hayn (2000). Non-operating accruals do not include accruals from 
depreciation, amortisation and operating accruals. Instead, non-operating accruals 
mostly include accruals from items whose timing and amount recognised are affected 
by the discretion of managers, e.g. bad debt provisions, changes in accounting 
estimates, disposals of assets, write-downs of assets, revenue deferrals, or restructuring 
charges. Givoly and Hayn (2000) indicate that the negative accumulation of non-
accruals is an indicator of accounting conservatism. They find that the negative 
accumulation of non-accruals is related to timely recognition of bad news over good 
news. Similar to CONS_RANK and CSCORE_RANK, I calculate NOACC_RANK 
which is the annual fractional rank of the three-year average of the negative 
accumulation of non-operating accruals. The calculation of the negative accumulation 
of non-operating accruals (NOACC) is as follows: 
Equation 4-6: Calculation of negative non-operating accruals: 
𝑁𝑂𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = −1 ∗ {𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐷𝑖,𝑡  −  𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡} 
 =  −1 ∗ {[(𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡  +  𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑖,𝑡) − 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡]
− [∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛥 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛥 𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑃𝐴𝐼𝐷𝑖,𝑡 −  𝛥 𝑃𝐴𝑌𝑖,𝑡 −  𝛥 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖,𝑡]}  
Where: 𝑁𝑂𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖,𝑡 is negative non-operating accruals; 𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐷𝑖,𝑡 is total accruals before 
depreciation and amortisation; 𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 is operating accruals; 𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡 is net income; 𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑖,𝑡 
is depreciation and amortisation; 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 is cash flows from operations; ∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡 is 
receivables in year t minus receivables in year t-1. 𝛥 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑡 is inventories in year t 
minus inventories in year t-1; 𝛥 𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑃𝐴𝐼𝐷𝑖,𝑡 is prepaid expenses in year t minus 
prepaid expenses in year t-1; 𝛥 𝑃𝐴𝑌𝑖,𝑡 is payables in year t minus payables in year t-1; 
𝛥 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖,𝑡 is tax payables in year t minus tax payables in year t-1. All variables are 
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scaled by total assets at the end of year t. i represents company i and t represents fiscal 
year t. 
Table 4-9 reports the findings of Equation 4-5 where CONS_RANK is replaced by 
NOACC_RANK as the dependent variable. Consistent with the main findings, the 
results indicate that banking expertise has a negative and significant impact on the 
negative accumulation of non-operating accruals. In general, using alternative 
measures of firm-year accounting conservatism, I find collaborative evidence for the 
hypothesis that banking expertise helps to reduce costly accounting conservatism.
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Table 4-8: Alternative measures of firm-year accounting conservatism: CSCORE_RANK 
  yEXPERTISE   aEXPERTISE   EXPERTISE 
  Coefficient t-statistic   Coefficient t-statistic   Coefficient t-statistic 
yEXPERTISEi,t -0.041 -1.04       
aEXPERTISEi,t    -0.448* -1.70    
EXPERTISEi,t       -1.655** -2.50 
LEVi,t 1.116** 2.01  1.125** 2.03  1.100** 1.98 
SIZEi,t -12.336*** -79.49  -12.299*** -78.40  -12.262*** -78.16 
MTBi,t 0.160** 2.03  0.159** 2.02  0.161** 2.04 
CFOi,t 7.519*** 3.01  7.410*** 2.97  7.392*** 2.97 
∆SALEi,t 5.963*** 5.60  5.953*** 5.60  5.942*** 5.59 
CYCLEi,t 3.569*** 3.38  3.573*** 3.39  3.571*** 3.39 
SEOi,t 5.326*** 5.99  5.295*** 5.95  5.299*** 5.96 
DEBTISSUEi,t -0.528 -0.83  -0.531 -0.83  -0.552 -0.86 
Constant 2.006*** 55.71  2.004*** 55.61  2.000*** 55.54 
Year fixed effects Yes   Yes   Yes  
Industry fixed effects Yes   Yes   Yes  
Observations 3428   3428   3428  
Adjusted R2 0.757     0.757     0.757   
Note: The table reports the results of the estimation of the relationship between CSCORE_RANK and banking expertise on the boards of directors. 
I replace CONS_RANK in Equation 4-5 by CSCORE_RANK. All coefficients are multiplied by 100. Industry fixed effects are based on 
Datastream’s level six codes. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. *, **, *** are significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 4-9: Alternative measures of firm-year accounting conservatism: NOACC_RANK 
  yEXPERTISE   aEXPERTISE   EXPERTISE 
  Coefficient t-statistic   Coefficient t-statistic   Coefficient t-statistic 
yEXPERTISEi,t -0.105 -1.43       
aEXPERTISEi,t    -0.830* -1.70    
EXPERTISEi,t       -3.220*** -2.63 
LEVi,t 2.609** 2.55  2.630** 2.57  2.585** 2.53 
SIZEi,t -0.147 -0.51  -0.108 -0.37  -0.026 -0.09 
MTBi,t 0.496*** 3.38  0.494*** 3.37  0.498*** 3.40 
CFOi,t 24.260*** 5.20  24.040*** 5.16  23.964*** 5.14 
∆SALEi,t 28.000*** 14.18  28.024*** 14.21  27.988*** 14.20 
CYCLEi,t -11.718*** -6.02  -11.729*** -6.02  -11.731*** -6.03 
SEOi,t 8.979*** 5.45  8.940*** 5.42  8.952*** 5.44 
DEBTISSUEi,t 0.298 0.25  0.298 0.25  0.251 0.21 
Constant 0.283*** 3.79  0.281*** 3.75  0.274*** 3.67 
Year fixed effects Yes   Yes   Yes  
Industry fixed effects Yes   Yes   Yes  
Observations 3406   3406   3406  
Adjusted R2 0.174     0.175     0.175   
Note: The table reports the results of the estimation of the relationship between NOACC_RANK and banking expertise on the boards of directors. 
I replace CONS_RANK in Equation 4-5 by NOACC_RANK. All coefficients are multiplied by 100. Industry fixed effects are based on 
Datastream’s level six codes. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. *, **, *** are significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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4.4.3.2. An alternative measure of banking expertise 
One of my concerns is that the measures of banking expertise, e.g. yEXPERTISE 
which accumulate the number of years working in the banking industry of all directors 
on the boards of directors, may inflate the levels of banking expertise, therefore there 
may be estimation errors. To mitigate this concern, I use the average number of years 
all directors on the board have worked as executives in banks, denoted mEXPERTISE, 
as an alternative measure of banking expertise.  
Table 4-10 reports the results of the regression Equation 4-5 where the independent 
variable is mEXPERTISE, and the dependent variable is CONS_RANK, 
CSCORE_RANK, and NOACC_RANK (used as substitutes). The results show that 
the coefficient on mEXPERTISE is negative and statistically significant when the 
dependent variable is CONS_RANK (column a) and NOACC_RANK (column c), 
while it is still negative when the dependent variable is CSCORE_RANK (column b). 
In general, the evidence is consistent with the baseline regression results.
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Table 4-10: Alternative measures of banking expertise 
  CONS_RANK (a)  CSCORE_RANK (b)  NOACC_RANK (c) 
  Coefficient t-statistic  Coefficient t-statistic  Coefficient t-statistic 
mEXPERTISEi,t -0.255** -2.04  -0.136 -1.11  -0.445** -1.96 
LEVi,t 12.250*** 21.70  1.100** 1.98  2.553** 2.49 
SIZEi,t -11.622*** -73.71  -12.334*** -79.58  -0.111 -0.39 
MTBi,t 0.100 1.24  0.160** 2.04  0.497*** 3.39 
CFOi,t 7.306*** 2.88  7.530*** 3.02  24.304*** 5.21 
∆SALEi,t 5.174*** 4.78  5.965*** 5.60  27.958*** 14.17 
CYCLEi,t 4.236*** 3.95  3.574*** 3.39  -11.681*** -6.00 
SEOi,t 6.279*** 6.94  5.341*** 6.01  9.013*** 5.47 
DEBTISSUEi,t -2.177*** -3.35  -0.534 -0.84  0.268 0.23 
Constant 1.890*** 51.63  2.006*** 55.76  0.282*** 3.77 
Year fixed effects Yes   Yes   Yes  
Industry fixed effects Yes   Yes   Yes  
Observations 3428   3428   3406  
Adjusted R2 0.749   0.757   0.175  
Note: The table reports the findings of regressions between the alternative measure of banking expertise on the boards of directors (mEXPERTISE) and three different firm-year measures 
of accounting conservatism. 
Column (a) reports the results of estimating the following regression: 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆_𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑚𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6∆SALE𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽7𝐶𝑌𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡.  
Column (b) reports the results of estimating the following regression: 𝐶𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸_𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑖,𝑡   = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑚𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6∆SALE𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽7𝐶𝑌𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡.  
Column (c) reports the results of estimating the following regression: 𝑁𝑂𝐴𝐶𝐶_𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑖,𝑡   = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑚𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6∆SALE𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽7𝐶𝑌𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡.  
All coefficients are multiplied by 100. Industry fixed effects are based on Datastream’s level six codes. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. *, **, *** are significance at 10%, 5% 
and 1%, respectively. 
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4.4.4. Propensity score matching 
Because this research is a non-experimental study, there may be possible confounding 
factors which may affect both accounting conservatism and the presence of banking 
expertise on the board (see, e.g., Gow et al., 2016; Shipman et al., 2017). The presence 
of directors with banking expertise on the board may not be random because it can be 
affected by firm characteristics (Kroszner and Strahan, 2001; Hilscher and Şişli-
Ciamarra, 2013; Kang and Kim, 2017). Similar to the work of Erkens et al. (2014), I 
construct a propensity score matching sample to eliminate the effect of confounding 
factors. I firstly classify observations into two groups: observations where firms have 
directors with banking expertise on the board  (treatments) and observations where 
firms do not have directors with banking expertise on the board (controls). I then run 
a probit regression to estimate the probability of having directors with banking 
expertise on the board based on explanatory variables, which are control variables used 
in the main regressions. The model is as follows:  
Equation 4-7: Modelling the probability of having directors with banking expertise on 
the board 
𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5∆SALE𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐶𝑌𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽7𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡.   
Table 4-11 reports findings of Equation 4-7 modelling the probability of having 
directors with banking expertise on the board. The findings are broadly similar to those 
reported in prior studies (Booth and Deli, 1999; Kroszner and Strahan, 2001; Byrd and 
Mizruchi, 2005; Hilscher and Şişli-Ciamarra, 2013; Kang and Kim, 2017). In 
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particular, I find that directors with banking expertise are more likely to serve on the 
boards of large firms, and firms with low sales growth.  
Based on the conditional odd ratio of having directors with banking expertise on the 
board, I match each treatment with four controls having the closest odd ratio and a 
maximum caliper of 0.01. The final matched sample has 2,590 firm-year observations 
(679 treatments and 1,911 controls). I also perform a simple t-test and find that 
differences in firm characteristics between the two groups are insignificant at the 1% 
level in nearly all cases (see Table 4-12).  
Table 4-13 reports findings of Equation 4-5, where the dependent variable is 
CONS_RANK, using the propensity-score-matching sample. The table shows that 
CONS_RANK is negatively associated with four different measures of banking 
expertise on boards of directors. The magnitudes of the coefficients on banking 
expertise are broadly equivalent to those reported in Table 4-7. I find similar evidence 
that banking expertise has a negative and significant impact on CSCORE_RANK 
(Table 4-14) and on NOACC_RANK (Table 4-15). In short, the results in this section 
suggest that the link between the banking expertise on the board of directors and 
accounting conservatism is less likely affected by confounding factors. 
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Table 4-11: Probit model to estimate the probability of having directors with banking 
expertise on the board 
  EXPERTISE 
 Coefficient          z-statistic 
LEVi,t -0.0883 -1.61  
SIZEi,t 0.2555 18.33 *** 
MTBi,t -0.0050 -0.65  
CFOi,t 0.0426 0.16  
∆SALEi,t -0.2127 -1.86 * 
CYCLEi,t -0.0589 -0.56  
SEOi,t -0.0719 -0.76  
DEBTISSUEi,t -0.0998 -1.57  
Constant -3.8472 -22.17  
Observations 3,428   
Pseudo R2  0.1172     
Note: The table report findings of the probit regression to estimate the probability of 
having directors with banking expertise on the board based on explanatory variables. 
The model is as follows: 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽5∆SALE𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐶𝑌𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. Variable definitions are in the 
Appendix. *, **, *** is significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
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Table 4-12: Simple t-test for key firm characteristics difference after the propensity score matching procedure 
  EPXERTISE = 1 (N = 679) EXPERTISE = 0 (N = 1,911) T-test 
  MEAN MEDIAN STD MIN MAX MEAN MEDIAN STD MIN MAX MEAN 
t-
statistics 
LEVi,t 0.29 0.15 0.44 0.00 3.12 0.29 0.15 0.44 0.00 3.12 -0.000 -0.01 
SIZEi,t 12.43 12.42 1.67 7.63 17.38 12.43 12.42 1.67 7.63 17.38 -0.609* -7.73 
MTBi,t 3.00 2.08 3.30 0.32 22.83 3.00 2.08 3.30 0.32 22.83 -0.268 -1.65 
CFOi,t 0.09 0.09 0.11 -0.46 0.34 0.09 0.09 0.11 -0.46 0.34 -0.006 -1.47 
∆SALEi,t 0.10 0.07 0.24 -0.62 1.21 0.10 0.07 0.24 -0.62 1.21 0.004 0.43 
CYCLEi,t 0.07 0.00 0.25 0.00 1.00 0.07 0.00 0.25 0.00 1.00 0.002 0.15 
SEOi,t 0.09 0.00 0.29 0.00 1.00 0.09 0.00 0.29 0.00 1.00 0.019 1.63 
DEBTISSUEi,t 0.22 0.00 0.41 0.00 1.00 0.22 0.00 0.41 0.00 1.00 -0.007 -0.39 
Note: The table reports descriptive statistics of the propensity-score-matching sample by two groups: firms with banking expertise on the board 
(EXPERTISE = 1) and without banking expertise on the board (EXPERTISE = 0). The table also shows mean differences between the two groups 
and the t-statistics obtained from the t-tests under the null that the difference is zero. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. * is significance at 
5% respectively.
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Table 4-13: Propensity-score-matching sample: CONS_RANK and banking expertise on boards of directors 
  
Expected 
signs 
yEXPERTISE   aEXPERTISE   EXPERTISE   mEXPERTISE 
Coefficient t-statistic   Coefficient t-statistic   Coefficient t-statistic   Coefficient t-statistic 
yEXPERTISEi,t - -0.117** -2.56          
aEXPERTISEi,t -    -0.887*** -2.96       
EXPERTISEi,t -       -2.569*** -3.58    
mEXPERTISEi,t           -0.316** -2.34 
LEVi,t + 14.938*** 20.52  14.979*** 20.59  14.960*** 20.58  14.915*** 20.47 
SIZEi,t - -12.384*** -60.53  -12.350*** -60.04  -12.354*** -60.46  -12.406*** -60.88 
MTBi,t + 0.244*** 2.59  0.243*** 2.59  0.248*** 2.64  0.245*** 2.61 
CFOi,t + 4.013 1.26  3.707 1.16  3.585 1.12  3.965 1.24 
∆SALEi,t +/- 4.462*** 3.29  4.525*** 3.34  4.589*** 3.39  4.508*** 3.32 
CYCLEi,t +/- 4.037*** 3.34  4.046*** 3.35  4.016*** 3.33  4.030*** 3.33 
SEOi,t + 6.534*** 5.74  6.488*** 5.70  6.516*** 5.73  6.587*** 5.79 
DEBTISSUEi,t + -2.424*** -3.15  -2.416*** -3.14  -2.454*** -3.20  -2.454*** -3.19 
Constant  1.981*** 43.57  1.979*** 43.52  1.981*** 43.65  1.985*** 43.70 
Year fixed effects  Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Industry fixed effects  Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Observations  2590   2590   2590   2590  
Adjusted R2   0.704     0.704     0.705     0.704   
Note: This table reports the findings of Equation 4-5, where the dependent variable is CONS_RANK, using the propensity-score-matching sample. All coefficients are multiplied 
by 100. Industry fixed effects are based on Datastream’s level six codes. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. *, **, *** are significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.  
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Table 4-14: Propensity-score-matching sample: CSCORE_RANK and banking expertise on the board of directors 
  
Expected 
signs 
yEXPERTISE   aEXPERTISE   EXPERTISE   mEXPERTISE 
Coefficient t-statistic   Coefficient t-statistic   Coefficient t-statistic   Coefficient t-statistic 
yEXPERTISEi,t - -0.095** -2.11          
aEXPERTISEi,t -    -0.730** -2.46       
EXPERTISEi,t -       -2.144*** -3.02    
mEXPERTISEi,t           -0.226* -1.69 
LEVi,t + 2.358*** 3.27  2.391*** 3.32  2.376*** 3.30  2.345*** 3.25 
SIZEi,t - -12.930*** -63.83  -12.901*** -63.34  -12.903*** -63.76  -12.953*** -64.19 
MTBi,t + 0.252*** 2.71  0.251*** 2.70  0.255*** 2.75  0.253*** 2.71 
CFOi,t + 5.704* 1.80  5.453* 1.72  5.350* 1.69  5.655* 1.79 
∆SALEi,t +/- 5.350*** 3.98  5.400*** 4.02  5.454*** 4.06  5.396*** 4.02 
CYCLEi,t +/- 3.387*** 2.83  3.395*** 2.84  3.372*** 2.82  3.376*** 2.82 
SEOi,t + 5.965*** 5.29  5.927*** 5.26  5.949*** 5.28  6.009*** 5.33 
DEBTISSUEi,t + -0.382 -0.50  -0.375 -0.49  -0.406 -0.53  -0.405 -0.53 
Constant  2.087*** 46.35  2.085*** 46.31  2.087*** 46.43  2.090*** 46.48 
Year fixed effects  Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Industry fixed 
effects  Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Observations  2590   2590   2590   2590  
Adjusted R2   0.705     0.705     0.705     0.704   
Note: This table reports the findings of Equation 4-5, where the dependent variable is CSCORE_RANK, using the propensity-score-matching sample. All coefficients are 
multiplied by 100. Industry fixed effects are based on Datastream’s level six codes. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. *, **, *** are significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively.  
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Table 4-15: Propensity-score-matching sample: NOACC_RANK and banking expertise on the board of directors 
  
Expected 
signs 
yEXPERTISE   aEXPERTISE   EXPERTISE   mEXPERTISE 
Coefficient t-statistic   Coefficient t-statistic   Coefficient t-statistic   Coefficient t-statistic 
yEXPERTISEi,t - -0.085 -1.06          
aEXPERTISEi,t -    -0.679 -1.30       
EXPERTISEi,t -       -3.155** -2.52    
mEXPERTISEi,t           -0.432* -1.84 
LEVi,t + 2.537** 2.00  2.564** 2.02  2.548** 2.01  2.482* 1.96 
SIZEi,t - -0.313 -0.87  -0.285 -0.79  -0.233 -0.65  -0.292 -0.82 
MTBi,t + 0.415** 2.52  0.415** 2.52  0.421** 2.57  0.417** 2.54 
CFOi,t + 29.631*** 5.27  29.390*** 5.22  29.110*** 5.18  29.643*** 5.27 
∆SALEi,t +/- 32.593*** 13.69  32.638*** 13.72  32.674*** 13.75  32.558*** 13.68 
CYCLEi,t +/- -11.291*** -5.36  -11.280*** -5.35  -11.282*** -5.36  -11.258*** -5.35 
SEOi,t + 5.196*** 2.61  5.159*** 2.59  5.161*** 2.60  5.241*** 2.64 
DEBTISSUEi,t + 0.053 0.04  0.057 0.04  0.015 0.01  0.022 0.02 
Constant  0.227** 2.46  0.226** 2.45  0.223** 2.42  0.228** 2.48 
Year fixed effects  Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Industry fixed 
effects  Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Observations  2573   2573   2573   2573  
Adjusted R2   0.192     0.193     0.194     0.193   
Note: This table reports the findings of Equation 4-5, where the dependent variable is NOACC_RANK, using the propensity-score-matching sample. All coefficients are 
multiplied by 100. Industry fixed effects are based on Datastream’s level six codes. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. *, **, *** are significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively.
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4.4.5. Alternative methods to estimate the effects of banking 
expertise on accounting conservatism 
4.4.5.1. Original Basu (1997)’s model 
To test further if the findings are robust, I employ the model of Basu (1997) to measure 
the asymmetric timeliness of bad news over good news as a proxy of accounting 
conservatism. Following prior research (e.g., Erkens et al., 2014; Lin, 2014; Kong et 
al., 2017; Hu and Jiang, 2018), I interact the measures of banking expertise on the 
board with the variables in the model. I also follow Ball et al. (2013a) to include 
industry and year fixed effects to mitigate heterogeneity bias. The model is as follows:  
Equation 4-8: Original Basu (1997)'s model 
𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼1 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛾1𝐷𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾2 ∗ 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾3𝐷𝑖,𝑡
∗ 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
Where: 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 is 𝑦𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡, 𝑎𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡, 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡, or 𝑚𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡 
(used as substitutes). Variable definitions are in the appendix. The coefficient 𝛾3 
indicates the effect of banking expertise on the asymmetric timeliness of bad news 
over good news. I expect that 𝛾3 is negative and significant.  
Table 4-16 reports the findings of Equation 4-8. I find that the coefficient 𝛾3 is negative 
across all measure of banking expertise and statistically significant in column (b) and 
(c). The evidence is consistent with the main findings that banking expertise on the 
board has a negative impact on accounting conservatism. 
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Table 4-16: Applying the Basu (1997)’s to estimate the effect of banking expertise on the asymmetric timeliness of bad news over good news 
  
Expected 
sign 
yEXPERTISE (a)   aEXPERTISE (b)   EXPERTISE (c)   mEXPERTISE (d) 
Coefficient t-statistic   Coefficient t-statistic   Coefficient t-statistic   Coefficient t-statistic 
Di,t  4.025* 1.87  4.232* 1.95  4.445** 1.98  4.077* 1.85 
RETi,t + 2.750 1.59  2.673 1.53  2.849 1.59  2.811 1.60 
Di,t*RETi,t + 33.740*** 6.04  35.321*** 6.26  36.591*** 6.25  34.574*** 6.05 
Di,t*yEXPERTISEi,t  -0.047 -0.18          
RETi,t*yEXPERTISEi,t  0.038 0.19          
Di,t*RETi,t*yEXPERTISEi,t - -0.695 -0.81          
Di,t*aEXPERTISEi,t     -0.930 -0.57       
RETi,t*aEXPERTISEi,t     0.400 0.33       
Di,t*RETi,t*aEXPERTISEi,t -    -9.125* -1.70       
Di,t*EXPERTISEi,t        -2.610 -0.63    
RETi,t*EXPERTISEi,t        -0.237 -0.08    
Di,t*RETi,t*EXPERTISEi,t -       -21.700* -1.75    
Di,t*mEXPERTISEi,t           -0.189 -0.24 
RETi,t*mEXPERTISEi,t           -0.012 -0.02 
Di,t*RETi,t*mEXPERTISEi,t           -2.503 -1.03 
Constant  0.087 1.01  0.087 1.01  0.083 0.97  0.086 1.00 
Year fixed effects  Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Industry fixed effects  Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Observations  3428   3428   3428   3428  
Adjusted R2   0.026   0.027   0.028   0.027  
Note: Column (a) reports the findings of the regression: 𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼1 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛾1𝐷𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑦𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾2 ∗ 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑦𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛾3𝐷𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑦𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. 
Column (b) reports the findings of the regression: 𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼1 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾1𝐷𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑎𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾2 ∗ 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑎𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾3𝐷𝑖,𝑡 ∗
𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑎𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. 
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Column (c) reports the findings of the regression: 𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼1 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛾1𝐷𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾2 ∗ 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾3𝐷𝑖,𝑡 ∗
𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. 
Column (d) reports the findings of the regression: 𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼1 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾1𝐷𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑚𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾2 ∗ 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑚𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾3𝐷𝑖,𝑡 ∗
𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑚𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. 
All coefficients are multiplied by 100. Industry fixed effects are based on Datastream’s level six codes. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. *, **, *** are significance at 
10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.   
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4.4.5.2. Ball and Shivakumar (2008)’s model 
Next, I follow Ball and Shivakumar (2005) and Ball and Shivakumar (2008) to use the 
timeliness of loss recognition as an alternative proxy for accounting conservatism. I 
also interact the measures of banking expertise on the board with other variables in the 
model as follows (see, e.g., Kong et al., 2017): 
Equation 4-9: Ball and Shivakumar (2008)'s model 
𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼1 + 𝛽1𝐷𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛾1𝐷𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡
∗ 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾2 ∗ 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾3𝐷𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑋𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
Where: 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 is 𝑦𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑆𝐸, 𝑎𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑆𝐸, 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑆𝐸, or 𝑚𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑆𝐸 (used 
as substitutes). Variable definitions are in the appendix 2.  
In this model, the coefficient 𝛽3 is the incremental timeliness in recognition of bad 
news over good news, which is used as a measure of accounting conservatism. 27 It is 
predicted that 𝛽3 is positive, because accruals are more likely to reflect losses in 
periods with negative cash flows. Also, the coefficient 𝛾3 shows the effect of the 
banking expertise on the asymmetric timelines of loss recognition. I expect that 𝛾3 is 
negative and significant.  
Table 4-17 reports the findings of Equation 4-9. Consistent with my prediction, the 
evidence shows that the coefficient on 𝛾3 is negative and significant in nearly every 
case. The results suggest that the measures of banking expertise have a significantly 
negative effect on asymmetric timeliness of loss recognition.
                                                 
27 See Chapter 2, Section 2.3.4.1.3, for a comprehensive explanation of this model. 
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Table 4-17: Applying the Ball and Shivakumar (2008) model to estimate the effect of banking expertise on the timeliness of loss recognition 
  Expected 
sign 
yEXPERTISE (a)   aEXPERTISE (b)   EXPERTISE (c)   mEXPERTISE (d) 
  Coefficient t-statistic   Coefficient t-statistic   Coefficient t-statistic   Coefficient t-statistic 
DCFOi,t  0.185 0.36  -0.008 -0.02  -0.020 -0.04  0.130 0.25 
CFOi,t - -40.139*** -28.35  -39.943*** -28.05  -41.667*** -27.93  -42.323*** -28.63 
DCFOi,t*CFOi,t + 28.500*** 16.69  28.488*** 16.58  30.238*** 17.02  30.722*** 17.44 
∆SALEi,t + 8.459*** 18.30  8.437*** 18.26  8.399*** 18.21  8.433*** 18.31 
PPEi,t - -2.075*** -4.41  -2.060*** -4.38  -2.039*** -4.34  -2.009*** -4.28 
DCFOi,t*yEXPERTISEi,t  -0.052 -0.51          
CFOi,t*yEXPERTISEi,t  0.279** 2.04          
DCFOi,t*CFOi,t*yEXPERTISEi,t - -0.913 -1.18          
DCFOi,t*aEXPERTISEi,t     0.232 0.37       
CFOi,t*aEXPERTISEi,t     1.253 1.34       
DCFOi,t*CFOi,t*aEXPERTISEi,t -    -10.154** -2.43       
DCFOi,t*EXPERTISEi,t        0.439 0.33    
CFOi,t*EXPERTISEi,t        8.539*** 3.75    
DCFOi,t*CFOi,t*EXPERTISEi,t -       -17.762*** -3.38    
DCFOi,t*mEXPERTISEi,t           -0.091 -0.37 
CFOi,t*mEXPERTISEi,t           2.061*** 5.12 
DCFOi,t*CFOi,t*mEXPERTISEi,t           -3.103** -2.48 
Constant  0.005 0.28  0.003 0.16  0.004 0.21  0.006 0.30 
Year fixed effects  Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Industry fixed effects  Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Observations  3421   3421   3421   3421  
Adjusted R2   0.348     0.348     0.351     0.352   
Note: Column (a) reports the findings of the regression: 𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼1 + 𝛽1𝐷𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽4∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾1𝐷𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 ∗
𝑦𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾2 ∗ 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑦𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾3𝐷𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑦𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡.  
Column (b) reports the findings of the regression: 𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼1 + 𝛽1𝐷𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾1𝐷𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑎𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛾2 ∗ 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑎𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾3𝐷𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑎𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. 
Column (c) reports the findings of the regression: 𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼1 + 𝛽1𝐷𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛾1𝐷𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛾2 ∗ 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾3𝐷𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. 
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Column (d) reports the findings of the regression: 𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼1 + 𝛽1𝐷𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾1𝐷𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑚𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛾2 ∗ 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑚𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾3𝐷𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑚𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. 
All coefficients are multiplied by 100. Industry fixed effects are based on Datastream level-six codes. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. *, **, *** are significance at 
10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
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4.4.6. Cross-sectional analyses 
So far, the main results show that banking expertise on boards of directors negatively 
affects accounting conservatism. In this section, I do cross-sectional analyses to see 
how the effect of banking expertise on accounting conservatism varies with 
bankruptcy risk and financial leverage.  
4.4.6.1. Bankruptcy risk 
I conjecture that the effect of financial expertise on boards of directors on accounting 
conservatism is more pronounced for firms having higher bankruptcy risk. Opler and 
Titman (1994) document that firms with financial distress experience a decline in 
corporate performance. In those circumstances, debtholders are more likely to demand 
more borrowing firms’ accounting conservatism, which facilitates the violation of debt 
covenants and the transfer to control rights from shareholders to debtholders (e.g., 
Watts, 2003a). However, the violation of debt covenants prevents borrowers from 
investing in profitable projects (Nash et al., 2003) and has other consequences such as 
increases in operating and restructuring costs (Beneish and Press, 1993; Bhaskar et al., 
2017; Gao et al., 2017), thus limits their opportunities to increase their corporate 
performance. As a consequence, directors with working experience in the banking 
industry could help borrowing firms not only access external capital (e.g., Engelberg 
et al., 2012) but also reduce excessive costly accounting conservatism. 
To test this conjecture, I run the Equation 4-5 using subsamples of firms with high and 
low bankruptcy risk. I employ the ZSCORE (Altman, 1968; Taffler, 1983) as a 
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measure of bankruptcy risk, with a lower ZSCORE indicating higher bankruptcy risk. 
28 I rank ZSCORE of all firms in the sample and define that firms have a high (low) 
bankruptcy risk when its ZSCORE in year t-1 is smaller than or equal (greater) than 
the median level of all firms.  
Table 4-18 reports findings of Equation 4-5, where the dependent variable is 
CONS_RANK, using subsamples of firms with high and low bankruptcy risk. The 
results show that the magnitudes of the coefficients on banking expertise are 
considerably higher for firms with a low ZSCORE than for firms with a high ZSCORE. 
Importantly, I find that the coefficients on banking expertise are significant in 
subsamples of firms with a low ZSCORE, but not significant for those with a high 
ZSCORE. I obtain similar results on the effects of bankruptcy risk on the relationship 
between banking expertise with CSCORE_RANK (Table 4-19) and with 
NOACC_RANK (Table 4-20). In general, the evidence supports the conjecture that 
the effect of the board’s banking expertise on accounting conservatism is more 
pronounced when firms have high bankruptcy risk.
                                                 
28 Financial distress at the end of year t, measured by ZSCORE following (Taffler, 1983) as 
follows: ZSCORE = 3.2 +  12.18 ∗
Profit before tax
current liabilities
 +  2.50 ∗
Current assets
Total liabilities
 −  10.68 ∗
Current liabilities
Total assets
 +  0.029 ∗
(Quick assets−Current liabilities)
(Sales−Pretax income−Depreciation)/365
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Table 4-18: Cross-sectional analysis: The effect of bankruptcy risk on the relationship between CONS_RANK and banking expertise on the board 
 yEXPERTISE aEXPERTISE EXPERTISE mEXPERTISE 
 
Low 
ZSCORE 
High 
ZSCORE 
Low 
ZSCORE 
High 
ZSCORE 
Low 
ZSCORE 
High 
ZSCORE 
Low 
ZSCORE 
High 
ZSCORE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
yEXPERTISEi,t -0.139** -0.001       
 (-2.16) (-0.02)       
aEXPERTISEi,t   -1.074** -0.115     
   (-2.55) (-0.34)     
EXPERTISEi,t     -3.469*** -0.664   
     (-3.27) (-0.79)   
mEXPERTISEi,t       -0.425** -0.060 
       (-2.05) (-0.40) 
LEVi,t 9.945*** 14.676*** 9.967*** 14.679*** 9.934*** 14.674*** 9.911*** 14.670*** 
 (12.36) (17.57) (12.40) (17.58) (12.37) (17.58) (12.31) (17.57) 
SIZEi,t -11.258*** -12.147*** -11.212*** -12.129*** -11.155*** -12.101*** -11.258*** -12.128*** 
 (-46.74) (-56.78) (-46.13) (-56.11) (-45.81) (-55.86) (-46.60) (-56.68) 
MTBi,t -0.012 0.312*** -0.018 0.312*** -0.012 0.314*** -0.007 0.312*** 
 (-0.10) (2.65) (-0.15) (2.65) (-0.10) (2.67) (-0.06) (2.65) 
CFOi,t 10.411*** 4.323 10.164*** 4.295 10.312*** 4.200 10.478*** 4.306 
 (2.66) (1.18) (2.60) (1.17) (2.64) (1.15) (2.68) (1.18) 
∆SALEi,t 4.773*** 4.335*** 4.796*** 4.330*** 4.817*** 4.296*** 4.816*** 4.308*** 
 (3.06) (2.82) (3.08) (2.82) (3.10) (2.80) (3.09) (2.80) 
CYCLEi,t 2.968* 4.635*** 2.966* 4.624*** 2.916* 4.620*** 2.946* 4.636*** 
 (1.92) (3.12) (1.92) (3.11) (1.90) (3.11) (1.91) (3.12) 
SEOi,t 4.958*** 6.681*** 4.897*** 6.670*** 4.855*** 6.680*** 4.954*** 6.685*** 
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 (3.56) (5.74) (3.51) (5.73) (3.49) (5.74) (3.55) (5.75) 
DEBTISSUEi,t -1.703* -2.787*** -1.708* -2.794*** -1.769* -2.809*** -1.718* -2.804*** 
 (-1.68) (-3.40) (-1.69) (-3.41) (-1.75) (-3.42) (-1.70) (-3.41) 
Constant 1.861*** 1.948*** 1.860*** 1.947*** 1.858*** 1.943*** 1.862*** 1.947*** 
 (33.35) (38.70) (33.36) (38.62) (33.39) (38.48) (33.38) (38.67) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1708 1720 1708 1720 1708 1720 1708 1720 
Adjusted R2 0.718 0.791 0.718 0.791 0.719 0.792 0.718 0.791 
This table reports the findings on the effect of bankruptcy risk on the relationship between accounting conservatism and banking expertise on the board. I define 
firms with low (high) ZSCORE as having a ZSCOREt-1 lower (greater) than the median of all firms. I use CONS_RANK as the dependent variable in Equation 
4-5 for subsamples of low and high ZSCORE. All coefficients are multiplied by 100. Industry fixed effects are based on Datastream’s level six codes. Figures 
in parentheses are t-statistics. Definitions of variables are in the Appendix. *, **, *** are significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 4-19: Cross-sectional analysis: The effect of bankruptcy risk on the relationship between CSCORE_RANK and banking expertise on the 
board 
  yEXPERTISE aEXPERTISE EXPERTISE mEXPERTISE 
 
Low 
ZSCORE 
High 
ZSCORE 
Low 
ZSCORE 
High 
ZSCORE 
Low 
ZSCORE 
High 
ZSCORE 
Low 
ZSCORE 
High 
ZSCORE 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (6) (8) 
yEXPERTISEi,t -0.117* 0.021       
 (-1.86) (0.43)       
aEXPERTISEi,t   -0.985** 0.004     
   (-2.40) (0.01)     
EXPERTISEi,t     -2.888*** -0.204   
     (-2.79) (-0.24)   
mEXPERTISEi,t       -0.305 0.083 
       (-1.51) (0.56) 
LEVi,t 0.865 0.104 0.882 0.102 0.855 0.101 0.845 0.109 
 (1.10) (0.12) (1.13) (0.12) (1.09) (0.12) (1.08) (0.13) 
SIZEi,t -12.011*** -12.665*** -11.959*** -12.644*** -11.926*** -12.629*** -12.027*** -12.671*** 
 (-51.25) (-59.54) (-50.57) (-58.83) (-50.31) (-58.63) (-51.15) (-59.55) 
MTBi,t 0.036 0.430*** 0.031 0.431*** 0.037 0.432*** 0.040 0.431*** 
 (0.32) (3.68) (0.27) (3.69) (0.32) (3.69) (0.36) (3.68) 
CFOi,t 9.272** 2.132 9.043** 2.132 9.189** 2.093 9.323** 2.155 
 (2.44) (0.59) (2.38) (0.59) (2.42) (0.57) (2.45) (0.59) 
∆SALEi,t 5.345*** 6.054*** 5.351*** 6.034*** 5.382*** 6.022*** 5.399*** 6.073*** 
 (3.52) (3.97) (3.53) (3.95) (3.56) (3.94) (3.56) (3.98) 
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CYCLEi,t 3.146** 2.873* 3.160** 2.867* 3.102** 2.862* 3.107** 2.866* 
 (2.09) (1.94) (2.11) (1.94) (2.07) (1.94) (2.07) (1.94) 
SEOi,t 3.704*** 6.380*** 3.642*** 6.368*** 3.618*** 6.367*** 3.709*** 6.363*** 
 (2.73) (5.51) (2.69) (5.50) (2.67) (5.50) (2.73) (5.50) 
DEBTISSUEi,t -0.712 -0.295 -0.717 -0.307 -0.768 -0.314 -0.724 -0.282 
 (-0.72) (-0.36) (-0.73) (-0.38) (-0.78) (-0.39) (-0.73) (-0.35) 
Constant 1.988*** 2.022*** 1.986*** 2.020*** 1.985*** 2.018*** 1.990*** 2.023*** 
 (36.61) (40.40) (36.61) (40.30) (36.65) (40.19) (36.65) (40.41) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1708 1720 1708 1720 1708 1720 1708 1720 
Adjusted R2 0.733 0.797 0.734 0.797 0.734 0.797 0.733 0.797 
This table reports the findings on the effect of bankruptcy risk on the relationship between accounting conservatism and banking expertise on the board. I define 
firms with low (high) ZSCORE as having a ZSCOREt-1 lower (greater) than the median of all firms. I use CSCORE_RANK as the dependent variable in Equation 
4-5 for subsamples of low and high ZSCORE. All coefficients are multiplied by 100. Industry fixed effects are based on Datastream’s level six codes. Figures 
in parentheses are t-statistics. Definitions of variables are in the Appendix. *, **, *** are significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 4-20: Cross-sectional analysis: The effect of bankruptcy risk on the relationship between CSCORE_RANK and banking expertise on the 
board 
  yEXPERTISE aEXPERTISE EXPERTISE mEXPERTISE 
 
Low 
ZSCORE 
High 
ZSCORE 
Low 
ZSCORE 
High 
ZSCORE 
Low 
ZSCORE 
High 
ZSCORE 
Low 
ZSCORE 
High 
ZSCORE 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (6) (8) 
yEXPERTISEi,t -0.175 -0.075       
 (-1.58) (-0.76)       
aEXPERTISEi,t   -1.555** -0.262     
   (-2.15) (-0.38)     
EXPERTISEi,t     -4.991*** -1.667   
     (-2.74) (-0.99)   
mEXPERTISEi,t       -0.721** -0.256 
       (-2.03) (-0.85) 
LEVi,t 0.662 3.251* 0.688 3.263** 0.644 3.252** 0.587 3.236* 
 (0.48) (1.96) (0.50) (1.97) (0.47) (1.96) (0.43) (1.95) 
SIZEi,t -0.524 0.009 -0.434 -0.023 -0.353 0.055 -0.470 0.021 
 (-1.27) (0.02) (-1.04) (-0.05) (-0.84) (0.13) (-1.13) (0.05) 
MTBi,t 0.428** 0.226 0.418** 0.226 0.427** 0.229 0.434** 0.225 
 (2.12) (0.97) (2.08) (0.97) (2.12) (0.98) (2.15) (0.96) 
CFOi,t 13.629** 48.555*** 13.294** 48.491*** 13.562** 48.230*** 13.790** 48.472*** 
 (2.02) (6.60) (1.98) (6.59) (2.02) (6.55) (2.05) (6.59) 
∆SALEi,t 24.623*** 33.317*** 24.610*** 33.374*** 24.617*** 33.283*** 24.586*** 33.263*** 
 (9.24) (10.83) (9.25) (10.85) (9.26) (10.82) (9.23) (10.80) 
CYCLEi,t -13.589*** -8.844*** -13.552*** -8.849*** -13.630*** -8.864*** -13.543*** -8.822*** 
 (-5.14) (-3.00) (-5.13) (-3.00) (-5.17) (-3.01) (-5.13) (-2.99) 
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SEOi,t 9.067*** 6.768*** 8.966*** 6.783*** 8.915*** 6.815*** 9.035*** 6.831*** 
 (3.79) (2.92) (3.75) (2.92) (3.74) (2.94) (3.78) (2.95) 
DEBTISSUEi,t -2.101 3.624** -2.113 3.649** -2.206 3.608** -2.122 3.590** 
 (-1.21) (2.23) (-1.22) (2.24) (-1.28) (2.22) (-1.23) (2.20) 
Constant 0.412*** 0.211* 0.409*** 0.215* 0.406*** 0.206* 0.411*** 0.211* 
 (3.87) (1.91) (3.84) (1.94) (3.82) (1.86) (3.86) (1.91) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1693 1713 1693 1713 1693 1713 1693 1713 
Adjusted R2 0.173 0.211 0.174 0.211 0.176 0.212 0.174 0.211 
This table reports the findings on the effect of bankruptcy risk on the relationship between accounting conservatism and banking expertise on the board. I define 
firms with low (high) ZSCORE as having a ZSCOREt-1 lower (greater) than the median of all firms. I use NOACC_RANK as the dependent variable in Equation 
4-5 for subsamples of low and high ZSCORE. All coefficients are multiplied by 100. Industry fixed effects are based on Datastream’s level six codes. Figures 
in parentheses are t-statistics. Definitions of variables are in the Appendix. *, **, *** are significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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4.4.6.2. Financial leverage 
In the final analysis, I examine how financial leverage affects the relationship between 
banking expertise on boards of directors and accounting conservatism. Highly levered 
firms face restrictive debt covenants and have a high demand for accounting 
conservatism as a debt monitoring mechanism (Watts, 2003a; LaFond and Watts, 
2008; Khan and Watts, 2009). Because the violation of debt covenants is costly (Nash 
et al., 2003; Chava and Roberts, 2008; Nini et al., 2012; Gao et al., 2017) and 
accounting conservatism may have negative impact on shareholders’ wealth (Beneish 
and Press, 1993; Nash et al., 2003; Bhaskar et al., 2017; Gao et al., 2017), highly 
levered firms are more likely to rely on financial expertise on boards of directors to 
mitigate the negative consequences of accounting conservatism. Therefore, I predict 
that the effect of banking expertise on accounting conservatism is more pronounced 
for firms with high financial leverage than for firms with low financial leverage. 
To provide evidence for this prediction, I also run the Equation 4-5 with subsamples: 
firms with high and low financial leverage. I define firms with high (low) financial 
leverage as having financial leverage (LEV) in year t-1 greater than or equal (lower) 
than the median of all firms. Table 4-21 reports findings of the effect of financial 
leverage on the relationship between CONS_RANK and banking expertise on board. 
In nearly every case across all columns, I find robust evidence that the coefficients on 
banking expertise are substantially higher for firms with high financial leverage than 
for firms with low financial leverage. Also, the coefficients on banking expertise are 
(not) significant or firms with high (low) financial leverage. In Table 4-22 and Table 
4-23, I obtain similar results on the effects of financial leverage on the relationship 
between banking expertise with CSCORE_RANK and with NOACC_RANK, 
respectively. In short, the evidence is consistent with the prediction that the effect of 
banking expertise on accounting conservatism is more pronounced when firms have 
high financial leverage. 
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Table 4-21: Cross-sectional analysis: the effect of financial leverage on the relationship between CONS_RANK and measures of banking expertise 
  yEXPERTISE aEXPERTISE EXPERTISE mEXPERTISE 
 
High 
leverage 
Low 
Leverage 
High 
leverage 
Low 
Leverage 
High 
leverage 
Low 
Leverage 
High 
leverage 
Low 
Leverage 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (6) (8) 
yEXPERTISEi,t -0.127** 0.003       
 (-2.12) (0.08)       
aEXPERTISEi,t   -0.998*** -0.323     
   (-2.58) (-0.99)     
EXPERTISEi,t     -2.884*** -1.146   
     (-2.74) (-1.57)   
mEXPERTISEi,t       -0.314 0.016 
       (-1.53) (0.13) 
LEVi,t 9.090*** -5.156** 9.091*** -5.237** 9.100*** -5.270** 9.108*** -5.152** 
 (12.15) (-2.22) (12.16) (-2.25) (12.17) (-2.27) (12.16) (-2.21) 
SIZEi,t -11.571*** -12.485*** -11.522*** -12.434*** -11.488*** -12.404*** -11.601*** -12.488*** 
 (-47.45) (-67.84) (-46.86) (-66.93) (-46.28) (-66.67) (-47.34) (-67.51) 
MTBi,t 0.227 0.203*** 0.222 0.203*** 0.213 0.205*** 0.218 0.203*** 
 (1.43) (2.71) (1.39) (2.72) (1.34) (2.74) (1.37) (2.71) 
CFOi,t 9.720* 7.600*** 9.369 7.581*** 9.835* 7.490*** 9.915* 7.603*** 
 (1.65) (3.33) (1.59) (3.32) (1.67) (3.28) (1.68) (3.33) 
∆SALEi,t 2.968 7.968*** 2.985 7.945*** 2.949 7.924*** 3.035 7.972*** 
 (1.49) (7.72) (1.50) (7.70) (1.48) (7.68) (1.52) (7.71) 
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CYCLEi,t 2.799* 3.426** 2.815* 3.374** 2.727* 3.399** 2.709* 3.420** 
 (1.90) (2.51) (1.92) (2.47) (1.86) (2.49) (1.84) (2.51) 
SEOi,t 6.143*** 5.543*** 6.062*** 5.508*** 6.048*** 5.519*** 6.140*** 5.542*** 
 (3.96) (6.31) (3.90) (6.27) (3.90) (6.29) (3.95) (6.31) 
DEBTISSUEi,t -1.732* 2.012** -1.682* 1.984** -1.716* 1.967** -1.753* 2.014** 
 (-1.70) (2.56) (-1.65) (2.52) (-1.68) (2.50) (-1.72) (2.56) 
Constant 1.888*** 1.966*** 1.885*** 1.961*** 1.882*** 1.959*** 1.891*** 1.966*** 
 (32.33) (50.31) (32.30) (50.18) (32.19) (50.18) (32.35) (50.34) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed 
effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1714 1714 1714 1714 1714 1714 1714 1714 
Adjusted R2 0.739 0.838 0.739 0.838 0.740 0.838 0.739 0.838 
This table reports the findings on the effect of financial distress on the relationship between accounting conservatism and measures of banking 
expertise. I define firms with low (high) financial leverage as having LEVt-1 lower (greater) than the median of all firms. I use CONS_RANK as 
the dependent variable in Equation 4-5 for subsamples of high and low financial leverage. All coefficients are multiplied by 100. Industry fixed 
effects are based on Datastream’s level six codes. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. Definitions of variables are in the Appendix. *, **, *** 
are significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 4-22: Cross-sectional analysis: the effect of financial leverage on the relationship between CSCORE_RANK and measures of banking 
expertise 
 yEXPERTISE aEXPERTISE EXPERTISE mEXPERTISE 
 High Leverage Low Leverage High Leverage Low Leverage High Leverage Low Leverage High Leverage Low Leverage 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (6) (8) 
yEXPERTISEi,t -0.078 -0.008       
 (-1.35) (-0.17)       
aEXPERTISEi,t   -0.699* -0.467     
   (-1.87) (-1.44)     
EXPERTISEi,t     -2.263** -1.377*   
     (-2.23) (-1.89)   
mEXPERTISEi,t       -0.199 0.000 
       (-1.01) (0.00) 
LEVi,t 0.122 -8.752*** 0.120 -8.847*** 0.125 -8.869*** 0.133 -8.739*** 
 (0.17) (-3.77) (0.17) (-3.81) (0.17) (-3.82) (0.18) (-3.76) 
SIZEi,t -12.281*** -12.815*** -12.235*** -12.752*** -12.194*** -12.728*** -12.298*** -12.822*** 
 (-52.14) (-69.74) (-51.50) (-68.77) (-50.85) (-68.54) (-51.97) (-69.43) 
MTBi,t 0.233 0.273*** 0.229 0.274*** 0.221 0.276*** 0.226 0.273*** 
 (1.51) (3.67) (1.49) (3.68) (1.44) (3.71) (1.47) (3.67) 
CFOi,t 6.510 8.157*** 6.263 8.120*** 6.598 8.017*** 6.633 8.152*** 
 (1.15) (3.58) (1.10) (3.57) (1.16) (3.52) (1.17) (3.58) 
∆SALEi,t 3.465* 7.495*** 3.457* 7.473*** 3.410* 7.452*** 3.503* 7.502*** 
 (1.80) (7.27) (1.80) (7.26) (1.77) (7.24) (1.82) (7.27) 
CYCLEi,t 2.613* 3.007** 2.640* 2.939** 2.587* 2.980** 2.560* 3.011** 
 (1.84) (2.21) (1.86) (2.16) (1.82) (2.19) (1.80) (2.21) 
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SEOi,t 4.470*** 5.378*** 4.412*** 5.335*** 4.393*** 5.356*** 4.468*** 5.383*** 
 (2.98) (6.13) (2.94) (6.09) (2.93) (6.12) (2.98) (6.14) 
DEBTISSUEi,t 0.607 1.976** 0.645 1.941** 0.626 1.927** 0.595 1.979** 
 (0.62) (2.52) (0.65) (2.47) (0.64) (2.45) (0.60) (2.52) 
Constant 2.055*** 1.999*** 2.052*** 1.993*** 2.048*** 1.992*** 2.057*** 1.999*** 
 (36.43) (51.24) (36.40) (51.10) (36.28) (51.12) (36.44) (51.28) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1714 1714 1714 1714 1714 1714 1714 1714 
Adjusted R2 0.755 0.843 0.755 0.843 0.755 0.844 0.755 0.843 
This table reports the findings on the effect of financial distress on the relationship between accounting conservatism and measures of banking expertise. I define 
firms with low (high) financial leverage as having LEVt-1 lower (greater) than the median of all firms. I use CSCORE_RANK as the dependent variable in 
Equation 4-5 for subsamples of high and low financial leverage. All coefficients are multiplied by 100. Industry fixed effects are based on Datastream’s level 
six codes. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. Definitions of variables are in the Appendix. *, **, *** are significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 4-23: Cross-sectional analysis: the effect of financial leverage on the relationship between NOACC_RANK and measures of banking 
expertise 
  yEXPERTISE aEXPERTISE EXPERTISE mEXPERTISE 
 High Leverage Low Leverage High Leverage Low Leverage High Leverage Low Leverage High Leverage Low Leverage 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (6) (8) 
yEXPERTISEi,t -0.164* -0.099       
 (-1.75) (-0.85)       
aEXPERTISEi,t   -1.096* -0.910     
   (-1.82) (-1.09)     
EXPERTISEi,t     -4.512*** -2.632   
     (-2.77) (-1.40)   
mEXPERTISEi,t       -0.705** -0.385 
       (-2.22) (-1.16) 
LEVi,t 2.880** 9.805* 2.885** 9.776 2.886** 9.749 2.889** 9.736 
 (2.48) (1.65) (2.49) (1.64) (2.49) (1.64) (2.49) (1.64) 
SIZEi,t -0.720* 0.539 -0.692* 0.585 -0.554 0.628 -0.664* 0.583 
 (-1.90) (1.14) (-1.81) (1.23) (-1.44) (1.32) (-1.74) (1.23) 
MTBi,t 0.305 0.532*** 0.298 0.533*** 0.282 0.537*** 0.284 0.535*** 
 (1.24) (2.75) (1.21) (2.75) (1.14) (2.77) (1.15) (2.76) 
CFOi,t 23.582*** 27.027*** 23.221** 26.894*** 23.778*** 26.698*** 24.036*** 26.931*** 
 (2.59) (4.57) (2.55) (4.54) (2.61) (4.51) (2.64) (4.55) 
∆SALEi,t 27.770*** 25.838*** 27.830*** 25.873*** 27.664*** 25.836*** 27.677*** 25.763*** 
 (8.98) (9.70) (9.00) (9.72) (8.96) (9.71) (8.95) (9.67) 
CYCLEi,t -10.732*** -14.146*** -10.749*** -14.232*** -10.795*** -14.151*** -10.763*** -13.997*** 
 (-4.70) (-4.06) (-4.71) (-4.08) (-4.74) (-4.06) (-4.72) (-4.01) 
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SEOi,t 5.895** 11.109*** 5.808** 11.081*** 5.744** 11.123*** 5.877** 11.153*** 
 (2.44) (4.92) (2.41) (4.90) (2.38) (4.93) (2.44) (4.94) 
DEBTISSUEi,t -1.416 0.573 -1.366 0.532 -1.381 0.502 -1.427 0.520 
 (-0.89) (0.28) (-0.86) (0.26) (-0.87) (0.25) (-0.90) (0.26) 
Constant 0.454*** 0.104 0.453*** 0.101 0.442*** 0.098 0.451*** 0.102 
 (4.49) (0.93) (4.49) (0.89) (4.38) (0.87) (4.47) (0.91) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed 
effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1705 1701 1705 1701 1705 1701 1705 1701 
Adjusted R2 0.199 0.195 0.199 0.195 0.201 0.196 0.200 0.195 
This table reports the findings on the effect of financial distress on the relationship between accounting conservatism and measures of banking expertise. I define 
firms with low (high) financial leverage as having LEVt-1 lower (greater) than the median of all firms. I use NOACC_RANK as the dependent variable in 
Equation 4-5 for subsamples of high and low financial leverage. All coefficients are multiplied by 100. Industry fixed effects are based on Datastream’s level 
six codes. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. Definitions of variables are in the Appendix. *, **, *** are significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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4.5. Conclusions 
In this research, I examine the relationship between accounting conservatism and 
banking expertise on boards of directors. I provide an innovative way to measure 
banking expertise based on the working history in banks of all individual directors on 
the board. I hypothesise that banking expertise on the board helps to reduce demand 
for accounting conservatism. Using a sample of listed companies in the UK from 2005 
to 2012, I find that the banking expertise on the board negatively affects accounting 
conservatism. The negative relationship is both statistically and economically 
significant. The findings hold strongly for various robustness checks. Also, further 
analyses show that the banking expertise on the board has a more pronounced negative 
impact on accounting conservatism when firms have high bankruptcy risk, and when 
firms have high financial leverage. The study complements the work of Erkens et al. 
(2014) and Bonetti et al. (2017) by providing further evidence on the relevance of 
boards of directors for accounting conservatism.  
However, the chapter has some limitations. First, there may be measurement errors in 
estimating the banking expertise of boards of directors. For example, some directors 
may be connected to the same banking network (Renneboog and Zhao, 2011), so that 
having them all on the board does not necessarily increase the levels of banking 
expertise. Also, the chapter treats experiences gained from different positions in banks 
equally and does not take into account differences in experience accumulated from 
different positions, e.g. the CEO and CFO positions. Future studies should attempt to 
reduce measurement errors by excluding banking expertise gained from the same 
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director network or by considering different positions of directors in banks. Second, 
there may be survival bias because the research sample does not include dead 
companies because of data constraints. Dead companies are less likely to disclose 
information on the board of directors, thus observations with missing data may be 
deleted during the sample selection procedure. Third, the chapter does not consider the 
possibility that directors might work for some banks whose names are not on the lists 
of banks. Future studies should extend the definition of working experience in banks 
by considering this concern. Finally, future studies should consider factors which may 
affect banking expertise on the board, such as changes in regulatory requirements, 
which leads to human capital movement between firms and banks. Those changes may 
affect levels of banking expertise on the board, but not necessarily affect accounting 
conservatism.  
 
 
 
  
232 
 
 
Appendix 2: Variable definitions for Chapter 4 
Variable Definitions 
Accounting conservatism measures 
CONS_RANK Annual fractional rank of the three-year average of total 
accounting conservatism (García Lara et al., 2016), where total 
accounting conservatism is the sum of the timeliness of good 
news (GSCORE) and the asymmetric timeliness of bad news 
over good news (CSCORE) estimated by the model of Khan and 
Watts (2009), which is based on Basu (1997). I calculate the 
average of total accounting conservatism across years t-2, t-1, 
and t (denoted 𝑎𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑖,𝑡); then rank 𝑎𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑖,𝑡 of all firms for 
each year; and divide the rank values by N+1, where N is the 
total observations in each rank group. I refer to the new variable 
as the annual fractional rank of total accounting conservatism. 
CSCORE_RANK Annual fractional rank of the three-year average of CSCORE 
(Basu, 1997; Khan and Watts, 2009). 
NOACC_RANK Annual fractional rank of the three-year average of the negative 
accumulation of non-operating accruals (Givoly and Hayn, 
2000). The calculation of negative non-operating accruals is as 
follows: 
 
𝑁𝑂𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = −1 ∗ {𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐷𝑖,𝑡  −  𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡} 
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 =  −1 ∗ {[(𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡  +  𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑖,𝑡) − 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡]
− [∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛥 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛥 𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑃𝐴𝐼𝐷𝑖,𝑡 −  𝛥 𝑃𝐴𝑌𝑖,𝑡
−  𝛥 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖,𝑡]}  
Where: 𝑁𝑂𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖,𝑡 is negative non-operating accruals; 𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐷𝑖,𝑡 is 
total accruals before depreciation and amortisation; 𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 is 
operating accruals; 𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡 is net income; 𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑖,𝑡 is depreciation 
and amortisation; 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 is cash flows from operations; ∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡 
is receivables in year t minus receivables in year t-1. 𝛥 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑡 is 
inventories in year t minus inventories in year t-1; 𝛥 𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑃𝐴𝐼𝐷𝑖,𝑡 
is prepaid expenses in year t minus prepaid expenses in year t-1; 
𝛥 𝑃𝐴𝑌𝑖,𝑡 is payables in year t minus payables in year t-1; 
𝛥 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖,𝑡 is tax payables in year t minus tax payables in year t-1. 
All variables are scaled by total assets at the end of year t. i 
represents company i and t represents fiscal year t. 
Banking expertise measures 
yEXPERTISE Total number of years all directors on the board have worked as 
executives in banks. 
aEXPERTISE Total number of banks for which all directors on the board have 
worked as executives. 
EXPERTISE The presence of banking expertise on the board, which is equal 
one if a company has at least one director on board who has 
worked as an executive in a bank, zero otherwise. 
234 
 
 
mEXPERTISE Average number of years all directors on the board have worked 
as executives in banks, which is equal yEXPERTISE divided by 
the number of board members. 
Other variables 
∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸 Sale growth, which is equal sales in year t minus sales in year t-
1, scaled by total assets. 
ACC Accruals which are calculated as follows: 𝐴𝐶𝐶 = ∆𝐼𝑁𝑉 +
 ∆𝑅𝐸𝐶 + ∆𝑂𝐶𝐴 − ∆𝑃𝐴𝑌 − ∆𝑂𝐶𝐿 − 𝐷𝐸𝑃, where ∆𝐼𝑁𝑉 is 
inventories in year t minus inventories in year t-1, ∆𝑅𝐸𝐶 is 
receivables in year t minus receivables in year t-1, ∆𝑂𝐶𝐴 is other 
current assets in year t minus other current assets in year t-1, 
∆𝑃𝐴𝑌 is payables in year t minus payables in year t-1, ∆𝑂𝐶𝐿 is 
other current liabilities in year t minus other current liabilities in 
year t-1, 𝐷𝐸𝑃 is depreciation and amortisation. 
AT Total assets  
CASH Ratio of cash to total assets 
CFO Cash flow from operations, which equals to net income before 
extraordinary items (𝐼𝐵) minus accruals (𝐴𝐶𝐶), scaled by assets. 
CYCLE Business life cycle (Dickinson, 2011), which is a dummy 
variable is equal one if firms are classified based on cash flows 
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as at mature stage (positive cash flows from operating activities, 
negative cash flows from investing activities, and negative cash 
flows from financing activities), and zero if firms are classified 
as at young stage (negative cash flows from operating activities, 
negative cash flows from investing activities, and positive cash 
flows from financing activities), or growth stage (positive cash 
flows from operating activities, negative cash flows from 
investing activities, and positive cash flows from financing 
activities). 
D A dummy variable that equals one if 𝑅𝐸𝑇 < 0, and zero 
otherwise. 
DCFO A dummy variable which equals to one if 𝐶𝐹𝑂 < 0, and zero 
otherwise. 
DEBTISSUE Debt issue, which is a dummy variable with the value of one if 
the change in short-term and long-term debts from the end of 
year t-1 to the end of year t. 
EARN Net income before extraordinary items in year t, scaled by 
market value of equity at the end of year t-1 
IB Net income before extraordinary items 
LEV Financial leverage, which is the sum of long-term and short-term 
debts, scaled by the market value of equity. 
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MTB Market to book ratio, which is equal to market value of equity 
divided by book value of equity. 
PPE Ratio of PPE (gross) to total assets. 
RET Buy-and-hold stock returns over the fiscal year 
SALE Sales 
SEO Equity issue, which is a dummy variable with the value of one if 
a firm increases outstanding shares at least 5% with positive 
proceeds from equity issuance, zero otherwise. 
SIZE Firm size, which is the log of the market value of equity 
ZSCORE Financial distress at the end of year t, measured by 𝑍𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸 
following (Taffler, 1983) as follows: 
ZSCORE
= 3.2 +  12.18 ∗
Profit before tax
current liabilities
 +  2.50
∗
Current assets
Total liabilities
 −  10.68 ∗
Current liabilities
Total assets
 +  0.029
∗
(Quick assets − Current liabilities)
(Sales − Pretax income − Depreciation)/365
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5. Chapter 5: BENFORD’S LAW, EARNINGS 
MANAGEMENT, AND ACCOUNTING CONSERVATISM: 
THE UK EVIDENCE 
Abstract 
Benford’s Law, which is the law of digit distributions, is widely applied to study fraud 
or bias in a data set. In this chapter, I apply Benford’s Law to examine the first digits 
of financial statement items of UK listed companies. The evidence shows that the first 
digits conform to Benford’s Law at the firm-specific level and market level. Further 
analysis shows that deviations from Benford’s Law of the first digits of income 
statement items are larger than those of balance sheet items and cash flow items, 
suggesting that income statements may contain more errors. The evidence also 
supports the hypothesis that, in addition to earnings management, conditional 
conservatism is a source of deviations of the first digits. I argue that conditional 
conservatism introduces biases to financial statements, which make accounting figures 
deviate from the law of digit distributions. The results have implications for auditors.  
Keywords: Benford’s Law, earnings management, accounting conservatism 
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5.1. Introduction 
Accounting scandals normally begin with inflating earnings up to four years prior to 
the collapse of corporations (García Lara, Garcia Osma, et al., 2009). A significant 
consequence is that investors may suffer losses before accounting manipulations are 
detected. Therefore, building empirical models to identify earnings management in 
published financial statements attracts many researchers (Dechow et al., 2010). 
One strand of research focuses on developing models to detect earnings management 
or predict accounting fraud. Some researchers use firm characteristics to estimate 
abnormal accruals, which are viewed as earnings management (Jones, 1991; Dechow 
et al., 1995; Dechow and Dichev, 2002; Kothari et al., 2005). Other researchers use 
actual fraud cases to construct models to predict accounting fraud (Beneish, 1997, 
1999; Dechow et al., 2011). A common feature of those models is the use of time-
series or cross-sectional data to estimate earnings management or fraud. Although 
earnings management models are widely applied, previous studies indicate that those 
models may be misspecified (Dechow et al., 2010). 
Another line of accounting research relies on mathematics to examine risks of earnings 
management or fraud. Specifically, researchers apply Benford’s Law, which is the law 
of digit distributions, to accounting numbers to study errors which may be caused by 
intentional or unintentional acts. Benford’s Law indicates that when there is an absence 
of errors in a data set, every digit will appear with a certain frequency in the data set. 
Thus, deviations from the expected frequencies are indications of the existence of 
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errors in data sets. The research applying Benford’s Law may overcome the limitations 
of earnings management models because it relies on only mathematics. There is 
emerging evidence on the application of Benford’s Law to examine errors (Carslaw, 
1988; Thomas, 1989; Nigrini, 1996; Caneghem, 2002, 2004; Lin et al., 2014; Amiram 
et al., 2015; Nigrini, 2015).  
In the context of the UK, Caneghem (2002) and Caneghem (2004) provide evidence 
that deviations of second digits of earnings from Benford’s Law are signals of earnings 
management. However, a major limitation of those studies is that they examine only 
one item in financial statements (pre-tax income). Given that financial statements are 
prepared for various stakeholders, net income is not the only figure to be manipulated. 
The research attempts to fill this gap in the literature by examining all numbers 
reported in financial statements. I adopted the methodology introduced by Amiram et 
al. (2015), which uses firm-year data to calculate deviations of the first digits of 
financial statement items. Amiram et al. (2015) show that the first digits of financial 
statement items of US-listed companies conform to Benford’s Law. In this study, I 
hypothesised that the first digits of financial statement items of UK listed companies 
also conform to Benford’s Law. 
I also provide an alternative explanation for sources of deviations of first digits. The 
literature indicates that an introduction of earnings management or fraud in financial 
statements would lead to greater divergence of digits from Benford’s Law (Caneghem, 
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2002; Amiram et al., 2015). In this paper, I argue that conditional conservatism,29 to 
the extent it can be purposeful manipulation by management (LaFond and Watts, 2008; 
Zhang, 2008) rather than a neutral selection and application of accounting policies, is 
also a source of deviations. This argument is consistent with the work of Mora and 
Walker (2015) which has indicated that accounting conservatism can introduce biases 
and the study of Amiram et al. (2015) which has explained that first-digit deviations 
could be caused by fraud, errors or biases in financial statements.  
I test the hypotheses with financial statements items from a sample of UK listed 
companies from 2005 to 2012. I measure deviations of first digits from Benford’s Law 
by using maximum cumulative absolute differences and mean absolute differences 
between expected frequencies and actual frequencies of the first digits of financial 
statement items. At the firm-specific level, I calculate deviations for each company by 
using a pool of first digits from all available financial statements of a company during 
the research period. I also examine deviations of first digits from Benford’s Law for 
                                                 
29 As discussed in Section 2.3.1, conditional conservatism refers to the understatement of 
values of assets in financial statements which recognise losses in unfavourable conditions, but 
not gains in favourable conditions. Conditional conservatism is dependent on the speed of 
recognition of good news and bad news in financial reports. It is also called news-dependent 
conservatism. In contrast, unconditional conservatism refers to accounting treatments that 
result in lower book values relative to neutral (economic) values of net assets, and this 
conservatism is called “balance sheet conservatism” or news-independent conservatism 
because it does not depend on the news. 
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the whole market by using a pool of first digits reported on financial statements of all 
companies in the sample. The evidence shows that financial statements of UK listed 
companies conform to Benford’s Law at the firm-specific level and the market level. 
Further analysis shows that deviations of the first digits of income statement items are 
larger than those of balance sheet items and cash flow items, suggesting that income 
statements may contain more errors. Also, the results from multivariate regressions 
show that deviations of first digits are positively associated with earnings management 
and conditional conservatism. The evidence suggests that earnings management and 
conditional conservatism are sources of deviations of first digits. 
The research makes significant contributions to the literature and accounting practice. 
This is the first study to analyses  the first digits of all items in the financial statements 
of UK listed companies. Previous studies using UK data examined only the second 
digits of specific items, such as pre-tax income (Caneghem, 2002, 2004). Thus, the 
existing evidence can only suggest errors in earnings. By studying all figures reported 
in financial statements, this study accounts for the fact that errors may exist anywhere 
in financial statements. The approach applying Benford’s Law on all financial 
statement items, rather than some single items such as net income, has some 
advantages. First, the approach is in line with the standard setters’ view that the general 
purpose of financial statements is to present financial information for different users, 
including shareholders, debtholders and others such as employees, suppliers, 
customers and government (International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), 2018). 
Different users may require different types of accounting information. Also, the 
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Conceptual Framework (IASB, 2018) firstly define assets and liabilities (balance sheet 
items), and then incomes and expenses (income statement items) which are defined 
based on changes in assets and liabilities. The interpretation is that assets and liabilities 
are cornerstones of financial statements, and changes in assets and liabilities will affect 
reported earnings. While income statement items (including net income) are possibly 
the most important figures for shareholders, balance sheet items may also be important 
because they provide debtholders with information on the financial health of 
companies. The approach which focuses on all financial statement items gives a 
chance to detect errors or fraud in assets, liabilities, incomes, expenses and cash flows. 
Second, errors or frauds are more likely to be detected under the approach using all 
items in financial statements. The reason is that an error or fraud in one item may affect 
several other items in financial statements under double-entry accounting, for 
example, underestimation of bad debts affects receivable, bad debt expense and other 
resulting balances such as earnings before tax and net income. In other words, the 
manipulation in one transaction will affect several accounts so that it results in higher 
deviations from Benford’s Law. Third, the approach can flag up errors or frauds in 
accounts which do not directly affect net income. In some cases, e.g. when restrictive 
debt covenants require that liquidity ratios must be maintained at given levels,  it is 
more likely that current debts are understated (or current assets are overstated) if a firm 
is in financial distress. In general, the findings may have more implications for 
practitioners.  
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Another contribution of the paper is that I offer an alternative explanation for 
deviations of first digits. The existing literature explains that first digits deviate from 
Benford’s Law because accounting data include instances of fraud or bias, such as 
earnings management. I hypothesised and found that accounting conservatism is also 
a source of deviations. The paper contributes further evidence on the debates about 
whether accounting conservatism introduces biases to financial statements (see, e.g., 
Mora and Walker, 2015; Ruch and Taylor, 2015). For example, the accounting 
standard setters removed the requirement that conservatism (prudence) be one of the 
characteristics of financial statements in the 2010 Conceptual Framework (IASB, 
2010), but have recently reintroduced the concept of prudence in the 2018 Conceptual 
Framework for Financial Reporting (International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB), 2018). It shows that conservatism is a controversial concept even among 
standard setters. Empirical studies support the ideas that conditional conservatism is 
affected by managers’ purposeful intervention (LaFond and Watts, 2008; Zhang, 
2008). In this paper, I provide evidence that conditional conservatism causes higher 
first-digit deviations from Benford’s Law, to the extent it is related to purposeful biases 
(Amiram et al., 2015). I note that the paper is different from the recent work of Lin et 
al. (2014), which applies Benford’s Law and finds mixed evidence on the relationships 
between accounting conservatism and earnings management. In their paper, the 
authors use deviations of individual digits (from 0s to 9s) of quarterly net income from 
Benford’s Law as a proxy for earnings management, but they do not provide a 
sufficient explanation for earnings management behaviours associated with deviations 
of those individual digits and each position (first, second, third and fourth positions in 
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net income numbers), especially when the empirical findings are mixed on the 
relationships between accounting conservatism and earnings management (Kwon, 
Yin, and Han, 2006; García Lara, García Osma, and Penalva, 2012). I study deviations 
of first digits of all items reported in annual, rather than quarterly, financial statements 
to examine whether conservatism is a source of deviations. 
The findings also have implications for auditors. I am a proponent of the use of 
Benford’s Law as an analytical procedure in an audit engagement because Benford’s 
Law can indicate errors in accounting data. The findings show that income statements 
have larger deviations of first digits than do other types of statements, suggesting that 
there may be comparatively more errors in income statements. Thus, auditors should 
be cautious when auditing income statement items such as revenues and expenses. 
Also, the findings indicate that deviations of first digits may be caused by earnings 
management or conditional conservatism driven by managers’ purposeful 
intervention. Thus, auditors should pay more attention to conservatism-related items 
such as impairment losses and inventory written-off because those items can be 
manipulated by managers. 
5.2. Literature review and hypothesis development: 
5.2.1. An Introduction to Benford’s Law 
Benford’s Law refers to the distributional probability of the digits of numbers in a data 
set. The distributional probability of first digits was discovered by astronomer Simon 
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Newcomb in 1881 and was later tested on various data sets by physicist Frank Benford, 
who gave Benford’s Law its name (Amiram et al., 2015).  
Table 5-1: Distributions of first digits following Benford's Law a,b 
 
The reason that the probability of the first digit being 1 is the greatest and the 
probability of the first digit being 9 is the smallest is as follows: As explained by 
Nigrini (1996), the number 1 needs 100% growth to change to the number 2 (e.g., if 
the population of a city increases from 100,000 to 200,000), the number 2 needs only 
50% growth to change to the number 3, and so forth, until finally, the number 9, which 
needs only 11.1% growth to change to the number 1. Therefore, a number starting with 
the digit 1 (9) has the greatest (smallest) probability of existence in a population. 
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Mathematically, the expected frequency of the first digit of a number following 
Benford’s Law is given by the equation (Nigrini, 1996; Amiram et al., 2015; Nigrini, 
2015): 
Equation 5-1: Probability of the first digits 
P(D1 = d1) = log10 (1 +
1
d1
) = log10(d1 + 1) − log10(d1)  
Where D1 is the first digit of a number, d1 = 1, 2, 3, …, 9. 
Similar to that of the first digits, the probability of second digits can also be written in 
the mathematical formulas (Carslaw, 1988; Thomas, 1989; Da Silva and Carreira, 
2013; Nigrini, 2015) as follows30: 
Equation 5-2: Probability of the second digit 
P(D2 = d2) = ∑ log10 (1 +
1
d2
)
9
𝑑1=1
 
Where D2 is the second digits, d2 = 0, 1, 2, …, 9 
Also, the probability of a combination of digits can also be written. For example, 
formulas for combinations of the first and second digits are as follows: 
                                                 
30 Similarly, the probability of other digits can also be written in the mathematical formulas 
(see, e.g., Carslaw, 1988; Thomas, 1989; Da Silva and Carreira, 2013; Nigrini, 2015). 
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Equation 5-3: Probability of a combination of the first and second digit 
P(D1D2 = d1d2) = log10 (1 +
1
d1d2
) 
Equation 5-4: Probability of the second digit conditional on the first digit 
P(D2 = d2|D1 = d1) =
log10 (1 +
1
d1d2
)
log10 (1 +
1
d1
)
 
While this study focuses on the distributional of the first digits only, it is helpful to 
provide a review of accounting research on Benford’s Law in general. 
5.2.2. Benford’s Law in accounting research 
A common application of Benford’s Law is to assess accounting numbers’ conformity 
to Benford’s Law in tabulated (actual) data. Nigrini (1994) indicates that non-
conformity to Benford’s Law may be a red flag for errors in data. From a practical 
perspective, Nigrini and Mittermaier (1997) propose that comparing actual and 
expected frequencies of a list of numbers can be used as an analytical procedure in an 
audit. Durtschi, Hillison, and Pacini (2004) also provide guidance for auditors to apply 
Benford’s Law to detect suspected accounts which may contain instances of fraud. Da 
Silva and Carreira (2013) use predefined criteria based on Benford’s Law to develop 
models which support auditors in constructing auditing samples containing both 
conforming and non-conforming transactions. 
Early empirical studies applied Benford’s Law to study earnings management. 
Examining individual tax return items, Nigrini (1996) reported that the interest 
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received line had higher (lower) than expected frequencies of smaller (larger) first 
digits. In contrast, the interest paid line had lower (higher) than expected frequencies 
of smaller (larger) first digits. The findings suggested that interest received (paid) had 
been understated (overstated) due to taxpayers intentionally evading tax. 
Carslaw (1988) studied the second digits of reported income in financial statements of 
New Zealand firms and found that the actual frequencies of 0s (9s) were higher (lower) 
than that expected by Benford’s Law. He theorized that this phenomenon was caused 
by the tendency of managers to round numbers up to achieve earnings targets. For 
example, when an earnings target is 6,000 but the true earnings number is 5,984 (or 
any number just below 6,000), managers are more likely to report the earnings number 
as 6,004 (or any number just above 6,000) to meet or beat the earnings target. 
Consequently, the frequency of second-digit 0s will be abnormally high, while the 
frequency of second-digit 9s will be abnormally low.  
Consistent with Carslaw (1988), Thomas (1989) showed similar patterns in the US, 
but with less deviation of earnings numbers from the expectations following Benford’s 
Law. Thomas (1989) also reported that while firms showing losses have more second-
digit 9s and fewer second-digit 0s than expected, companies showing profits have 
abnormally high frequencies of second-digit 0s and 5s (after the decimal points) in 
their earnings-per-share (EPS) numbers. Later studies provide further evidence 
supporting the notion that the second digits of earnings numbers do not follow 
Benford’s Law as a result of rounding-up behaviour (Niskanen and Keloharju, 2000; 
Caneghem, 2002, 2004).  
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So far, previous discussions indicate that Benford’s Law can be applied to study a 
specific accounting item such as earnings (Carslaw, 1988; Thomas, 1989; Niskanen 
and Keloharju, 2000; Caneghem, 2002, 2004) and income tax (Nigrini, 1996). The 
general evidence is that accounting numbers follow distributional expectations of 
Benford’s Law and that deviations from Benford’s Law suggest the existence of errors. 
However, an interesting question is whether financial statement items follow 
Benford’s Law. The question is valid because there is a mixture of estimations of cash 
flow realisations in accounting data (Amiram et al., 2015). Financial statements are 
prepared to give information about realisations of all present and future cash flows 
which are unknown at the time of presentation. There are different cash flows related 
to financial statements such as cash flows received from revenues, cash flows paid to 
suppliers, cash flows paid to employees or cash flows paid to tax authorities. 
Therefore, it is expected that financial statements may result from a mixture of 
estimations of cash flow realisations. Studying first digits rather than second digits, 
Amiram et al. (2015) prove that financial statement items follow Benford’s Law. Their 
finding is based on the work of Hill (1995), Ray and Lindsay (2005), and Pimbley 
(2014). Ray and Lindsay (2005) indicate that a combination of normal distributions 
has a nearly exact normal distribution when their means are less than two standard 
deviations apart, meaning that it follows the expectations of Benford’s Law. Hill 
(1995) proves that, under certain conditions, combined distributions follow Benford’s 
Law if there is no error in the data sets. While Pimbley (2014) shows that the Central 
Limit Theorem leads to the conformity to Benford’s Law of data which have smooth 
and symmetric distributions, Amiram et al. (2015) mathematically prove that a mixture 
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of estimations of cash flow realisations tends to have smooth and symmetric 
distributions, and therefore follows Benford’s Law. Another significant contribution 
of Amiram et al. (2015) is their development of an innovative score, namely 
FSD_SCORE, to capture deviations from Benford’s Law of the first digits of figures 
reported in financial statements. The FSD_SCORE is defined as the sum of first-digit 
deviations from Benford’s Law divided by nine, where deviations are absolute 
differences between observed (actual) frequencies of the first digits and the expected 
frequencies of all items in balance sheets, income statements, and cash flow 
statements. Amiram et al. (2015) prove that an introduction of errors in financial 
statements results in more divergences of first digits from Benford’s Law. The 
FSD_SCORE is also associated with earnings management, which makes this measure 
helpful to predict material accounting misstatements identified by accounting and 
auditing enforcement releases, or AAERs, issued by SEC. 
It is worthy to note that the term “errors” used in the paper of Amiram et al. (2015) 
(and in the thesis) has a slightly different meaning from that is defined by auditing 
standards (e.g., International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB), 
2010) in which errors result from unintentional acts, leading to misstatements of 
financial statements. From the auditing standard perspective, accounting 
misstatements include errors (unintentional) and frauds (intentional). In the work of 
Amiram et al. (2015), the term “errors” refers to irregularities of accounting data 
regardless of whether they are the results of intentional or unintentional acts. In other 
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words, the term “errors” used in that paper has a close meaning to “misstatements” 
used in the auditing standards. 
Similar to the approach of Amiram et al. (2015), Nigrini (2015) relies on the law of 
the first two digits to study the conformity to Benford’s Law of accounting data, stock 
prices and trading volumes of US companies. To capture deviations of the first two 
digits, Nigrini (2015) also uses the mean absolute deviations, which is the sum of the 
absolute difference between expected frequencies and actual frequencies of the first 
two digits divided by 90 (which is the number of possible two-digit combinations 
between 10 to 99). Comparing MAD with predetermined ranges of conformity, the 
author shows that distributions of the first two digits of accounting data, stock prices, 
and trading volumes closely conform to Benford’s Law. 
5.2.3. Accounting research on Benford’s Law in the UK 
There are relatively few accounting studies applying Benford’s Law in the UK. 
Caneghem (2002) and Caneghem (2004) find that there is an abnormally high (low) 
frequency of the second-digit 0s (9s) in income numbers, and these deviations of 
second-digit 0s (9s) from what is expected by Benford’s Law are statistically 
significant. Highly abnormal distributions do not exist in other second digits. This 
evidence is consistent with previous studies on rounding-up behaviour (Carslaw, 1988; 
Thomas, 1989; Niskanen and Keloharju, 2000; Caneghem, 2002).  
Caneghem (2002) attempt to explain the causes of deviations from Benford’s Law of 
earnings numbers. Using abnormal accruals as a proxy for earnings management, he 
252 
 
 
indicates that firms which are involved in the rounding up of earnings exhibit higher 
abnormal accruals. The evidence suggests that firms are likely to manage accruals to 
achieve targeted earnings and the introduction of earnings management results in 
significant variations of the second digits to Benford’s Law. The notion that earnings 
management is related to deviations from Benford’s Law is also supported by findings 
of Amiram et al. (2015). However, while Amiram et al. (2015) study the first digits of 
all figures reported in financial statements, Caneghem (2002) examines the 
distribution of the second digits of earnings numbers. 
In another research, Caneghem (2004) studies the effect of audit quality on deviation 
from Benford’s Law, which results from the rounding up of the second digits of 
earnings figures. He uses deviations of second-digit 0s and 9s of pre-tax earnings as a 
proxy for earnings management. Contrary to evidence on the effect of audit quality on 
earnings management (Krishnan, 2003), he finds that the abnormal distributions of 
second-digit 0s and 9s are not statistically significantly different between companies 
audited by the Big Four firms and companies audited by non–Big Four firms.  
Although some studies apply Benford’s Law to examine the accounting practices of 
UK listed companies (Caneghem, 2002, 2004), there are still fruitful areas for further 
research. First, prior research only focuses on the second digits of a specific item (such 
as pre-tax income). This line of study provides evidence that deviations of second 
digits from Benford’s Law are related to rounding-up behaviours (Caneghem, 2002, 
2004). In this study, I follow recent studies (e.g., Amiram et al., 2015) and focus on 
the first digits of all numbers reported in financial statements, including balance sheets, 
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income statements and cash flow statements because any item in financial statements 
could be managed. Under accounting standards, financial statements are prepared for 
general purposes (IASB, 2018), meaning that there may be various stakeholders who 
use financial statements, and different users may require different accounting 
information. Also, the standard setters’ view is that not only income statement items 
but also balance sheet (and cash flows) items are important. For example, definitions 
of incomes and expenses under accounting standards are based on definitions of assets 
and liabilities and changes in asset and liability values (IASB, 2018). This means that, 
in addition to income statement items, assets and liabilities in balance sheets are also 
important, and therefore they may be the target of accounting manipulation. By 
examining not only income statements but also balance sheets and cash flows 
statements, I give every item an equal chance for investigation. Second, previous 
studies applying Benford’s Law (Caneghem, 2002, 2004) require time series data or 
cross-sectional data for analyses, which can be costly for researchers. In this research, 
following Amiram et al. (2015), I use firm-year observations to calculate the deviations 
of the first digits of financial statement items from Benford’s Law. In the UK context, 
applying Benford’s Law to study errors or fraud in financial statements has even more 
potential because of the lack of data on earnings quality similar to that available in the 
US (such as accounting restatements enforced by the US Government Accountability 
Office or AAERs issued by the US Securities and Exchange Commission). 
5.2.4. Hypothesis development 
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First, similar to Amiram et al. (2015), who find that the first digits of financial 
statement items of US-listed companies follow Benford’s Law, I hypothesise that the 
first digits of financial statement items of UK companies conform to Benford’s Law 
at both the firm-specific and market levels. 
H1: Distributions of first digits of items reported in financial statements of UK listed 
companies follow Benford’s Law. 
In addition, previous studies show earnings management has an important implication 
for markets because earnings are used for equity valuation (Aharony, Lin, and Loeb, 
1993; Teoh et al., 1998a; Teoh et al., 1998b; DuCharme et al., 2001; Kim and Park, 
2005; Iqbal et al., 2009; Kao, Wu, and Yang, 2009; Iqbal and Strong, 2010). The 
consequence is that items in income statements are more likely to be manipulated than 
items in other types of statements because income and expense items affect net profit 
(earnings) directly. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that first-digit deviations of 
income statement items are larger than those of balance sheet items and cash flow 
items. This hypothesis is consistent with findings of Amiram et al. (2015), who also 
report larger deviations of income statement items than those of balance sheet items 
and cash flow items. 
H2: Deviations from Benford’s Law of the first digits of income statement items are 
larger than those of balance sheet items and cash flow items. 
Furthermore, previous studies suggest that deviations from Benford’s Law can be red 
flags signalling earnings management (Caneghem, 2002, 2004; Durtschi et al., 2004; 
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Amiram et al., 2015). Examining second digits, Caneghem (2002) indicates that firms 
which are involved in the rounding up of earnings exhibit higher abnormal accruals. 
The evidence suggests that firms are likely to manage accruals to achieve targeted 
earnings and the introduction of earnings management results in large variations of the 
second digits to Benford’s Law. Amiram et al. (2015) also explain that an introduction 
of errors, frauds or bias (such as earnings management) leads to higher divergence of 
digits in financial statements (Amiram et al., 2015).  
H3: Earnings management leads to an increase in first-digit deviations of financial 
statement items from Benford’s Law. 
While previous studies show that earnings management is a cause of deviations of 
financial statements from Benford’s Law, there have been few attempts to provide an 
alternative explanation for such deviations. Motivated by current debates on 
conditional conservatism (e.g., Mora and Walker, 2015), which is a type of accounting 
conservatism, I further examine whether it can be a source of the deviations from 
Benford’s Law.  
Mora and Walker (2015) explain that conditional conservatism is controversial 
because it facilitates earnings management practices, such as downward earnings 
management by recognising huge losses to create reserves for future use. Recently, 
Lin et al. (2014) use deviations of digits of quarterly net income from Benford’s Law 
as a measure of earnings management and find that firms with higher conservatism 
exhibit lower earnings management, but the findings also indicate that managers of 
firms with higher conservatism have more incentives to manipulate earnings in the 
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presence of institutional shareholders. This mixed evidence also contributes to the 
debates on whether conditional conservatism can introduce bias to financial 
statements. In this paper, I study deviations of first digits of all items reported in 
annual, rather than quarterly, financial statements to examine whether conditional 
conservatism is a source of deviations.  
There are also growing concerns that conditional conservatism is affected by 
purposeful interventions by management. Managers may choose to report to different 
levels of conservatism to deal with problems arising from information asymmetry 
between insiders and outsiders (LaFond and Watts, 2008) or to provide lenders with 
an assurance of timely signals of their creditworthiness to get benefits from lower 
interest rates (Zhang, 2008). Conservatism-related biases then cause first-digit 
deviations of financial statement items from Benford’s Law, since Amiram et al. 
(2015) have explained that deviations of digits from Benford’s Law could result from 
errors, fraud or biases in financial statements. Therefore, the last hypothesis is as 
follows. 
H4: Conditional conservatism which is caused by managers’ purposeful 
intervention leads to an increase in first-digit deviations of financial statement items 
from Benford’s Law. 
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5.3. Methodology 
5.3.1. Sample selection 
This research uses data of all companies listed on the London Stock Exchange from 
2005 to 2012. I download all financial statements items from the Datastream 
database,31 except for data on external auditors which is collected from Bloomberg 
and merged with the main dataset via the International Securities Identification 
Number (ISIN). Financial institutions and utility firms are removed. I replace missing 
values with 0s when calculating the distributions of first digits, but this approach does 
not affect the analysis because 0 cannot be a leading digit. I extract the first digits of 
financial statement items (including balance sheets, income statements and cash flow 
statements). For negative numbers, I use the first digit after the negative sign. For 
numbers from –1 to 1, I use the first non-zero digit. Finally, I remove observations 
with fewer than 50 total first digits because the inclusion of firms with few total first 
digits may introduce bias to the sample.32 As a result, I derive 10,048 firm-year 
                                                 
31 I acknowledge that some of our data is not ‘as reported’ because Datastream could make 
adjustments or aggregate some items when inputting the data to ensure comparability and 
consistency. The distribution of the first digits based on the original figures could therefore be 
different from the one based on adjusted figures.  
32 Amiram et al. (2015) indicate that firms with less than 50 first digits may be too young or 
not in continuing operations, therefore inclusion of those firms may cause measurement errors. 
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observations from 2005 to 2012 (1,839 unique companies) with 721,027 first digits. 
This sample is used to calculate measures of deviations from Benford’s Law for firm-
year observations and for the entire market to determine whether financial statement 
items of UK listed companies conform to Benford’s Law.  
I test hypotheses H3 and H4 using a sample of 3,633 firm-year observations with 
sufficient data to calculate empirical measures. All continuous variables are winsorised 
to the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
5.3.2. Measuring conformity and deviations from Benford’s Law 
Previous studies have documented that conformity to Benford’s Law can be tested for 
each digit or all digits. To test the conformity of each digit, prior research uses the chi-
square (𝜒2) test, which uses the z-statistic as the critical value (Carslaw, 1988; 
Thomas, 1989; Niskanen and Keloharju, 2000; Caneghem, 2002, 2004). To test the 
conformity of all digits, the existing literature suggests two methods: the Kolmogorov–
Smirnov (KS) test and the mean absolute deviation (MAD) test (Nigrini and 
Mittermaier, 1997; Amiram et al., 2015; Nigrini, 2015). For the purposes of this study, 
I used the KS test and the MAD test to provide evidence for hypotheses H1 and H2. 
The following part explains the KS test and the MAD test. 
The first test relies on the KS statistic, which uses the maximum deviation of digits 
from Benford’s Law (where the deviation is defined as the cumulative absolute 
difference between the observed and expected probabilities of each digit). The 
calculation of the KS statistic is as follows (Amiram et al., 2015): 
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Equation 5-5: KS statistic calculation 
𝐾𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥{|𝑂𝐷1,𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐸𝐷1|, |(𝑂𝐷1,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑂𝐷2,𝑖,𝑡) − (𝐸𝐷1
+ 𝐸𝐷2)|, … , |(𝑂𝐷1,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑂𝐷2,𝑖,𝑡 + ⋯ + 𝑂𝐷9,𝑖,𝑡) − (𝐸𝐷1 + 𝐸𝐷2 + ⋯
+ 𝐸𝐷9)|}         
Where 𝐾𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is the maximum cumulative absolute deviation of the first digits of items 
reported in financial statements from that expected by Benford’s Law of firm i in year 
t; 𝑂𝐷𝑑,𝑖,𝑡 is the cumulative observed probability of the first digit d (d = 1, 2, …, 9) of 
firm i in year t; 𝐸𝐷𝑑  is the expected probability of the first digit d (d = 1, 2, …, 9), as 
defined by Benford’s Law.  
The critical value (test value) used to test whether a data set conforms to Benford’s 
Law at the 5% level of significance is 1.36/√P, where P is the total number of first 
digits. If the KS statistic is less than the test value, the distribution of first digits 
conforms to Benford’s Law. 
Table 5-2 illustrates deviations of first digits of figures reported in financial statements 
for the fiscal year 2012 of M&C SAATCHI PLC from what are expected by Benford’s 
Law. Cumulative deviations are stated in column (b).  
Figure 5-1 also helps to visualise the cumulative deviations. In this illustration, the 
maximum absolute deviation (KS statistic) is 0.0196 and the test value is equal to 
1.36/√91 = 0.1426. Because KS statistic is less than the test value, the chapter 
cannot reject the null hypothesis that the distribution of the first digits follows 
Benford’s Law at the 5% level significance. This is evidence that the distribution of 
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first digits of figures reported in the financial statement of M&C SAATCHI PLC for 
the fiscal year 2012 conforms to Benford’s Law. 
Table 5-2: Deviation from Benford's Law of M&C SAATCHI PLC 
First 
digit 
Number 
of 
digits 
Mean absolute deviation (a)  Cumulative absolute deviation (b) 
Expected 
frequency 
Observed 
frequency 
Deviation  
Cumulative 
expected 
frequency 
Cumulative 
observed 
frequency 
Cumulative 
deviation 
1 26 0.3010 0.2857 0.0153  0.3010 0.2857 0.0153 
2 16 0.1761 0.1758 0.0003  0.4771 0.4615 0.0156 
3 11 0.1249 0.1209 0.0041  0.6021 0.5824 0.0196 
4 10 0.0969 0.1099 0.0130  0.6990 0.6923 0.0067 
5 8 0.0792 0.0879 0.0087  0.7782 0.7802 0.0021 
6 7 0.0670 0.0769 0.0100  0.8451 0.8571 0.0120 
7 3 0.0580 0.0330 0.0250  0.9031 0.8901 0.0130 
8 6 0.0512 0.0659 0.0148  0.9542 0.9560 0.0018 
9 4 0.0458 0.0440 0.0018  1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 
Total 91 1.0000 1.0000 0.0929         
Mean absolute deviation  0.0103     
Maximum absolute deviation         0.0196 
Note: the table reports mean absolute deviation (column a) and cumulative absolute deviation of first 
digits of figures reported in the financial statement (2012) of company M&C SAATCHI PLC. 
(Cumulative) expected frequency is (cumulative) distribution of the first digits following Benford’s 
Law. (Cumulative) observed frequency is (cumulative) actual distribution of the first digits. 
(Cumulative) deviation is (cumulative) absolute difference between observed and expected 
frequency. The bottom of the table shows mean absolute deviation and maximum absolute deviation. 
 
Figure 5-1: Cumulative absolute deviation of M&C SAATCHI PLC 
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The second test for conformity to Benford’s Law relies on the mean absolute deviation 
(MAD), where MAD is the sum of absolute differences between observed (actual) and 
expected frequencies of digits (Amiram et al., 2015; Nigrini, 2015). Regarding the first 
digits, FSD_SCORE, developed by Amiram et al. (2015), is calculated based on MAD 
as follows: 
Equation 5-6: FSD_SCORE calculation 
𝐹𝑆𝐷_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡 =
∑ |𝑂𝐵𝑆𝐸𝑅𝑉𝐸𝐷𝑑,𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐸𝐷𝑑|
9
𝑑=1
9
           
Where: 𝐹𝑆𝐷_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is the mean absolute deviation of the first digits of financial 
statement items from that expected by Benford’s Law of firm i in year t; 
𝑂𝐵𝑆𝐸𝑅𝑉𝐸𝐷𝑑,𝑖,𝑡 is the actual probability of the first digit d of firm i in year t; 
𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐸𝐷𝑑 is the expected probability of the first digit d following Benford’s Law; 
and d = 1, 2, …, 9. 
While there is no critical value for MAD, prior studies have suggested ranges of MAD 
values which indicate levels of first-digit conformity to Benford’s Law. Drake and 
Nigrini (2000) and Nigrini (2012) indicate that there are four levels of conformity of 
first digits: close conformity, acceptable conformity, marginally acceptable 
conformity, and non-conformity. Table 5-3 shows MAD conformity ranges suggested 
by Drake and Nigrini (2000) and Nigrini (2012). The chapter also relies on those 
suggested MAD range values to test first-digit conformity. 
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Table 5-3: MAD conformity ranges. 
MAD Conformity level 
from 0.000 to 0.004 close conformity 
from 0.004 to 0.008 acceptable conformity 
from 0.008 to 0.012 marginally acceptable conformity 
greater than 0.012 Nonconformity 
 
Regarding the example of M&C SAATCHI PLC above, as reported in column (a) of 
Table 5-2, the FSD_SCORE in 2012 is 0.0103. Figure 5-2 also helps to visualise the 
absolute deviations of M&C SAATCHI PLC. Because FSD_SCORE falls between 
0.008 and 0.012, this is evidence for the marginally acceptable conformity to 
Benford’s Law of the distribution of the first digits of figures reported in the financial 
statement for the fiscal year 2012 of M&C SAATCHI PLC.  
In this research, I use the KS for testing the conformity to Benford’s Law at the firm-
specific level and the FSD_SCORE for testing the conformity to Benford’s Law at the 
market level. While the KS test becomes sensitive when P (total number of first digits) 
is large because the test value is calculated based on P, the construction of 
FSD_SCORE based on MAD overcomes the drawback of the KS statistic (Amiram 
2015). For the firm-specific level test, I calculate deviations for each company using a 
pool of first digits from all available financial statements of that company during the 
research period. For the market level test, I calculate deviations using a pool of first 
digits of financial statements of all companies in the sample. At the market level, 
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because the population of first digits is significant, the MAD statistic is more 
appropriate than the KS statistic. 
Figure 5-2: Mean absolute deviations of M&C SAATCHI PLC 
 
 
5.3.3. Earnings management proxy 
Various models are used to estimate earnings management (Dechow et al., 2010). In 
this study, I apply the Modified Jones model (Jones, 1991; Dechow et al., 1995) to 
estimate abnormal accruals (DAC) because Peasnell et al. (2000b) find that it is the 
most effective model. I run the following regression with at least ten observations for 
each industry-year (Datastream level 6). 
Equation 5-7: Jones (1991) model 
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𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑡 is total accruals, which equals net income before extraordinary items, minus net 
cash flows from operations; 𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 is total assets of firm i at the end of year t–1; ∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 
is the change in sales from year t–1 to year t of firm i; 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is gross PPE of firm i at 
the end of year t.  
Using  ?̂?, ?̂?1, ?̂?2, ?̂?3, estimated from equation (4), I calculate DAC as follows: 
Equation 5-8: Dechow et al. (1995)'s model 
𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = |
𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
− [?̂? + ?̂?1 (
1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + ?̂?2 (
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 − ∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + ?̂?3  (
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
)]| 
Where: ∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡 is the change in receivables from the end of year t–1 to the end of year 
t of firm i. 
In this research, I follow previous studies (e.g., Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006; Jiang 
et al., 2010; Armstrong et al., 2013; Hilary et al., 2016) and use the absolute values for 
figures used in the practice of earnings management regardless of direction (upward 
or downward). The reason is that both upward and downward earnings management 
introduce biases to financial statements, therefore leading to greater first-digit 
divergence from that expected by Benford’s Law. 
5.3.4. Accounting conservatism proxy 
I follow the practice of Basu (1997) and Khan and Watts (2009) to estimate firm-year 
conditional conservatism. I first run the following regression for each year: 
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Equation 5-9: Khan and Watts (2009)'s model 
𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + (𝜇1 + 𝜇2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜇3𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜇4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1)𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 
(𝛾1 + 𝛾2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾3𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1)𝐷𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 
(𝛿1𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛿2𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛿3𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛿4𝐷𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛿5𝐷𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛿6𝐷𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡 is net income before extraordinary items in year t, scaled by the market value 
of equity at the end of year t–1; 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡 is buy-and-hold stock returns for fiscal year t; 
𝐷𝑖,𝑡 is a dummy variable either equal to 1 if 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡 < 0, otherwise it is equal to 0; 
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑖−1 is the natural log of the market value of equity at the end of year t–1; 
𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑖−1 is the market-to-book ratio at the end of year t–1; 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 is the sum of long-
term and short-term debts at the end of year t–1, scaled by the market value of equity 
at the end of year t–1. 
I then calculate empirical measures of the timeliness of good news (𝐺𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸) and the 
incremental timeliness of bad news over good news (𝐶𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸) based on firm 
characteristics as follows: 33 
                                                 
33 In this research, I used lagged values of firm characteristics while Khan and Watts (2009) 
use values at the end of current year. Because earnings are figures for an entire year, firms can 
rely on financial conditions at the beginning of the year to determine needed levels of 
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Equation 5-10: Calculation of GSCORE and CSCORE 
𝐺𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽3 = 𝜇1 + 𝜇2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜇3𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜇4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 
𝐶𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽4 = 𝛾1 + 𝛾2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾3𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 
CSCORE is the measure of conditional conservatism, which I use to calculate the 
average of CSCORE across years t–2, t–1 and t. I then calculate the annual fractional 
rank of conditional conservatism, denoted CSCORE_RANK, by ranking the average 
values of CSCORE for all observations by year and then dividing the ranked values by 
N+1 (where N is the total number of observations in each year). I use ranked values 
because they help to mitigate concerns about nonlinearity and measurement errors 
(García Lara et al., 2016; Goh et al., 2017). 
5.3.5. Multivariate regression 
To provide evidence for hypotheses H3 and H4, I run the following regression: 
Equation 5-11: Main regression 
𝐾𝑆𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸_𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐹𝑅𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆 +  𝜀 
                                                 
conservatism for the year. The use of lagged values of firm characteristics is supported by Ball 
et al. (2013a) and applied by Banker et al. (2012). 
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In the model, I include two control variables, losses in previous years (LOSS) and risk 
of fraud (FRAUD) (Amiram et al., 2015). 𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is equal to 1 if net incomes before 
extraordinary items in years t–2 and t–1 are both negative, 0 otherwise. 𝐹𝑅𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑖,𝑡 is 
calculated based on FSCORE following Dechow et al. (2011) (Model 1, Table 7). 
𝐹𝑅𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑖,𝑡 is equal to 1 if FSCORE is greater than 1, otherwise 0. FSCORE is 
calculated as follows: 
Equation 5-12: Calculation of fraud score following Dechow et al. (2011) 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
=  −7.893 +  0.790 ∗ 𝐴𝐶𝐶_𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑇 +  2.581 ∗ ∆𝑅𝐸𝐶 +  1.191
∗ ∆𝐼𝑁𝑉 +  1.979 ∗ 𝑆𝑂𝐹𝑇𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇 +  0.171 ∗ ∆𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻 −  0.932
∗ ∆𝑅𝑂𝐴 +  1.029 ∗ 𝑆𝐸𝑂  
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 =  
𝑒𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
1 + 𝑒𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
 
𝐹𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸 =  
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
0.0037
     
Where: The value of 𝑒 =  2.71828183; 𝐴𝐶𝐶_𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑇 is change in non-cash net 
operating assets following Richardson et al. (2005),34 scaled by total assets at the end 
                                                 
34 ACC_RSST = (chWC + ChNCO + ChFIN)/ATt–1; where: 
▪ ChWC = WCt – WCt–1= [(ACTt - CHEt) - (LCTt - DLCt)] - [(ACTt–1 - CHEt–1) - (LCTt–
1 - DLCt–1)]; ACT is current assets, CHE is cash and cash equivalent, LCT is current 
liabilities, DLC is short term debts and current portions of long term debts. 
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of year t–1; ∆𝑅𝐸𝐶 is changes in receivables from year t–1 to year t, scaled by total 
assets at the end of year t–1; ∆𝐼𝑁𝑉 is changes in inventories from year t–1 to year t, 
scaled by total assets at the end of year t–1; 𝑆𝑂𝐹𝑇𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇 is soft assets in year t–1 
(total assets minus cash and cash equivalent minus net PPE, scaled by total assets at 
the end of year t–1); ∆𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻 is changes in cash and cash equivalent scaled by total 
assets at the end of year t–1; ∆𝑅𝑂𝐴 is return on assets in year t minus return on assets 
in year t–1, where return on assets equals net income divided by total assets; SEO is 
actual equity issuance, which equals 1 if change in common share capital is greater 
than 5% and proceeds from issuance is greater than 0, otherwise 0. 
I expect that 𝛽1 would be positive and significant (hypothesis H3) and that 𝛽2 would 
positive and significant (hypothesis H4). I also expect 𝛽3 and 𝛽4 to be positive and 
significant because losses and high risk of fraud may cause an increase in deviations 
from Benford’s Law (Amiram et al., 2015). 
                                                 
▪ ChNCO = NCOt - NCOt–1 = [(ATt - ACTt - INVSTt) - (LTt - LCTt - DLTTt)] - [(ATt–
1 - ACTt–1 - INVSTt–1) - (LTt–1 - LCTt–1 - DLTTt–1)]; INVST is total investments; LT 
is total liabilities, DLTT is long term debts. 
▪ ChFIN = FINt - FINt–1 = [(STINVSTt + LTINVSTt) - (LTt + LTDEBTCt + 
PRESTOCKt)] - [(STINVSTt–1 + LTINVSTt–1) - (LTt–1 + LTDEBTCt–1 + 
PRESTOCKt–1)]; STINVST is short-term investments, LTINVST is long-term 
investments, LTDEBTC is current portion of long term debts, PRESTOCK is 
preferred stock. 
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5.4. Findings and discussions 
5.4.1. Descriptive statistics and correlations 
Table 5-4 reports descriptive statistics of firm characteristics and selected variables. 
Firm characteristics are broadly similar to those used in prior research, which uses 
similar data (Goh and Gupta, 2016). At first glance, KS values are higher than 
FSD_SCORE in all aspects (MEAN, STD, MEDIAN, MAX, MIN, P25 and P75). The 
reason is that while KS values are calculated based on maximum cumulative absolute 
differences between expected and actual distributions of the first digits of financial 
statement items, whereas FSD_SCORE is calculated based on mean absolute 
differences. Also, in Table 5-4, the mean of abnormal accruals is 0.080, indicating that 
on average, earnings are managed by 8% of opening total assets. The descriptive 
statistics also indicate that the sample has fewer firms with losses in two consecutive 
years (median of LOSS is 0) and has fewer firms with a high risk of fraud (median of 
FRAUD is 0).  
Table 5-5 shows the correlations of selected variables. The findings indicate that 
correlation coefficients between independent variables are very small (less than 0.2) 
and even insignificant (in italics), suggesting that multicollinearity is not a significant 
concern. 
5.4.1. Evidence on the conformity of first digits to Benford’s Law 
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As discussed above, there are two tests for conformity of the first digits of financial 
statement items to Benford’s Law: the KS test and the MAD test. I rely on the KS 
statistic for conformity at the firm-specific level and on MAD test for conformity at 
the market level. 
5.4.1.1. Conformity at the firm-specific level 
Table 5-6 reports findings of the KS test of conformity at the firm-specific level. I 
observe that the percentage of firm-year observations following Benford’s Law is 
90.86%. This conformity ratio is slightly higher than the conformity ratio of US 
companies for the period from 2001 to 2011, which is 85.63% (Amiram et al., 2015, 
page 1584).  
To have a closer look at the conformity of first digits of financial statements, I analyse 
distributions of first digits by year and by industry. Table 5-7 reports findings of the 
conformity by year. The table indicates that the conformity rates level off around 91%, 
suggesting that financial statements of UK listed companies maintained high levels of 
conformity for at least the eight-year research period. Also, Table 5-8 reports the 
conformity to Benford’s Law at the firm-specific level for each industry. The evidence 
shows that the conformity rate is very high, varying between 82% to 100% (with one 
exception of 71%). In general, those figures reinforce the above evidence that UK-
listed companies conform to Benford’s Law at the firm-specific level. 
271 
 
 
5.4.1.1. Conformity to Benford’s Law at the market level 
For conformity to Benford’s Law at the market level, I rely on the MAD test. As 
explained above, the MAD test is more appropriate for large pools of first digits 
because this test is not affected by the number of first digits used.  
 
 
 
Table 5-9 report findings of the MAD test. The table shows that the aggregate 
FSD_SCORE for the entire market of listed companies in the UK from 2005 to 2012 
is 0.0010, which is similar to that of companies listed in the US, as reported by Amiram 
et al. (2015). 35 The small aggregate FSD_SCORE falls within the first predetermined 
range (from 0.000 to 0.004) of conformity suggested by previous studies (Drake and 
Nigrini, 2000; Nigrini, 2012). The results indicate that distributions of first digits 
closely conform to Benford’s Law. As shown in  
Figure 5-3, distributions of first digits of UK listed companies perfectly match with 
the expectations of Benford’s Law, suggesting close conformity. 
Table 5-11 reports FSD_SCORE by industry. The findings show that the UK market 
maintains a low FSD_SCORE for each industry, meaning high levels of conformity. 
In particular, in 81 industries, there are 32 industries with conformity level A (close 
                                                 
35 In the US, Amiram et al. (2015) report that the aggregate FSD_SCORE of listed companies 
in US from 2001 to 2011 is 0.0009. 
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conformity), 32 industries with conformity level B, 9 industries with conformity level 
C (marginally acceptable conformity), and only 8 industries with conformity level D 
(non-conformity). The evidence supports the findings above that, in general, first digits 
of UK listed companies follow Benford’s Law at the market level. 
In general, the evidence reported in Section 5.4.1.1 and 5.4.1.1 support the Hypothesis 
H1 that the first digits of financial statement items of UK listed companies conform to 
Benford’s Law, at the firm-specific and at market levels. The results are similar to 
what are reported by Amiram et al. (2015) using a sample of US data. 
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Table 5-4: Descriptive statistics 
Variables N MEAN STD MEDIAN MIN MAX P25 P75 
ATi,t 3635  1,020,420   3,612,198   120,127   276   50,806,224   36,874   530,592  
Salei,t 3635  818,674   2,559,972   121,071  0   41,591,430   26,067   549,600  
Net income before extraordinary 
itemsi,t 
3635 
 71,504   403,825  4,677  - 1,425,847  6,893,275   491   28,200  
Debt to assets ratioi,t 3635 0.315 0.999 0.131 0.000 46.609 0.007 0.355 
Market to book ratioi,t 3635 4.039 20.544 2.084 0.083 1080.851 1.251 3.566 
FSD_SCOREi,t 3635 0.032 0.010 0.031 0.009 0.088 0.025 0.037 
KSi,t 3635 0.089 0.039 0.082 0.012 0.307 0.061 0.111 
DACi,t 3635 0.080 0.128 0.049 0.000 2.776 0.023 0.095 
CSCORE_RANKi,t 3635 0.502 0.281 0.501 0.001 0.999 0.263 0.744 
LOSSi,t 3635 0.153 0.360 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 
FRAUDi,t 3635 0.102 0.303 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Note: Table reports the number of observations (N), mean (MEAN), standard deviation (STD), median (MEDIAN), minimum (MIN), maximum (MAX), 
25th (P25), and 75th (P75) percentiles of firm characteristics and selected variables. Definitions of variables are in the Appendix. 
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Table 5-5: Correlations 
Variable   1 2 3 4 5 6 
FSD_SCOREi,t 1 1.000      
KSi,t 2 0.727 1.000     
DACi,t 3 0.127 0.091 1.000    
CSCORE_RANKi,t 4 0.065 0.058 0.019 1.000   
LOSSi,t 5 0.238 0.197 0.192 0.059 1.000  
FRAUDi,t 6 0.061 0.031 0.109 0.042 0.081 1.000 
Note: The table reports the Pearson correlation coefficients between selected variables. The values reported in italic indicate the corresponding 
coefficients are not significant at 5% level. Definitions of variables are in the Appendix. 
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Table 5-6: Aggregate conformity to Benford's Law (based on KS values) at the firm-
specific level 
 Number of firm-year 
observations 
Percentage  
Conformity 
                             
9,130  90.86%  
Non-Conformity  918  9.14%  
Total  10,048  100.00%  
       
Note: Table reports findings of KS tests for aggregate conformity to Benford’s Law of 
first digits of financial statement items of UK listed companies from 2005 to 2012.  
 
 
Table 5-7: Conformity to Benford's Law (based on KS values) at the firm-specific level, 
by year 
Year 
Number of firm-year 
observations 
Number of 
conformity 
Percentage 
2005 1544 1368 88.60% 
2006 1535 1397 91.01% 
2007 1447 1309 90.46% 
2008 1311 1205 91.91% 
2009 1182 1084 91.71% 
2010 1086 999 91.99% 
2011 1009 922 91.38% 
2012 934 846 90.58% 
Note: Table reports findings of KS tests for conformity to Benford’s Law by year of 
first digits of financial statement items of UK listed companies from 2005 to 2012.  
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Table 5-8: Conformity to Benford's Law (based on KS values) at the firm-specific level, 
by industry 
Industry 
Number of firm-
year observations 
Number of 
conformity 
Percentage 
Aerospace 58 55 95% 
Airlines 38 37 97% 
Alternative Fuels 74 66 89% 
Apparel Retailers 115 103 90% 
Auto Parts 56 52 93% 
Biotechnology 232 198 85% 
Brewers 11 11 100% 
Broadcast 250 213 85% 
Broadline Retailers 71 67 94% 
Building Material and fixtures 171 152 89% 
Bus Train and Employment 272 247 91% 
Business Support Services 970 915 94% 
Clothing and Accessory 111 104 94% 
Coal 88 73 83% 
Commercial Vehicles and 
Trucks 32 31 97% 
Commodity Chemicals 1 1 100% 
Computer Hardware 60 51 85% 
Computer Services 307 291 95% 
Consumer Electronics 24 22 92% 
Containers and Package 75 72 96% 
Defense 49 48 98% 
Delivery Services 9 9 100% 
Diamonds and Gemstones 70 61 87% 
Distillers and Vintners 21 20 95% 
Diversified Industrials 26 25 96% 
Drug Retailers 7 7 100% 
Durable Household Products 27 26 96% 
Electrical Office Equipment 4 4 100% 
Electrical Equipment 194 173 89% 
Electronic Equipment 164 151 92% 
Exploration and Production 601 511 85% 
Farming and Fishing 77 67 87% 
Financial Administration 25 24 96% 
Fixed Line 
Telecommunication 101 94 93% 
Food Products 187 176 94% 
Food Retail - Wholesale 79 73 92% 
Forestry 7 5 71% 
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Industry 
Number of firm-
year observations 
Number of 
conformity 
Percentage 
Furnishings 73 73 100% 
Gambling 135 117 87% 
General Mining 423 355 84% 
Gold Mining 230 188 82% 
Healthcare Providers 95 90 95% 
Heavy Construction 134 123 92% 
Home Construction 102 99 97% 
Home Improvement Retailers 58 58 100% 
Hotels 47 41 87% 
Industrial Machinery 294 273 93% 
Industrial Suppliers 152 148 97% 
Integrated Oil and Gas 19 18 95% 
Internet 92 84 91% 
Iron and Steel 40 37 93% 
Marine Transportation 27 23 85% 
Media Agencies 326 304 93% 
Medical Equipment 169 155 92% 
Medical Supplies 75 72 96% 
Mobile Telecommunication 97 88 91% 
Nondurable Household 
Product 31 31 100% 
Nonferrous Metals 53 46 87% 
Oil Equipment and Services 126 122 97% 
Paper 19 17 89% 
Personal Products 29 27 93% 
Pharmaceuticals 248 208 84% 
Platinum and Precious Metal 37 31 84% 
Publishing 177 165 93% 
Railroads 2 2 100% 
Recreational Products 24 19 79% 
Recreational Services 160 149 93% 
Renewable Energy 
Equipment 30 26 87% 
Restaurants and Bars 200 184 92% 
Semiconductors 85 79 93% 
Soft Drinks 27 27 100% 
Software 686 621 91% 
Specialized Consumer Service 44 36 82% 
Specialty Chemicals 145 132 91% 
Specialty Retailers 203 188 93% 
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Industry 
Number of firm-
year observations 
Number of 
conformity 
Percentage 
Telecommunication 
Equipment 116 105 91% 
Tobacco 18 18 100% 
Toys 42 40 95% 
Transport Services 155 144 93% 
Travel and Tourism 89 85 96% 
Waste, Disposal Services 50 47 94% 
Note: Table reports findings of KS tests for conformity to Benford’s Law by industry 
(Datastream’s level 6 code) of first digits of financial statement items of UK listed 
companies from 2005 to 2012.  
 
Table 5-10 reports FSD_SCORE by years. When calculating FSD_SCORE separately 
for each year, the findings show that the UK market maintains a low FSD_SCORE 
from 2005 to 2012, ranging from 0.0012 to 0.0015.36 Based on the MAD conformity 
range values suggested by previous studies (Drake and Nigrini, 2000; Nigrini, 2012), 
this is evidence that first digits of UK-listed companies closely conform to Benford’s 
Law when tested separately by year.  Figure 5-4 helps to visualise deviations of first 
digits by year.  
                                                 
36 It is noted that the aggregate FSD_SCORE reported in  
 
 
Table 5-9 (0.0010) is calculated based on the whole sample from 2005 to 2012. It means that 
the pool of first digits to calculate the aggregate FSD_SCORE for the market is larger than the 
pools of first digits used to calculate FSD_SCORE for each year.  
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Table 5-9: Aggregate conformity to Benford’s Law at the market level 
First digit 
Number of the first 
digits 
Expected frequency Observed frequency Deviation 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) 
1        218,700  0.3010 0.3033 0.0023 
2        127,672  0.1761 0.1771 0.0010 
3          90,719  0.1249 0.1258 0.0009 
4          69,400  0.0969 0.0963 0.0007 
5          57,485  0.0792 0.0797 0.0005 
6          47,424  0.0670 0.0658 0.0012 
7          41,411  0.0580 0.0574 0.0006 
8          36,185  0.0512 0.0502 0.0010 
9          32,031  0.0458 0.0444 0.0013 
Total        721,027  1.0000 1.0000 0.0094 
FSD_SCORE       0.0010 
Note: the table reports the aggregate FSD_SCORE of UK listed companies for the period from 2005 to 
2012. The table shows the first digits being analysed, expected frequencies of the first digits following 
Benford’s Law, observed (actual) frequencies of the first digits, deviations of the first digits from 
Benford’s Law, where deviations are defined as the absolute values of the observed frequencies minus 
the expected frequencies. FSD_SCORE is the sum of all deviations divided by nine. Definitions of 
variables are in the Appendix. 
 
Figure 5-3: Aggregate deviations of the first digits of UK listed companies (2005-
2012) 
 
Note: the figure shows the expected and observed (actual) distributions of the first digits of financial 
statements of UK listed companies (2005-2012). The expected frequency is the theoretical distributions 
of the first digits following Benford’s Law. The observed frequency is the observed (actual) 
distributions of the first digits in the sample. The deviation is defined as the absolute value of the 
observed frequency minus the expected frequency. 
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Table 5-10: FSD_SCORE by year 
Year Number of first digits 
Number of firm-year 
observations 
FSD_SCORE 
2005        107,950            1,544  0.0012 
2006        108,288            1,535  0.0012 
2007        103,418            1,447  0.0014 
2008          94,830            1,311  0.0015 
2009          85,496            1,182  0.0012 
2010          78,604            1,086  0.0013 
2011          73,720            1,009  0.0014 
2012          68,721               934  0.0014 
Note: The table reports FSD_SCORE by year of all firms in the research period from 
2005 to 2012. 
 
 
 
Figure 5-4: Visualisation of FSD_SCORE, by year 
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Table 5-11: FSD_SCORE by industry 
Industry 
Number 
of first 
digits 
Number of 
firm-year 
observations 
FSD_SCO
RE 
Conformity 
level 
Aerospace 4,986 58 0.0040 A 
Airlines 3,053 38 0.0036 A 
Alternative Fuels 4,648 74 0.0042 B 
Apparel Retailers 8,629 115 0.0041 B 
Auto Parts 3,883 56 0.0085 C 
Biotechnology 14,745 232 0.0024 A 
Brewers 1,061 11 0.0098 C 
Broadcast 16,605 250 0.0029 A 
Broadline Retailers 5,506 71 0.0044 B 
Building Material and 
fixtures 12,541 171 0.0041 B 
Bus Train and Employment 18,768 272 0.0018 A 
Business Support Services 73,930 970 0.0023 A 
Clothing and Accessory 7,838 111 0.0028 A 
Coal 4,959 88 0.0036 A 
Commercial Vehicles and 
Trucks 2,540 32 0.0039 A 
Commodity Chemicals 99 1 0.0269 D 
Computer Hardware 4,388 60 0.0075 B 
Computer Services 22,192 307 0.0013 A 
Consumer Electronics 1,759 24 0.0090 C 
Containers and Package 5,920 75 0.0060 B 
Defense 4,395 49 0.0043 B 
Delivery Services 689 9 0.0148 D 
Diamonds and Gemstones 4,408 70 0.0083 C 
Distillers and Vintners 1,644 21 0.0063 B 
Diversified Industrials 2,356 26 0.0073 B 
Drug Retailers 525 7 0.0119 C 
Durable Household 
Products 2,118 27 0.0077 B 
Electrical Office Equipment 295 4 0.0122 D 
Electrical Equipment 14,159 194 0.0036 A 
Electronic Equipment 12,296 164 0.0028 A 
Exploration and Production 36,199 601 0.0017 A 
Farming and Fishing 5,468 77 0.0067 B 
Financial Administration 1,743 25 0.0077 B 
Fixed Line 
Telecommunication 7,546 101 0.0041 B 
Food Products 15,172 187 0.0040 A 
Food Retail - Wholesale 6,266 79 0.0050 B 
Forestry 278 7 0.0142 D 
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Industry 
Number 
of first 
digits 
Number of 
firm-year 
observations 
FSD_SCO
RE 
Conformity 
level 
Furnishings 5,461 73 0.0091 C 
Gambling 9,422 135 0.0033 A 
General Mining 27,627 423 0.0025 A 
Gold Mining 14,559 230 0.0019 A 
Healthcare Providers 6,998 95 0.0034 A 
Heavy Construction 10,225 134 0.0051 B 
Home Construction 7,717 102 0.0046 B 
Home Improvement 
Retailers 4,332 58 0.0044 B 
Hotels 3,166 47 0.0064 B 
Industrial Machinery 22,795 294 0.0026 A 
Industrial Suppliers 12,174 152 0.0023 A 
Integrated Oil and Gas 1,954 19 0.0086 C 
Internet 5,740 92 0.0045 B 
Iron and Steel 3,024 40 0.0068 B 
Marine Transportation 1,734 27 0.0089 C 
Media Agencies 23,652 326 0.0019 A 
Medical Equipment 11,564 169 0.0036 A 
Medical Supplies 5,364 75 0.0034 A 
Mobile Telecommunication 6,260 97 0.0035 A 
Nondurable Household 
Product 2,675 31 0.0031 A 
Nonferrous Metals 2,877 53 0.0060 B 
Oil Equipment and Services 9,981 126 0.0028 A 
Paper 1,690 19 0.0173 D 
Personal Products 2,052 29 0.0071 B 
Pharmaceuticals 17,794 248 0.0053 B 
Platinum and Precious 
Metal 2,157 37 0.0071 B 
Publishing 14,385 177 0.0022 A 
Railroads 137 2 0.0286 D 
Recreational Products 1,863 24 0.0127 D 
Recreational Services 11,206 160 0.0035 A 
Renewable Energy 
Equipment 1,921 30 0.0095 C 
Restaurants and Bars 15,198 200 0.0029 A 
Semiconductors 6,043 85 0.0057 B 
Soft Drinks 2,163 27 0.0143 D 
Software 45,406 686 0.0014 A 
Specialized Consumer 
Service 3,088 44 0.0057 B 
Specialty Chemicals 10,955 145 0.0028 A 
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Industry 
Number 
of first 
digits 
Number of 
firm-year 
observations 
FSD_SCO
RE 
Conformity 
level 
Specialty Retailers 15,777 203 0.0040 B 
Telecommunication 
Equipment 8,407 116 0.0030 A 
Tobacco 1,737 18 0.0073 B 
Toys 3,084 42 0.0056 B 
Transport Services 12,111 155 0.0041 B 
Travel and Tourism 7,411 89 0.0051 B 
Waste, Disposal Services 3,534 50 0.0042 B 
Note: The table reports FSD_SCORE by industry (Datastream’s level 6 code) of all firms in the research 
period from 2005 to 2012. Four conformity levels are based on previous studies (Drake and Nigrini, 
2000; Nigrini, 2012): close conformity (A), acceptable conformity (B), marginally acceptable 
conformity (C), and Nonconformity (D). 
 
5.4.1.2. Conformity to Benford’s Law by each component of financial 
statements 
To provide evidence for the hypothesis H2, I analyse deviations from Benford’s Law 
by each component of financial statements, namely income statements, balance sheets, 
and cash flow statements. Similar to the tests for the whole sample at the market level, 
I rely on FSD_SCORE, which is based on MAD, calculated for each component of 
financial statements. 
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Table 5-12 reports the results of the MAD test for income statements (Panel A), 
balance sheets (Panel B), and cash flow statements (Panel C). I find that the 
FSD_SCORE for income statement items, balance sheet items and cash flow items are 
0.0014, 0.0009 and 0.0011, respectively. Those small figures also indicate that first 
digits of separate components of financial statements also closely conform to 
Benford’s Law.  Figure 5-5 helps to visualise the deviations of the first digits and 
FSD_SCORE of each statement. Importantly, I find that FSD_SCORE of income 
statement items are larger than those of balance sheets and cash flow statements, 
suggesting that income statements may contain more errors. In general, the findings 
support the Hypothesis H2 that deviations from Benford’s Law of the first digits of 
income statement items are larger than those of balance sheet items and cash flow 
items. 
Figure 5-5: Visualisation of deviations from Benford's Law by statements 
 
Note: the figure shows the expected and observed (actual) distributions of the first digits of financial 
statements of UK listed companies (2005-2012), by components of financial statements. The expected 
frequency is the theoretical distributions of the first digits following Benford’s Law. 
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Table 5-12: Conformity to Benford’s Law at the market level, by statements 
Panel A: Income statement    
First digit 
Number of the 
first digits 
Expected 
frequency 
Observed 
frequency 
Deviation 
1 52,970 0.3010 0.3047 0.0037 
2 30,657 0.1761 0.1764 0.0003 
3 21,958 0.1249 0.1263 0.0014 
4 16,610 0.0969 0.0956 0.0014 
5 13,897 0.0792 0.0799 0.0008 
6 11,425 0.0670 0.0657 0.0012 
7 10,120 0.0580 0.0582 0.0002 
8 8,639 0.0512 0.0497 0.0015 
9 7,546 0.0458 0.0434 0.0023 
Total 173,822 1.0000 1.0000 0.0127 
FSD_SCORE    0.0014 
          
Panel B: Balance sheet 
First digit 
Number of the 
first digits 
Expected 
frequency 
Observed 
frequency 
Deviation 
1 101,811 0.3010 0.3032 0.0022 
2 59,444 0.1761 0.1770 0.0010 
3 42,247 0.1249 0.1258 0.0009 
4 32,215 0.0969 0.0959 0.0010 
5 26,590 0.0792 0.0792 0.0000 
6 22,019 0.0670 0.0656 0.0014 
7 19,404 0.0580 0.0578 0.0002 
8 17,007 0.0512 0.0507 0.0005 
9 15,013 0.0458 0.0447 0.0010 
Total 335,750 1.0000 1.0000 0.0081 
FSD_SCORE    0.0009 
          
Panel C: Cash flow statement    
First digit 
Number of the 
first digits 
Expected 
frequency 
Observed 
frequency 
Deviation 
1 63919 0.3010 0.3023 0.0013 
2 37571 0.1761 0.1777 0.0016 
3 26514 0.1249 0.1254 0.0004 
4 20575 0.0969 0.0973 0.0004 
5 16998 0.0792 0.0804 0.0012 
6 13980 0.0670 0.0661 0.0008 
7 11887 0.0580 0.0562 0.0018 
8 10539 0.0512 0.0498 0.0013 
9 9472 0.0458 0.0448 0.0010 
Total 211,455 1.0000 1.0000 0.0098 
FSD_SCORE    0.0011 
Note: the table reports the aggregate FSD_SCORE of UK listed companies for the period from 2005 to 2012 
by income statements (Panel A), balance sheets (Panel B), and cash flow statements (Panel C). The table 
shows the first digits being analysed, expected frequencies of the first digits following Benford’s Law, 
observed (actual) frequencies of the first digits, deviations of the first digits from Benford’s Law, where 
deviations are defined as the absolute values of the observed frequencies minus the expected frequencies. 
Definitions of variables are in the Appendix.  
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5.4.2. Multivariate regression results 
Table 5-13 reports findings of Equation 5-11, where independent variables include 
abnormal accruals (column a), conditional conservatism (column b) and both abnormal 
accruals and conditional conservatism (column c). Regarding control variables, I find 
that KS is higher for firms with losses in two consecutive years (LOSS = 1) and firms 
with a higher risk of fraud (FRAUD = 1). This evidence is consistent with prior studies 
(e.g., Amiram et al., 2015). I now turn to the key variables of interest. I find that KS is 
positively associated with abnormal accruals (columns a and c), which is a proxy for 
earnings management. The association is statistically significant. The findings support 
hypothesis H3 that earnings management is a source of deviations of first digits. This 
is consistent with the notion that earnings management causes deviations of digits of 
accounting numbers from Benford’s Law (Caneghem, 2002, 2004; Durtschi et al., 
2004; Amiram et al., 2015). The reason may be that, when earnings are managed, the 
first digits of financial statement items deviate from expectations following Benford’s 
Law. Thus, higher abnormal accruals are associated with larger KS. In column c, the 
evidence shows that one unit increase in abnormal accruals is associated with an 
increase of 0.011028 in KS. Given that the mean of KS is 0.089 (as reported in Table 
5-4) when abnormal accruals increase by one unit, KS increases by 12.34% 
(=0.011028/0.089), which is non-trivial. Thus, the association between KS and 
abnormal accruals is significant in economic terms. The evidence supports the 
hypothesis H3 that earnings management is a source of deviations of first digits of 
financial statement items. 
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Also in Table 5-13, columns (b) and (c), I find that CSCORE_RANK leads to an 
increase in KS. The effect is statistically significant at the 1% level. The relationship 
between CSCORE_RANK and KS is also significant in economic terms. For example, 
in column c, I observe that one unit increase in conditional conservatism is associated 
with an increase of 0.012486 in KS, which accounts for 14.02% of KS 
(=0.012486/0.089). In general, the evidence supports the hypothesis H4 that 
conditional conservatism is a source of first-digit deviations. The findings are 
supported by previous studies that conditional conservatism introduces biases, which 
causes first digits to deviate from Benford’s Law because it can be manipulated by 
managers (LaFond and Watts, 2008; Zhang, 2008; Mora and Walker, 2015).  
5.4.3. Robustness tests 
5.4.3.1. An alternative measure of deviations from Benford’s Law 
To check whether the findings for hypotheses H3 and H4 are robust, I replace KS with 
FSD_SCORE in Equation 5-11. As discussed above, whereas FSD_SCORE is 
calculated based on the mean of absolute differences between actual frequencies and 
expected frequencies of first digits following Benford’s Law, the KS value is 
calculated based on maximum cumulative absolute differences. The two measures, 
therefore, reinforce each other by capturing a different dimension of the deviation of 
first digits from Benford’s Law. I re-run the Equation 5-11 with FSD_SCORE as the 
dependent variable. 
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Table 5-14 reports findings with FSD_SCORE as the alternative measure of deviations 
from Benford’s Law. The evidence shows that FSD_SCORE is also positively 
associated with earnings management and conditional conservatism. These 
relationships are statistically significant at 1% level. In terms of economic 
significance, in column c, the evidence shows that one unit increase in abnormal 
accruals is associated with an increase of 0.004604 in FSD_SCORE. Given that the 
mean of FSD_SCORE is 0.032 (as reported in Table 5-4) when abnormal accruals 
increase by one unit, FSD_SCORE increases by 14.39% (=0.004604/0.032), which is 
non-trivial. Also, I observe that one unit increase in conditional conservatism is 
associated with an increase of 0.004174 in FSD_SCORE, which accounts for 13.04% 
of KS (=0.004174/0.032). In general, the evidence is very similar to the main findings 
reported in Table 5-13 above, supporting hypotheses H3 and H4.
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Table 5-13: Determinants of KS values 
  (a)   (b)   (c) 
  Coefficient t-statistic  Coefficient t-statistic  Coefficient t-statistic 
DCAi,t 1.2506* 2.40     1.1028* 2.12 
CSCORE_RANKi,t    1.2763*** 5.33  1.2486*** 5.21 
LOSSi,t 1.6987*** 8.71  1.5738*** 8.03  1.5230*** 7.72 
FRAUDi,t -0.0489 -0.30  -0.0689 -0.42  -0.1105 -0.67 
Constant 0.0914*** 20.27  0.0851*** 18.23  0.0848*** 18.18 
Year fixed effects Yes   Yes   Yes  
Industry fixed effects Yes   Yes   Yes  
Observations 3633   3633   3633  
Adjusted R2 0.0567   0.0626   0.0635  
Note: Column (a) reports findings of the following regressions: 𝐾𝑆𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑅𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆 +
𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆 +  𝜀.  
Column (b) reports findings of the following regressions: 𝐾𝑆𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸_𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑅𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑖,𝑡 +
𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆 +  𝜀. 
Column (c) reports findings of the following regressions: 𝐾𝑆𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸_𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐹𝑅𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑖,𝑡 +
𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆 +  𝜀. 
All coefficients are multiplied by 100 for easy reading. Definitions of variables are in the Appendix. *, **, *** are significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively.  
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Table 5-14: Determinants of FSD_SCORE 
  (a)   (b)   (c) 
  Coefficient 
t-
statistic  Coefficient 
t-
statistic  Coefficient 
t-
statistic 
DCAi,t 0.5098*** 3.97     0.4604*** 3.61 
CSCORE_RANKi,t    0.4289*** 7.30  0.4174*** 7.10 
LOSSi,t 0.5184*** 10.82  0.4809*** 10.01  0.4597*** 9.51 
FRAUDi,t 0.0086 0.21  0.0054 0.14  -0.0120 -0.30 
Constant 0.0326*** 29.43  0.0305*** 26.66  0.0304*** 26.61 
Year fixed effects Yes   Yes   Yes  
Industry fixed effects Yes   Yes   Yes  
Observations 3633   3633   3633  
Adjusted R2 0.0868   0.0963   0.0993  
Note: Column (a) reports findings of the following regressions: 𝐹𝑆𝐷_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑅𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑖,𝑡 +
𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆 +  𝜀.  
Column (b) reports findings of the following regressions: 𝐹𝑆𝐷_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸_𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽3𝐹𝑅𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆 +  𝜀. 
Column (c) reports findings of the following regressions: 𝐹𝑆𝐷_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸_𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽3𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐹𝑅𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆 +  𝜀. 
All coefficients are multiplied by 100 for easy reading. Definitions of variables are in the Appendix. *, **, *** are significance 
at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.  
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5.4.3.2. Alternative measures of conditional conservatism 
The main measure of firm-year conditional conservatism is CSCORE_RANK, which 
is based on the timeliness of bad news over good news (CSCORE) following Khan and 
Watts (2009). To check whether the findings are robust, I estimate total conditional 
conservatism following García Lara et al. (2016), which is also based on GSCORE 
and CSCORE obtained from Equation 5-10. In particular, I add 𝐺𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸 and 𝐶𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸 
together for each company in each year, and I refer to the new variable as 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆. After 
that, I calculate the average of 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆 across years t-2, t-1, and t (denoted 𝑎𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑖,𝑡); 
then rank 𝑎𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑖,𝑡 of all firms for each year; and divide the rank values by N+1, 
where N is the total observations in each rank group. I refer to the new variable as the 
annual fractional rank of total conditional conservatism, denoted 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆_𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑖,𝑡. 
𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆_𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑖,𝑡 also ranges from 0 to 1, and a higher 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆_𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑖,𝑡 indicates higher 
total conditional conservatism.37 
I re-run Equation 5-11 where CSCORE_RANK is replaced by CONS_RANK as the 
measure of conditional conservatism. Table 5-15 and  
Table 5-16 report the findings of regressions when KS and KSD_SCORE are used as 
the dependent variable, respectively. The evidence shows that CONS_RANK has a 
positive and statistically significant impact on KS and FSD_SCORE. In general, using 
this alternative measure of conditional conservatism, I find broadly similar evidence 
with main findings reported above.  
                                                 
37 The validity test of this measure is provided in Chapter 5, section 5.3.4. 
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Table 5-15: Alternative measure of conservatism: CONS_RANK and KS 
    (a)   (b) 
    Coefficient t-statistic   Coefficient t-statistic 
DCA     1.1078* 2.13 
CONS_RANK  1.2964*** 5.43  1.2702*** 5.32 
LOSS  1.5627*** 7.97  1.5116*** 7.65 
FRAUD  -0.0515 -0.32  -0.0937 -0.57 
Constant  0.0849*** 18.18  0.0846*** 18.13 
Year fixed effects  Yes   Yes  
Industry fixed effects  Yes   Yes  
Observations  3633   3633  
Adjusted R2   0.0629     0.0638   
Note: Column (a) reports findings of the following regressions: 𝐾𝑆𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆_𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽2𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑅𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆 +  𝜀. 
Column (b) reports findings of the following regressions: 𝐾𝑆𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆_𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽3𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐹𝑅𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆 +  𝜀. 
All coefficients are multiplied by 100 for easy reading. Definitions of variables are in the Appendix. *, 
**, *** are significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
 
Table 5-16: Alternative measure of conservatism: CONS_RANK and FSD_SCORE 
    (a)   (b) 
    Coefficient t-statistic   Coefficient t-statistic 
DCAi,t     0.4629*** 3.63 
CONS_RANKi,t  0.4289*** 7.33  0.4179*** 7.14 
LOSSi,t  0.4782*** 9.94  0.4569*** 9.44 
FRAUDi,t  0.0115 0.29  -0.0061 -0.15 
Constant  0.0305*** 26.63  0.0304*** 26.57 
Year fixed effects  Yes   Yes  
Industry fixed effects  Yes   Yes  
Observations  3633   3633  
Adjusted R2   0.0964   0.0994  
Note: Column (a) reports findings of the following regressions: 𝐹𝑆𝐷_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛼 +
𝛽1𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆_𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑅𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆 +
𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆 +  𝜀. 
Column (b) reports findings of the following regressions: 𝐹𝑆𝐷_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽2𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆_𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐹𝑅𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆 +
𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆 +  𝜀. 
All coefficients are multiplied by 100 for easy reading. Definitions of variables are in the Appendix. *, 
**, *** are significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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5.4.3.3. Purposeful-intervention conservatism 
I acknowledge that the measure of conditional conservatism (CSCORE_RANK) may 
capture both neutral application/selection of accounting choices and purposeful 
intervention by management, while H4 predicts that the Benford’s-law deviation is 
more likely to be led by the latter, not the former. To disentangle the effect of the two 
components of CSCORE_RANK on KS, I rely on the presence of the Big Four auditors. 
I argue that Big Four auditors would effectively remove a significant part of the 
conditional conservatism induced by managers’ purposeful intervention. Therefore, I 
create a dummy which turns on if a firm is audited by one of the Big Four auditors 
(denoted BIG4) and interact it with CSCORE_RANK. The model now becomes: 
Equation 5-13: Modelling the effect of conservatism-related purposeful intervention 
by management on deviations from Benford’s Law 
𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡  
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸_𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐵𝐼𝐺4𝑖,𝑡
∗ 𝐶𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸_𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐹𝑅𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐵𝐼𝐺4𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆 +  𝜀 
Where: 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡 can be 𝐾𝑆𝑖,𝑡 and 𝐹𝑆𝐷_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡 (used as substitutes). 𝐵𝐼𝐺4𝑖,𝑡 
is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if a firm is audited by a Big Four auditor, and 
zero otherwise. In this model, the coefficient on CSCORE_RANK (𝛽2) indicates the 
effect of conditional conservatism on first-digit deviations from Benford’s Law when 
there is an absence of Big Four auditors. There is evidence that Big Four auditors 
provide better audit quality which helps to mitigate accounting manipulations in 
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financial statements (Becker et al., 1998b; Krishnan, 2003), the coefficient 𝛽2 most 
likely captures the effect of conservatism on first-digit deviations caused by purposeful 
intervention by management in the absence of Big Four auditors. Also, the coefficient 
on the interaction term BIG4*CSCORE_RANK (𝛽3) indicates the incremental effect of 
conservatism on first-digit deviations when there is a presence of Big Four auditors, 
that is when purposeful intervention by management is less likely to exist. 
Table 5-17 reports the findings of Equation 5-13. The coefficient on BIG4 standing 
alone is negative and statistically significant, suggesting that Big Four auditors help to 
mitigate biases in financial statements, which supports the prior literature that Big Four 
auditors help reduce earnings management (Becker et al., 1998b; Krishnan, 2003). The 
table also shows that the coefficient on the interaction term BIG4*CSCORE_RANK is 
negative but not significant. It suggests that conditional conservatism which occurs 
naturally as a result of selecting and applying accounting policies required by financial 
reporting standards does not cause financial statements to deviate from the distribution 
predicted by Benford’s Law. Meanwhile, the coefficient on CSCORE_RANK is still 
positive and statistically significant, indicating that conditional conservatism has a 
positive impact on first-digit deviations from Benford’s Law in the absence of Big 
Four auditors, i.e. when the conservatism is more likely to be the results of purposeful 
intervention by the managers. The evidence, in general, suggests hypothesis H4 cannot 
be rejected. 
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Table 5-17: Purposeful-intervention conditional conservatism (CSCORE_RANK) 
  FSD_SCORE (a)  KS (b) 
  Coefficient t-statistic  Coefficient t-statistic 
DCA 0.4106** 3.2307  0.9413 1.8096 
CSCORE_RANK 0.3743*** 3.7201  0.9516* 2.3107 
BIG4*CSCORE_RAN
K -0.1210 -0.9838  -0.1458 -0.2895 
LOSS 0.4429*** 9.1972  1.4734*** 7.4760 
FRAUD -0.0318 -0.7958  -0.1735 -1.0594 
BIG4 -0.1600* -2.0820  -0.6512* -2.0705 
Constant 0.0319*** 24.9805  0.0906*** 17.3369 
Year fixed effects Yes   Yes  
Industry fixed effects Yes   Yes  
Observations 3633   3633  
Adjusted R2 0.1096   0.0698  
Column (a) reports findings of the following regression: 𝐹𝑆𝐷_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽2𝐶𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸_𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐵𝐼𝐺4𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸_𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐹𝑅𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐵𝐼𝐺4𝑖,𝑡 +
𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆 +  𝜀 
(b) reports findings of the following regression: 𝐾𝑆𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸_𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽3𝐵𝐼𝐺4𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸_𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐹𝑅𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐵𝐼𝐺4𝑖,𝑡 +
𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆 +  𝜀 
All coefficients are multiplied by 100 for easy reading. Definitions of variables are in the Appendix. *, 
**, *** are significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.   
 
 
Table 5-18 reports the findings of Equation 5-13 where the measure of conservatism 
is CONS_RANK (total conditional conservatism). The evidence also shows that the 
coefficient on the interaction term BIG4*CONS_RANK is negative but not significant 
while the coefficient on CSCORE_RANK is positive and statistically significant. The 
findings are in line with the notion that conditional conservatism has a positive impact 
on first-digit deviations from Benford’s Law in the absence of Big Four auditors, that 
is when managers are more likely to affect the choice of conservative accounting 
policies. The evidence also suggests hypothesis H4 cannot be rejected. 
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Table 5-18: Purposeful-intervention total conservatism (CONS_RANK) 
  FSD_SCORE (a)  KS (b) 
  Coefficient t-statistic  Coefficient t-statistic 
DCAi,t 0.4110** 3.2343  0.9402 1.8080 
CONS_RANKi,t 0.3415*** 3.4372  0.9284* 2.2831 
BIG4i,t*CONS_RANKi,t -0.0579 -0.4751  -0.0349 -0.0699 
LOSSi,t 0.4406*** 9.1402  1.4624*** 7.4123 
FRAUDi,t -0.0279 -0.6973  -0.1628 -0.9951 
BIG4i,t -0.1973** -2.6021  -0.7147* -2.3035 
Constant 0.0321*** 25.2064  0.0908*** 17.4115 
Year fixed effects Yes   Yes  
Industry fixed effects Yes   Yes  
Observations 3633   3633  
Adjusted R2 0.1099   0.0702  
Column (a) reports findings of the following regression: 𝐹𝑆𝐷_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽2𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆_𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐵𝐼𝐺4𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆_𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐹𝑅𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐵𝐼𝐺4𝑖,𝑡 +
𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆 +  𝜀 
(b) reports findings of the following regression: 𝐾𝑆𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆_𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽3𝐵𝐼𝐺4𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆_𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐹𝑅𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐵𝐼𝐺4𝑖,𝑡 +
𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆 +  𝜀 
All coefficients are multiplied by 100 for easy reading. Definitions of variables are in the Appendix. *, 
**, *** are significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.   
 
5.4.3.4. Unconditional conservatism 
The last test was to examine whether there is a relationship between deviations from 
Benford’s Law and unconditional conservatism. As CSCORE_RANK is a news-
dependent measure, or conditional conservatism, I follow Givoly and Hayn (2000) and 
Ahmed and Duellman (2013) to measure unconditional conservatism by estimating the 
difference between skewness of cash flows and skewness of earnings (SKEWNESS). 
Under conservative accounting practice, earnings tend to have a negative skewness 
because of downwards in book values of assets. The variable SKEWNESS is calculated 
as follows: 
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Equation 5-14: Skewness of earnings following Givoly and Hayn (2000) 
𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊𝑁𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 =
(𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 − 𝜇𝐶𝐹𝑂,𝑖,𝑡)
3
(𝛿𝐶𝐹𝑂,𝑖,𝑡)
3 −
(𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡 − 𝜇𝑁𝐼,𝑖,𝑡)
3
(𝛿𝑁𝐼,𝑖,𝑡)
3  
Where: 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 is cash flows from operations of firm i in year t and 𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡 is net income 
of firms i in year t, all scaled by total assets in year t-1. 𝜇𝐶𝐹𝑂,𝑖,𝑡 and 𝜇𝑁𝐼,𝑖,𝑡 are the mean 
of cash flows from operations and net incomes, respectively, of firm i over a five-year 
period from year t-4 to year t. 𝛿𝐶𝐹𝑂,𝑖,𝑡 and 𝛿𝑁𝐼,𝑖,𝑡 are the standard deviations of cash 
flows from operations and net incomes, respectively, of firm i over a five-year period 
from year t-4 to year t. Similar to CSCORE_RANK, I calculated the annual fractional 
rank of skewness, denoted SKEWNESS_RANK, by ranking SKEWNESS for all 
observations by year and then dividing the ranked values by N+1 (where N is total 
number of observations in each year). A higher SKEWNESS_RANK indicates higher 
conservatism. 
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Table 5-19 and Table 5-20 report the findings of regressions between deviations from 
Benford’s Law and unconditional conservatism. The coefficients on 
SKEWNESS_RANK are mixed and not significant. In general, I do not find evidence 
on the effect of unconditional conservatism on deviations of first-digit deviations from 
Benford’s Law. 
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Table 5-19: SKEWNESS_RANK and KS 
    (b)  (c) 
    Coefficient t-statistic  Coefficient t-statistic 
DCAi,t     1.2687* 2.38 
SKEWNESS_RANKi,t  0.0081 0.04  0.0209 0.10 
LOSSi,t  1.8025*** 9.14  1.7411*** 8.76 
FRAUDi,t  0.0456 0.28  -0.0011 -0.01 
Constant  0.0920*** 19.76  0.0914*** 19.64 
Year fixed effects  Yes   Yes  
Industry fixed effects  Yes   Yes  
Observations  3590   3590  
Adjusted R2   0.0543   0.0556  
Note: Column (a) reports findings of the following regressions: 𝐾𝑆𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊𝑁𝐸𝑆𝑆_𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽2𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑅𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆 +  𝜀. 
Column (b) reports findings of the following regressions: 𝐾𝑆𝑖,𝑡   = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊𝑁𝐸𝑆𝑆_𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽3𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐹𝑅𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆 +  𝜀. 
All coefficients are multiplied by 100 for easy reading. Definitions of variables are in the Appendix. *, **, *** are 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.   
 
 
Table 5-20: SKEWNESS_RANK and FSD_SCORE 
    (b)  (c) 
    Coefficient t-statistic  Coefficient t-statistic 
DCAi,t     0.5270*** 4.04 
SKEWNESS_RANKi,t  -0.0402 -0.76  -0.0349 -0.66 
LOSSi,t  0.5436*** 11.26  0.5181*** 10.66 
FRAUDi,t  0.0431 1.07  0.0237 0.58 
Constant  0.0331*** 29.09  0.0329*** 28.93 
Year fixed effects  Yes   Yes  
Industry fixed effects  Yes   Yes  
Observations  3590   3590  
Adjusted R2   0.0795   0.0834  
Note: Column (a) reports findings of the following regressions: 𝐹𝑆𝐷_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊𝑁𝐸𝑆𝑆_𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽2𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑅𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆 +  𝜀. 
Column (b) reports findings of the following regressions: 𝐹𝑆𝐷_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡   = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽2𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊𝑁𝐸𝑆𝑆_𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐹𝑅𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆 +
𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆 +  𝜀. 
All coefficients are multiplied by 100 for easy reading. Definitions of variables are in the Appendix. *, **, *** are 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.   
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5.5. Conclusions 
In this research, I apply Benford’s Law to study distributions of the first digits of 
financial statement items of UK listed companies. At the firm-specific level, I find that 
the percentage of firm-year observations conforming to Benford’s Law is 90.86%. At 
the market level, the evidence shows that the financial statements of all firms closely 
conform to Benford’s Law. The first digits of separate components of financial 
statements (income statements, balance sheets and cash flow statements) also closely 
conform to Benford’s Law. Deviations of first digits of income statement items are 
larger than those of balance sheet items and cash flow items, suggesting that income 
statements contain more errors. Also consistent with the hypothesis, the results 
indicate that earnings management and conditional conservatism are two sources of 
deviations of first digits from Benford’s Law. 
This research makes the following contributions to the literature. First, this research 
examines the first digits of all items as against what is more common in existing 
literature in this area. Secondly, it utilised the financial statements of UK listed 
companies. As compared with previous studies in the UK which also apply Benford’s 
Law (Caneghem, 2002, 2004), as the study demonstrated the use only firm-year 
observations as against time-series or cross-sectional data. Second, this research 
uniquely provides an alternative explanation for deviations of digits from Benford’s 
Law. Previous studies argue that digits of accounting numbers deviate from the law of 
distributions because of an introduction of frauds, errors or biases, such as earnings 
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management (Caneghem, 2004; Amiram et al., 2015). The findings show that 
conditional conservatism also increases first-digit deviations. The results have 
implications for practitioners, especially auditors. First, auditors should be more 
cautious with income statement items, such as revenues and expenses, because the 
evidence shows that income statement items are more likely to deviate from Benford’s 
Law. Second, auditors should pay more attention to conservatism-related items such 
as impairment losses and inventory written-off because they can be manipulated by 
managers. 
However, a limitation of the paper is that I mainly employ Datastream’s adjusted data, 
not “as reported” data. I randomly checked 10 randomly-selected firms included in the 
FTSE 100 index at the end of 2012 by downloading their original financial statements 
and compare the first digits reported on those statements with my sample. I find a 
small discrepancy (less than 5%). While the discrepancy is not too worrying, it does 
suggest a potential problem, and I invite future research to address that more 
thoroughly. 
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Appendix 3: Variable definitions for Chapter 5  
CSCORE_RANKi,t Annual factional rank of conditional conservatism, based 
on Basu (1997) and Khan and Watts (2009). 
CONS_RANKi,t Annual fractional rank of the three-year average of total 
conditional conservatism (García Lara et al., 2016), where 
total conditional conservatism is the sum of the timeliness 
of good news (GSCORE) and the asymmetric timeliness 
of bad news over good news (CSCORE) estimated by the 
model of Khan and Watts (2009), which is based on Basu 
(1997). I calculate the average of total conditional 
conservatism across years t-2, t-1, and t (denoted 
𝑎𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑖,𝑡); then rank 𝑎𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑖,𝑡 of all firms for each year; 
and divide the rank values by N+1, where N is the total 
observations in each rank group. I refer to the new variable 
as the annual fractional rank of total conditional 
conservatism. 
SKEWNESS_RANKi,t A measure of unconditional conservatism, which is the 
annual fractional rank of the difference between skewness 
of cash flows and skewness of earnings (SKEWNESS). 
Where SKEWNESS is calculated following Givoly and 
Hayn (2000) and Ahmed and Duellman (2013) as follows: 
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𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊𝑁𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 =
(𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 − 𝜇𝐶𝐹𝑂,𝑖,𝑡)
3
(𝛿𝐶𝐹𝑂,𝑖,𝑡)
3
−
(𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡 − 𝜇𝑁𝐼,𝑖,𝑡)
3
(𝛿𝑁𝐼,𝑖,𝑡)
3  
Where: 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 is cash flows from operations of firm i in 
year t and 𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡 is net income of firms i in year t, all scaled 
by total assets in year t-1. 𝜇𝐶𝐹𝑂,𝑖,𝑡 and 𝜇𝑁𝐼,𝑖,𝑡 are the mean 
of cash flows from operations and net incomes, 
respectively, of firm i over a five-year period from year t-
4 to year t. 𝛿𝐶𝐹𝑂,𝑖,𝑡 and 𝛿𝑁𝐼,𝑖,𝑡 are the standard deviations 
of cash flows from operations and net incomes, 
respectively, of firm i over a five-year period from year t-
4 to year t. 
DACi,t DACi,t = |
ACi,t
Ai,t−1
− [α̂ + β̂1 (
1
Ai,t−1
) + β̂2 (
∆REVi,t−∆RECi,t
Ai,t−1
) +
β̂3  (
PPEi,t
Ai,t−1
)]|; 
Where α̂, β̂1, β̂2, β̂3 are estimated from the following 
equation with at least ten observations for each industry-
year (Datastream level-six).  
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ACi,t
Ai,t−1
= α + β1 (
1
Ai,t−1
) + β2 (
∆REVi,t
Ai,t−1
) + β3  (
PPEi,t
Ai,t−1
) +
εi,t          
Where ACi,t is total accruals which equals to net income 
before extraordinary items minus net cash flows from 
operations; Ai,t−1 is total assets of firm i at the end of year 
t–1; ∆REVi,t and ∆RECi,t are change in sales and change in 
receivables from year t–1 to year t of firm i, respectively; 
PPEi,t is gross PPE of firm i at the end of year t.  
FSD_SCOREi,t FSD_SCOREi,t
=
∑ |OBSERVEDd,i,t − EXPECTEDd|
9
d=1
9
           
Where: FSD_SCOREi,t is the mean absolute deviation of 
the first digits of financial statement items from Benford’s 
Law of firm i in year t; OBSERVEDd,i,t is the actual 
probability of the first digit d of firm i in year t; 
EXPECTEDd is the expected probability of the first digit d 
following Benford’s Law; and d = 1, 2, …, 9. 
KSi,t KSi,t = max{|OD1,i,t − ED1|, |(OD1,i,t + OD2,i,t) − (ED1
+ ED2)|, … , |(OD1,i,t + OD2,i,t + ⋯
+ OD9,i,t) − (ED1 + ED2 + ⋯ + ED9)|} 
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Where KSi,t is maximum cumulative absolute deviation of 
the first digits of figures reported in financial statements 
from what are expected by Benford’s Law of firm i in year 
t; ODd,i,t is the cumulative observed probability of the first 
digit d (d = 1, 2, …, 9) of firm i in year t; EDd is the 
expected probability of the first digit d (d = 1, 2, …, 9) as 
defined by Benford’s Law. 
FRAUDi,t equal to one if FSCORE is greater than one, zero 
otherwise; where FSCORE is calculated as follows: 
Predicted Value
=  −7.893 +  0.790 ∗ ACC_RSST
+  2.581 ∗ ∆REC +  1.191 ∗ ∆INV 
+  1.979 ∗ SOFTASSET  +   0.171
∗ ∆CASH −  0.932 ∗ ∆ROA +  1.029
∗ SEO  
Probability =  
ePredicted Value
1 + ePredicted Value
 
FSCORE =  
Probability
0.0037
     
Where: e =  2.71828183; ACC_RSST is change in non-cash 
net operating assets following Richardson et al. (2005), scaled 
by total assets at the end of year t-1; ACC_RSST = (chWC + 
ChNCO + ChFIN)/ATt-1;  
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where:  
ChWC = WCt – WCt-1= [(ACTt - CHEt) - (LCTt - DLCt)] - 
[(ACTt-1 - CHEt-1) - (LCTt-1 - DLCt-1)]; ACT is current assets, 
CHE is cash and cash equivalent, LCT is current liabilities, 
DLC is short term debts and current portions of long term 
debts. 
ChNCO = NCOt - NCOt-1 = [(ATt - ACTt -  INVSTt) - (LTt - 
LCTt - DLTTt)] - [(ATt-1 - ACTt-1 -  INVSTt-1) - (LTt-1 - LCTt-
1 - DLTTt-1)]; INVST is total investments; LT is total 
liabilities, DLTT is long term debts. 
ChFIN = FINt - FINt-1 = [(STINVSTt + LTINVSTt) - (LTt + 
LTDEBTCt + PRESTOCKt)] - [(STINVSTt-1 + LTINVSTt-1) 
- (LTt-1 + LTDEBTCt-1 + PRESTOCKt-1)]; STINVST is short-
term investments, LTINVST is long-term investments, 
LTDEBTC is current portion of long term debts, PRESTOCK 
is preferred stock. 
∆REC is changes in receivables from year t-1 to year t, 
scaled by total assets at the end of year t-1; ∆INV is 
changes in inventories from year t-1 to year t, scaled by 
total assets at the end of year t-1; SOFTASSET is soft assets 
in year t-1 (total assets minus cash and cash equivalent 
minus net PPE, scaled by total assets at the end of year t-
1); ∆CASH is changes in cash and cash equivalent scaled 
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by total assets at the end of year t-1; ∆ROA is return on 
assets in year t minus return on assets in year t-1, where 
return on assets are equal net income divided by total 
assets; SEO is actual equity issuance, which is equal one 
if change in common share capital is greater than 5% and 
proceed from issuance is greater than 0, zero otherwise. 
LOSSi,t equal to one if net incomes before extraordinary items in 
year t-2 and year t-1 are both negative, zero otherwise. 
BIG4i,t Big Four auditor, which is a dummy variable with a value 
of one if a firm is audited by a Big Four auditor, and zero 
otherwise. 
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6. Chapter 6: CONCLUDING CHAPTER 
In most accounting scandals, managers inflated earnings, up to four years, prior to the 
collapses of companies (e.g., García Lara, Garcia Osma, et al., 2009). Levitt Jr (1998) 
refers this phenomenon as “the numbers game”. Following the accounting scandals in 
the 2000s and the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) in the US in 2002, a growing 
number of researchers have focussed on earnings quality (Dechow et al., 2010), 
developing, validating, and improving models to estimate earnings quality (e.g., Jones, 
1991; Dechow et al., 1995; Dechow and Dichev, 2002; Kothari et al., 2005; 
Roychowdhury, 2006)  to provide practitioners with tools which can provide early 
signals of accounting manipulations at firm levels.  
The thesis contributes to the research strand on earnings quality by employing recent 
methodologies to study the earnings quality of listed companies in the United Kingdom 
(UK). In the UK, the Financial Reporting Review Panel (FRRP) releases firm specific 
announcements for investigation of allegations of accounting standards, but the sample 
is very small. For example, Nguyen (2016) documents that there are only 70 cases of 
accounting allegations from 01/1995 and 12/2012. The lack of exposed accounting 
manipulations, which are similar to accounting restatements and AAER in the US, 
makes studies on earnings quality using recent methodological developments even 
more relevant. Building on recent research in the field, the thesis offers a new way to 
study earnings quality by using chief executive officers’ personal traits which are more 
likely to link with accounting manipulations activities. Also, the thesis employs 
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Benford’s Law, which relies on distributional probabilities of first digits of financial 
statement items (Amiram et al., 2015), to examine biases and sources of biases in 
financial statements of UK listed companies. Another focus of the thesis is using 
working history in the banking industry of individual directors on the boards of 
directors to study accounting conservatism, an aspect of earnings quality. 
The thesis has three independent empirical chapters. Section 6.1 briefly introduces the 
main findings and contributions of each chapter, while Section 6.2 explains the 
limitations of the thesis and suggests new directions for future research. 
6.1. The main findings and contributions of the thesis 
In the first empirical chapter, I offer a new way to study earnings quality by focusing 
on the profile of chief executive officers (CEO). Specifically, I construct a measure of 
CEO profile, namely PSCORE, which embraces various aspect of CEO characteristics 
linked to earnings quality, including financial expertise (e.g., Aier et al., 2005), 
reputation (Milbourn, 2003; Francis et al., 2008; Jian and Lee, 2011), internal power 
(Dechow et al., 1996; Feng et al., 2011), and age (Huang et al., 2012; Ali and Zhang, 
2015). Using a sample of 3,395 firm-year observations of listed companies at the 
London Stock Exchange from 2005 to 2012, I show that the PSCORE is positively 
related to three different types of measures of earnings quality: accrual earnings 
management, measured by abnormal accruals (Jones, 1991; Dechow et al., 1995; 
Peasnell et al., 2000b); (ii) real earnings management, measured by abnormal cash 
flows, abnormal production costs, abnormal discretionary expenditures (real earnings 
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management) (Roychowdhury, 2006); (iii) financial statement errors, measured by 
deviations of first digits of figures reported in financial statements from what are 
expected by Benford’s Law (Amiram et al., 2015; Nigrini, 2015). Further analysis 
indicates that the positive associations between PSCORE and proxies for earnings 
quality are more pronounced when CEOs have higher equity-based compensation 
incentives. The results suggest that PSCORE could signal the quality of earnings 
reported in financial statements.  
This study makes some significant contributions to the literature. The chapter 
introduces a new way to study earnings quality, by looking at the curriculum vitae of 
CEOs which are publicly available. It is more likely that PSCORE could help to 
overcome limitations of model-based approaches which require time-series or cross-
sectional data and other problems associated with empirical models such as poor 
specifications. Also, the chapter suggests that PSCORE can signal poor earnings 
quality in individual firms, regardless of whether it results from accruals 
manipulations, restructuring of actual business transactions, or errors. Misstated 
financial statements, regardless of causes, may have an impact on the “true” picture of 
the financial performance of companies. Therefore, the PSCORE can provide 
practitioners with a tool to assess the quality of earnings, e.g. they can pick up cases 
when reported earnings may not reflect the fundamental performance of firms because 
it may contain biases (earnings management) or errors. 
In the second empirical chapter, I offer an innovative way to study accounting 
conservatism by measuring the accumulated banking expertise of individual members 
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on the boards of directors. I measure banking expertise of boards of directors by taking 
into account the numbers of years and the number of banks an individual director has 
worked for. Using a sample of UK listed companies, the findings support the 
hypothesis that banking expertise on the board helps to reduce accounting 
conservatism, which is documented in recent years as costly for firms. In particular, I 
find the amount of banking expertise has a negative impact on firm-year accounting 
conservatism (Basu, 1997; Khan and Watts, 2009; García Lara et al., 2016), and the 
impact becomes more pronounced for firms with high financial leverage and for firms 
with high bankruptcy risk. The chapter suggests two explanations for the findings. 
First, directors with banking expertise would have an information advantage about the 
market-level demand for accounting conservatism so that they can help non-financial 
firms avoid excessive conservatism. Second, directors with banking expertise can 
provide firms with an interpersonal network (e.g., Engelberg et al., 2012) in the 
banking industry which can act as a private channel for debt contacting, leading to a 
reduction in demand for accounting conservatism as a debt monitoring mechanism.  
The chapter makes significant contributions to the literature. The study complements 
the work of Erkens et al. (2014) and Bonetti et al. (2017) by focusing on the role of 
the link between banks and non-financial firms on corporate practices, e.g. accounting 
conservatism. While previous studies examine how the presence of affiliated bankers 
on the board (Erkens et al., 2014) or non-affiliated bankers on the board (Bonetti et al., 
2017) affect accounting conservatism, this chapter considers working history in the 
banking industry of individual directors. That is because not only the presence of a 
312 
 
 
banker affects accounting conservatism, but life-time working experience in the 
banking industry can make a difference. Also, the findings could be more generalised 
compared with the previous studies because there is no restriction in the sample 
selection, e.g. there is no requirement for existence of a lending contract between 
affiliated banks and firms.  
In the third empirical chapter, I apply Benford’s Law, a law of distributions of first 
digits (Nigrini, 1996; Amiram et al., 2015; Nigrini, 2015), to study earnings quality in 
the context of UK. I find that the first digits of UK listed companies conform to 
Benford’s Law at firm-specific and market levels. The findings indicate that income 
statements exhibit higher deviations of first digits of financial statements from 
Benford’s Law than those of the balance sheets and cash flow statements. The evidence 
suggests that income statements contain more biases, e.g. earnings management, or 
errors. Also, I find that earnings management and conditional conservatism are two 
explanations for deviations. The relationship between deviations of first digits from 
Benford’s Law and conditional conservatism exists only when there is an absence of 
a Big-Four auditor. The evidence implies that conservatism-related purposeful 
intervention by management causes biases in financial statements, which are more 
likely to exist in the absence of Big-Four auditor, and this causes the deviations of first 
digits. 
The chapter contributes to the existing literature in several ways. This is the first study  
to apply Benford’s Law in analysing the first digits of all items in the financial 
statements of UK listed companies. The approach applying Benford’s Law on all 
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financial statement items (Erkens et al., 2014) overcomes the limitations of previous 
studies (Caneghem, 2002, 2004) which focus on only an individual item in financial 
statements such as earnings before tax. The approach has at least three major 
advantages because (i) it gives a chance to detect errors or fraud in assets, liabilities, 
incomes, expenses and cash flows, (ii) it makes errors and fraud are more likely to be 
detected due to double-entry accounting system, and (iii) it can flag up errors or frauds 
in accounts which do not directly affect net income. Also, the paper adds to the findings 
of Caneghem (2002) and Caneghem (2004) by showing that earnings management is 
a source of deviations from Benford’s Law. However, as explained above, while 
Caneghem (2002) and Caneghem (2004) rely on one item in financial statements (pre-
tax income), the chapter uses a recent methodology (Amiram et al., 2015; Nigrini, 
2015) which relies on first digits of all items reported in financial statements. Next, 
the chapter is the first study which provides an alternative explanation for deviations 
of first digits. Previous studies document that deviations of first digits are linked to 
earnings management (Carslaw, 1988; Caneghem, 2002, 2004; Amiram et al., 2015), 
the chapter shows that conditional conservatism is also a source of deviations because 
it may introduce biases to financial statements, which in turn lead to higher deviations. 
6.2. Limitations of the thesis and suggestions for future research 
Although the thesis has done a significant amount of work, the thesis has some 
limitations due to limited time and resources. I will explain the limitations and suggest 
directions for future research separately for each empirical chapter as follows. 
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Regarding Chapter 3, the construction of the PSCORE has some limitations. It does 
not include some CEO characteristics which have been documented in previous studies 
as being linked to earnings quality. For example, Barua et al. (2010) find that the 
gender of directors affects earnings management, while Hilary et al. (2016) find that 
marital status also has an impact. There are other potential candidates for the 
construction of PSCORE such as facial masculinity (Jia et al., 2014), narcissism 
(Capalbo et al., 2018),  overconfidence (Ahmed and Duellman, 2013), managing style 
(Bertrand and Schoar, 2003), managerial ability (Demerjian et al., 2013), vocal tone 
optimism (Davis et al., 2015), origin (Kuang et al., 2014), and personal life behaviours 
such as having criminal record or using luxury goods (Davidson et al., 2015). Future 
research might consider developing an even more complicated tool which takes into 
account more CEO characteristics to study earnings quality.  
In addition, another limitation is the construction of the PSCORE relies on the use of 
an equally-weighted binary variable. Although the simple method is employed in 
previous research to construct an index (Nguyen, 2016) and is applied in some 
influential studies (Piotroski, 2000; Mohanram, 2005), there is still room for further 
improvement. One direction for future research is that it may build a weighted index 
(Beneish, 1999; Dechow et al., 2011). The weighted index takes into account the 
possibility that each factor may have different weight on earnings quality. Another 
direction is that future research should consider constructing a single index based on 
the component of the principal component analysis. For example, Florackis and 
Sainani (2018) uses the first component of the principal component analysis to create 
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a single index for chief executive officers’ characteristics and study it with cash 
holdings. Other studies use the principal component analysis to construct a single 
index for corporate governance (Larcker et al., 2007; Florackis and Ozkan, 2009). A 
method based on the principal component analysis helps to mitigate potential 
multicollinearity of individual factors further. 
The third limitation of Chapter 3 is that the methodology to validate the PSCORE is 
not based on exposed earnings manipulation. In this chapter, I use three types of 
measures for earnings quality, namely accrual earnings management, real earnings 
management, and deviations of the first digits from Benford’s Law. While previous 
studies document that models to estimate earnings management suffer some 
limitations such as misspecifications (Holthausen et al., 1995; Fields et al., 2001; 
Dechow et al., 2010; Ball, 2013), the use of Benford’s Law to capture deviations of 
first digits of financial statements as sources of biases do not differentiate deviations 
caused by fraudulent activities from those caused by errors (mistakes) in the 
accounting processes. Therefore, future research using a comprehensive sample of 
exposed earnings manipulations of UK listed companies to validate the PSCORE is 
invited. 
Turning on Chapter 4, which is about banking expertise of boards of directors and 
accounting conservatism, there are also some limitations. First, survival bias may exist 
in the research sample. Because I do not have access to a comprehensive database for 
information on boards of directors of all companies, I compile data on directors’ 
working history from different sources, which are not available for all companies in 
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the research sample. Dead companies are less likely to disclose information on the 
board of directors, thus observations with missing data may be deleted during the 
sample selection procedure. This bias may affect the results. Second, the study does 
not differentiate banking expertise provided by directors in different roles in firms or 
expertise gained by from different positions in banks. For example, because CEOs and 
CFOs have different roles in firms, the levels of banking expertise they contribute to 
the board may be different. Also, different positions in banks may provide individual 
directors with varying knowledge on insights how borrowing firms’ data are 
processed, thus they may bring different levels of expertise even when they have a 
similar working history. I, therefore, invite future research to examine how those 
concerns affect the relationship between accounting conservatism and banking 
expertise on the board. Third, there is a chance that the banking expertise on the board 
may be underestimated. As stated in the sample selection, I mainly rely on the lists of 
banks provided by the Bank of England to determine whether CEOs have working 
experience in the banking industry. Directors have worked for some banks, but the 
names of those banks are not listed on the lists. This bias may significantly affect the 
results when (i) not-on-the-list banks are big and working in those banks increase 
directors’ experience significantly, and (ii) a director’s experience in those banks boost 
the overall banking expertise of the board significantly. Although it is less likely that 
all two conditions are met simultaneously, further research to respond to this concern 
is invited. Similarly, future research should consider eliminating some companies on 
the list which are not primarily banks because some financial services firms might 
have a banking licence or a banking segment, although I expect that the number of 
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these companies is very small. Fourth, while the study employes recent methodologies 
to examine the relationships between accounting conservatism and banking expertise 
on the board, it is unlikely to mitigate all endogeneity issues. For example, there may 
be shocks in firms’ industry, or even in the banking industry, which cause human 
capital movement between corporations and banks, leading to changes in levels of 
banking expertise on the board. Similarly, the choice of directors with banking 
expertise may be the board’s preference, e.g. Renneboog and Zhao (2011) find that it 
is more likely that CEOs and directors have direct and indirect networks. For example, 
an appointment of a new CEO with banking expertise is more likely to bring more 
directors within his banking network on the board, leading to a significant increase in 
the overall banking expertise of the board but it is not necessarily related to changes 
in demand for accounting conservatism. Also, this is a source of measurement errors 
because directors in the same banking network tend to know the same things, thus 
having them all on board does not necessarily increase the board’s banking expertise. 
Future studies could consider those issues. 
Finally, Chapter 5 also have a significant limitation. As explained in the study, I mainly 
employ Datastream’s adjusted data, not “as reported” data, thus the findings should be 
interpreted with caution. While the discrepancy is not too worrying, it does suggest a 
potential problem, and I invite future research to address that more thoroughly. Next, 
while this chapter follows previous studies (Amiram et al., 2015) and uses the first 
digits of figures of financial statement items, I invite future studies to employ the 
second digits or the combined first and second digits. 
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